Khamenei's Reaction and the Paradox of January

Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, reacted to the protests of January during a meeting with a group of people in Qom on the anniversary of the 9th of Dey, attempting to declare the matter resolved while simultaneously outlining a vision for the regime to overcome this crisis. However, his remarks, suffering from a lack of coherence and being overly rhetorical, reveal a clear paradox in the historical events that occurred in January in contemporary Iranian history. While he celebrated the event of 19th of Dey 1356 (1978), the events of January 1396 (2018) opened a completely opposite path in the political arena of Iran. This path not only neutralized the government's propaganda in commemorating the government movement of 9th of Dey but fundamentally challenged the existence of the regime that arose from the February 57 revolution. In Qom, which is considered the main base of the regime in Iran, a significantly larger crowd than 40 years ago gathered, chanting the most radical slogans against the regime and Khamenei himself, and expressed unprecedented anger and dissatisfaction towards the clergy as a whole. As expected, the leadership of the Islamic Republic followed a stereotypical approach, attributing the main source of the protests to a Hebrew-Western-Arab triangle, attacking the U.S. government, and discrediting Israeli and Saudi officials to cover up the protests. The outcome of Khamenei's remarks, in line with the regime's heavy security and judicial responses to the protesters and the application of the usual iron fist model in dealing with unrest, strengthens the hypothesis that at least the dominant part of power has put forgetfulness on the agenda and does not intend to change its governance style or show flexibility towards the protesters' demands. This same approach is also observable in the reactions of Rouhani's government. Leaders from both factions, by providing false addresses, attempt to deny and overlook the main message of the protests. Khamenei, similar to the protests of 2009, tries to manage the space by distinguishing between protesters, but this psychological tactic, which is more of a strategy to calm angry people, does not take into account the fundamental nature of the protests. The outcome of Khamenei's remarks, aligned with the regime's heavy security and judicial responses to the protesters and the application of the usual iron fist model in dealing with unrest, strengthens the hypothesis that at least the dominant part of power has put forgetfulness on the agenda and does not intend to change its governance style or show flexibility towards the protesters' demands. The nationwide protests of 2018, which are unlikely to subside and have a different nature from previous protests, cannot be reduced to Khamenei's intended dichotomy of 'chaos - legitimate economic protest.' Content analysis of videos and field reports of simultaneous protests in 82 cities in Iran highlights the undeniable reality that the common and widespread demand in the protests is for a change in the power structure. Those who have taken to the streets, although the predominant motivation for many of them is economic problems, have become politicized, and their main demand is now political change. The nature of their street marches is different from past protests by the financially distressed and unpaid workers. In 2018, there were nearly 1,000 scattered protests across the country, where economic dissidents and desperate individuals gathered in front of government institutions demanding solutions to their problems. However, street protests and chanting slogans, although related to the aforementioned gatherings, represent a different stage. In fact, the protesters, disillusioned with existing mechanisms and institutions and frustrated by Rouhani's promises, have taken to the streets and politicized their economic demands. They have rightly realized that fulfilling their economic expectations requires a fundamental transformation in the current political situation. This characteristic is general and cannot be separated from the protest movement. January 2018 brought new classes into political struggles in Iran, whose activism is rooted in their objective daily life needs and is a product of basic livelihood requirements. The convergence of these forces' political activism alongside the middle class and those who seek political, cultural, and social changes from the perspective of secondary needs has deepened the legitimacy and acceptability crisis of the government and seriously threatens the regime's survival. The destruction and violent acts on the fringes of these protests were noteworthy. Regardless of whether these concerning and unacceptable events were natural or the product of controlling measures by the security apparatus, they were ultimately a reaction to the continuous and structural violation of the rights of the people and the deprivation of the freedom of assembly, the non-recognition of protests, and the violent and repressive behavior of the government. Reducing protests to chaos and unrest and preparing the ground to legitimize authoritarian responses and expand the police space has no capacity to solve the problem and will at most serve as a temporary remedy for the political system and both of its factions. For the first time, Khamenei emphasized not the usual 'sedition' but framed his intended dichotomy for engineering the space in terms of 'nation vs. anti-nation,' 'Iran vs. anti-Iran,' and 'Islam vs. anti-Islam.' He hopes that through this, beyond the social base of Islamic fundamentalists and principlists, he can rally reformist forces and some opposition groups concerned about instability in Iran, as well as part of the country's religious community and clergymen frightened by the people's anger, to his side and mobilize them to contain a new wave of political struggles in society. In this context, he also counts on attracting a tendency of extreme Iranian nationalists and conservative reformists who pursue an authoritarian development model. However, relying on these manipulations, which the regime has had some success in applying this model domestically and in Syria, is unlikely to be effective. The crowd that took to the streets is a group of the Iranian people, and a significant part of their motivations is to protect the country from increasing dangers. Khamenei's false dichotomy has split society