Khamenei's Annual Speech; Psychological Reaction to Personal Insecurity

The speech delivered by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on the first day of Farvardin 1398 (March 21, 2019) in Mashhad can be described as one of his angriest speeches in recent decades from the perspective of foreign policy. Khamenei referred to American leaders as 'first-class fools' as usual, described Western diplomats as having a 'savage essence', and labeled Europeans as 'traitors', 'malicious', and 'wicked' who 'stab from behind'. He declared the Saudi government as 'the worst government', 'corrupt', 'dictatorial', 'oppressive', and 'dependent'. He also called on the people to bear the 'cost' of sanctions, stating that sanctions are an opportunity, that some officials' views on relations with the West have changed, and that Iran's missile program will not become a 'pressure tool' and will not be negotiated to demonstrate a form of 'will' of inflexibility and resistance. His model of resistance has simple and delineable characteristics. His overarching plan is 'preventive'. His important goal is to create 'deterrence'. His preferred model is the 'missile program'. His solution is 'resilient economy'. The Supreme Leader stated that Iran has succeeded in the field of 'defense capabilities' based on the 'missile program', having moved from a 'bound' situation to one that does not require 'imports', and that Iran's 'precision-guided missiles' have become a 'strong fist' of the regime and a 'deterrent power' against 'enemy aggression'. He views Iran's movement in this area as an important consequence of the sanctions imposed during the Iran-Iraq war, claiming that these sanctions led to the growth of 'scientific and practical capabilities' and implemented such a model in the economic sphere to thwart the 'economic war'. To implement this, he mainly relies on 'resilient economy' centered on 'domestic production'. 'Economy' and 'resilient economy' have been the focus of naming in the last decade. In this context, this is the fourth time he has emphasized 'national production' in naming the years. He named 1391 (2012) as the year of 'national production, support for Iranian work and capital', in 1396 (2017) he stated the title of the year as 'resilient economy, production-employment', and in 1397 (2018) he declared it the year of 'support for Iranian goods'. In other words, for three consecutive years, the Supreme Leader has focused on 'domestic production' and 'Iranian goods' in naming the years. Khamenei's continued focus on the economy is a multi-purpose 'propaganda' that, in the eyes of the domestic public, presents the leader's main concern not as a power struggle and enemy fabrication, but as 'people's livelihood', increases political pressure on the government as the executing agent, and serves as a tool for countering the 'psychological war of the enemy'. His primary and specific audience in this regard is, of course, the IRGC and Basij. IRGC and Basij commanders stated last year that just as the 'front line' of the war was previously Syria, now the front line is domestic production. In a predictable situation, in the coming months, the most projects in agriculture, livestock, and conversion industries will be presented by the IRGC and its affiliated institutions in collaboration with the government. However, in reality and from the perspective of the private sector in Iran, alongside Khamenei's discussion, one of the most important subjects of Iran's economy has been 'bankruptcy of production units and factories'. For instance, in Esfand 1391 (February 2013), which was the year of 'national production', it was officially announced that during that year, '100,000' Iranian workers were laid off and eight out of ten production units were in crisis, with the employment rate in the industry and mining sector reaching minus 36 percent. It may be perceived that this is due to the performance of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government. However, a review of the news indicates that over the past six months, there have been warnings about the danger of a 'tsunami of bankruptcy of production units'. In a more detailed report, on Bahman 7, 1397 (January 27, 2019), Hamidreza Fooladgar, representative of the head of the special commission for supporting production in the parliament, stated that 'one-third of small economic enterprises are inactive and stagnant' and 'two-thirds of the remaining operate below capacity'. Therefore, if we base our assessment on the news and statistics announced by official authorities and evaluate the consequences of the slogans about domestic production in 1396 and 1397, we face a 'completely failed' experience that is beyond the control of the government. But why, despite public statistics, warnings from economic analysts, and more precise and confidential estimates about the state of domestic production in Iran in the last two years, does Khamenei not abandon his slogans and naming? A common speculation may relate to his understanding of the depth and importance of the existing 'threat'. Khamenei emphasized today that the most important priority and problem is 'economy'. He is aware of the complexity of security wars, regional threats, cultural and social problems, and internal political divisions in Iran, but he considers 'economic threat' as the most powerful element that can remove the tools and playing field from the control of the leaders of the Islamic Republic. Over the past twenty years, Khamenei has always faced 'insecurity of position' in domestic politics and the international arena, and the stronger this insecurity has become, and the more fear and threats have been directed at him, the stronger his 'psychological reaction' and increasingly public insistence have been to maintain a grand image of himself. From this perspective, in the midst of this complex and effective crisis, the continued focus on the economy is a multi-purpose 'propaganda' that presents the leader's main concern not as a power struggle and enemy fabrication, but as 'people's livelihood', increases political pressure on the government as the executing agent, and serves as a tool for countering the 'psychological war of the enemy'. In fact, the Supreme Leader has no practical and effective solutions based on available infrastructure and capabilities that can solve the crisis or keep the game under his control from the perspective of economic science and statistics, but he has a specific personal advertising program. This is a simple technique that many use even in minor and daily matters. It does not matter what the outcome of the challenge or dispute will be, who will be the losers or harmed, how accessible and practical your solutions are, what matters is that your image as a wise, dominant, powerful, compassionate, or any positive attribute you wish to be remembered by remains intact. This is a 'selfish' desire but likely satisfying. Many of you know that a selfish person has many 'fulfilled wishes' that cause insecurity in their mind and feelings, and they constantly move to control this insecurity and have multiple 'psychological reactions'. With this introduction, to understand the strange insistence of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic on repetitive and ineffective slogans, the issue should be evaluated from the perspective of a 'psychological reaction', not a 'political program' or 'economic concern'. Khamenei has always faced 'insecurity of position' in domestic politics and the international arena over the past twenty years, and the stronger this insecurity has become, and the more fear and threats have been directed at him, the stronger his 'psychological reaction' and increasingly public insistence have been to maintain a grand image of himself. This insistence has turned his annual speech, which should typically be a grand strategy in policymaking and execution, into an emotional, repetitive, and trivial speech that even makes producing and constructing advertising programs about it difficult.