Khamenei's Full Resistance Against Change

Mr. Khamenei's speech indicated that although he accepted the election results legally, he is resisting them in reality and has decided to stand firmly against the vote and desire of the majority of the people by ignoring their voices. He unequivocally supported the Guardian Council and the elimination of candidates, attacking its critics, two of whom were sitting next to him (Rohani and Hashemi). Contrary to the clear vote of the people in removing Mohammad Yazdi and Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, he openly supported them and considered their removal and, in fact, the people's vote as a loss (to the Assembly of Experts). He harshly attacked the leaders of the Green Movement, calling them 'ungrateful' and responded negatively to their participatory actions in the recent elections. This means there is no hope for lifting their house arrest without their repentance. He openly and almost angrily dismissed the achievements of the JCPOA attributed to the government, stating that despite all the foreign visits, no real change has occurred in the economy. He also reaffirmed all his previous views regarding the enemy, infiltration, and the notion that the world is not just the West and Europe. The paradox lies in how one can speak of people's trust in the system while considering the content and direction of their vote as a 'loss.' This loss is nothing but a vote of protest and distrust from the people towards certain symbols of the system, centered around Mr. Khamenei's person and policies. By claiming a loss inflicted by the people's vote, the Supreme Leader inadvertently undermined his own claim regarding the people's trust in the system. Another noteworthy aspect of Mr. Khamenei's rhetoric is his use of military terminology in almost all non-military issues. He, who once referred to professors and students as commanders and troops of soft warfare, emphasized in this speech that a 'headquarters' would be established to advance resilient economy, and a 'command' would also be appointed for it! It seems Mr. Khamenei has forgotten the significant lesson of boldness in the nuclear dossier that led to heroic flexibility; one cannot command the economy! Two other minor points were noteworthy during this speech: one was that Mr. Khamenei warned that the religious sensitivities of Sunni Muslims should be respected during Fatimiyya mourning ceremonies to avoid creating resentment and hatred, which is desired by enemies. This approach could slightly reduce the flames of religious extremism in this specific area, which has found a thriving market concerning issues surrounding Fatima to stoke the fires of religious biases and sell their material and spiritual goods. Recently, flags and banners severely anti-Sunni regarding the usurpation of the Fadak garden and the manner of Fatima's death have been commercial advertisements in virtual spaces and channels! The other point was that while strongly supporting the Guardian Council, the Supreme Leader deemed the supervisory oversight to require legal reforms for more time and accuracy in the council's performance. This position opens a path that, although currently due to the imbalanced power dynamics at high levels, reviewing these rules will lead to stricter enforcement of this illegal act, it may, in better conditions, open a window for reform and control. In any case, Mr. Khamenei's remarks indicated his direction in the post-election conditions and clarified that he has a stance similar to his approach in the post-JCPOA situation: it must revolve on the old axis. This means that Rohani's government still faces a solid barrier and the main obstacle of the power establishment in domestic policy. Rohani has been talking about a JCPOA 2 for some time. A careful examination of the language and content analysis of the issues he addresses shows that in the JCPOA 2 proposal, contrary to some perceptions that see it as a matter related to laws and citizens' rights and changing the security atmosphere to political, he does not have such an intention and at least does not express such a purpose in his words. Everywhere the JCPOA 2 is mentioned, it refers to the economic domain and emphasizes that to build the country's future, all factions must come together to achieve economic growth and development. In these remarks, there is no mention of citizens' rights and legal adherence regarding critics and opponents, and possibly lifting the house arrest of the Green Movement leaders and the freedom of political and ideological prisoners and the press. However, despite the Supreme Leader's full opposition to the content and direction of the people's vote, the next parliament is more aligned and cooperative with Rohani's government than the ninth parliament. Hassan Rohani cannot count on the help and cooperation of the top political hierarchy in many domestic areas to fulfill his unfulfilled promises, especially since the direction and tone of the system's leader increasingly resemble the rhetoric of the opposition party leader, who aims to belittle achievements, raise expectations, and exaggerate mistakes. However, the President will have a more cooperative parliament ahead. A parliament that can change some weak or misaligned ministers to realize some of the unfulfilled slogans and replace them with new individuals. A parliament that can, in its 90th commission, which could hypothetically see a more diligent and courageous figure like Ali Motahari at its helm, serve as another reference for pursuing complaints regarding law violations related to freedom of expression and the press and similar issues, or even pursue the issue of lifting house arrests, at least to keep the topic alive in the political atmosphere of the country and the public opinion. Some parliamentary commissions can also, unlike before, engage in cooperation and strengthening ministers instead of obstructing them. The structural duality of the Leader/President has led to almost continuous challenges and conflicts between the President and the Leader since the revolution. Can Hassan Rohani step out of the closed and almost ineffective previous models (the two models of Banisadr and Ahmadinejad that led to conflict or struggle and the two models of Khatami and Rafsanjani that could not or did not want to go beyond the Leader's will)? This requires an initial determination for this task. Does Hassan Rohani's political doctrine and behavioral patterns possess this determination? It seems that in cases where it touches upon the sensitivities of the system's leader, despite sometimes having a strong and explicit initial stance, he retreats in practice (as in the latest example regarding supervisory oversight). This pattern resembles Mohammad Khatami's model. The difference between Rohani and Khatami is that Khatami had an independent social base to rely on, whereas Rohani's base of support is very weak due to his personal popularity. Thus, if he does not have powerful political allies supporting him, he cannot count on a solid social base and voting support. Therefore, if Rohani wants to satisfy his political supporters or win the hearts of voters, especially when Khatami, the moderate, is urging him in both of his statements after the elections to fulfill 'his other promises' and 'all his promises,' he must achieve results in this regard. The period after the JCPOA and the elections is also a rapid period for Hassan Rohani towards the end of his four-year presidency. He must be able to, in a relatively confrontational/interactive relationship with the Leader as the main obstacle to fulfilling his domestic promises, implement some of them. Can he provide a new definition and model of the strategic and crucial issue of 'the relationship between the President and the Leader' in Iran and gain satisfactory concessions for his voting base? This is the biggest challenge for the President's domestic policy in the post-JCPOA/post-election era.