within the framework of authoritarianism, negating the solidarity of Iranians and reducing Iran to the Islamic Republic and the regime to the Supreme Leader, jeopardizing the existence of Iran. Therefore, attention to Iran has made the leadership vulnerable, and contrary to his expectations, hostility towards Iran is directed at him, especially since in the overarching narrative of the Islamic Republic and particularly the institution of the Supreme Leader, Iran and Iranian identity have no relevance, and the discourse of Shiite Islamic fundamentalism is its focal point. The model of political tyranny and individual rule that Khamenei has imposed on the country over the past four decades has ignored the Iranian people and structurally threatened the unity of Iranian society, disrupting the nation-building process. The recent protest movement clarified that this understanding is not limited to the elite level; the masses have also felt and realized it. The main reason for the widespread targeting of Khamenei in the protests and the calls for his resignation stems from this shared perception. For a significant part of society, the main source of the country's problems is Khamenei himself and the institution of the Supreme Leader. In the recent protests, although the clergy was the target of widespread attacks, contrary to the government's propaganda, anti-religious signs were not observed in the movement. Of course, the protest movement did not have a religious characteristic, but it was not contradictory to it either. The slogans had a supra-religious nature and were more based on the discourse of secularism in the sense of the institutional separation of religion and state. The slogan 'You have made Islam a staircase, and the nation a burden' that was widely raised clearly indicates that the protesters have a problem with the instrumental use of religion for power-seeking purposes, not with the existence and foundation of Islam. In this context, the relatively high number of women in hijabs at the protests is also noteworthy and indicates the diversity of the protesters' composition in terms of ideological inclinations. Therefore, this trick of Khamenei also has no chance of success given the widespread dissatisfaction in the religious community and the growing trend of distancing from politics in religious seminaries. Khamenei's insulting approach towards the protesters and attributing them to 'evil-doers' has also increased the scope of anger and rebellion among the dissatisfied segments of society and deepened the rift between the leadership and the nation. A new aspect of Khamenei's positioning was his acceptance of responsibility for the existing problems for the first time. Until now, he always spoke from the perspective of a complainant and opposition towards the societal issues. However, now, in light of the intensifying political crisis, aiming to create cohesion within the power bloc and prevent the escalation of factional rivalries and bargaining in the emerging social tensions, he wants to convince all system officials to form a united front by acknowledging collective errors regarding the threats. He has rightly realized that disintegration within the power bloc and the escalation of political disputes within the regime, which does not reflect competition within a unified entity, has made the regime vulnerable and practically rendered significant actions impossible. However, his previous failures in claiming unity and adopting a unified stance against the movements he calls enemies raise serious doubts about whether he can establish maximum cohesion within the regime this time as well. Naturally, the more the likelihood of the emergence of a disruptive protest movement increases, the more the cohesion of both factions of the regime and their subordinates will increase. However, the intensity and scope of tensions and conflicting interests pose insurmountable obstacles to unity and convergence, and at most, one can expect that political currents defending the regime will temporarily and unsustainably come together, only to see divergences re-emerge. The distribution of power by Khamenei and the imposed balance of power from the institution of the Supreme Leader have not had the capacity to convince the majority of officials. This factor, alongside the confrontation between old and new forces and the lack of effective mechanisms for resolving disputes, does not paint a promising picture for solving the crisis of efficiency and cohesion within the regime. Khamenei also reacted to the international and regional aspects of the protests, challenging the confrontational and enemy-centered paradigm of foreign policy. Khamenei's defense of regional expansionism, which was wrapped in the concept of 'national power,' indicates that contrary to his portrayal, the movement has had such strength in challenging the government's policies in Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestine-Israel conflict that it has placed him in a defensive position. His threats regarding the U.S. government also pose significant risks for the Islamic Republic, and as a result, it is unlikely to go beyond mere rhetoric. Therefore, the outcome of Khamenei's remarks not only does not demonstrate the regime's authority and its ability to overcome the current crisis, but it also pushes the protesting forces further towards despair regarding the power structure, increasing motivations for protest and struggle. The final message conveyed by his remarks to society was not the regime's reliance on the people, but rather the regime's failure to learn from its mistakes and the continuation of the structural gap between the government and the nation, which insists on continuing its erroneous policies and has no intention of reconciling with the Iranian people. Khamenei's positioning and his maneuvering on organized marches in defense of the regime against spontaneous popular protests even reveal a kind of instability and helplessness, raising a serious question as to why a regime that claims to have popular support has had to hastily bring its supportive base to the streets in the face of those it considers foreign agents and influenced by 'fleeing trash' and reliant on the financial resources of the 'wealthy regional government.' Overall, Khamenei's remarks not only lack effective capacity to solve and contain the crisis but also legitimize street protests further and at least in the medium term strengthen them.