Khamenei's Reaction to Assad's Fall; A 'Great Fighter' Whose Name He Did Not Mention

Finally, four days after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, the leader of the Islamic Republic emerged from the shock of this event and described the 'Resistance Front,' constructed by the Islamic Republic, as resilient and victorious as always. Ali Khamenei, in explaining recent developments, employed the same clichés about internal and external crises and linked everything to a conspiracy by the United States and Israel. He had previously praised Bashar al-Assad multiple times, stating, 'Mr. Bashar al-Assad appeared as a great fighter,' but in his speech today about Syria, he did not mention his name even once. In recent days, some government figures attempted to suggest that Assad's fall was unrelated to the 'Resistance Front'; for instance, Mohammad Javad Zarif wrote in an Instagram post: 'The Resistance was neither created by Iran nor is its continuation dependent on Iran.' Khamenei stated that Assad's fall was a 'joint plan' of the U.S. and Israel with the help of a neighboring country. Khamenei's analysis contained the point that the weakness and renewed shocks to Assad's regime began when the militia force organized by Qassem Soleimani in Syria was disbanded and Iranian forces were asked to leave: 'In Syria, Martyr Soleimani trained, armed, organized, and prepared a group of several thousand of their own youth, and they stood firm. Later, unfortunately, some of the military officials of that country created problems, which were beneficial to themselves, and unfortunately, they disregarded it.' These actions, of course, date back to the very beginning of the civil war in Syria in 2011, when there was still no sign of ISIS in Syria. Nevertheless, Khamenei in his speech attempted to conflate issues and relate the presence of Soleimani and the Quds Force in Syria to ISIS and 'defending sacred sites': 'ISIS meant to make Iraq insecure, make Syria insecure, make the region insecure, and then come to the main point and ultimate goal, which is the Islamic Republic of Iran.' This is while even official narratives in Iran and Syria indicate that the presence of the Islamic Republic and its forces, commanded by Hossein Hamadani, who played a key role in suppressing the 2009 election protests, began from the very start of the conflict between Assad's government and the opposition in 2011; that is, fundamentally before the emergence of ISIS. Khamenei, while trying to convey power, stated that 'the enemy has dominated everything': 'In recent weeks, (the officials of the IRGC) told me that all the resources needed for the Syrians today have been prepared. We are ready to go. The skies were closed, the ground was closed, the Zionist regime and the U.S. closed the skies of Syria, and closed the ground routes; it was impossible.' He did not mention that the repeated Israeli attacks on Syria, which have targeted the positions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic and Hezbollah for almost a decade, have mainly been related to Tehran's perception of this country as an element 'in the Resistance Front' and in helping to besiege the 'Zionist enemy.' Khamenei has never hidden the heavy weight of Bashar al-Assad's Syria in the 'strategic depth and Resistance Front' of the Islamic Republic. He reiterated this perception again in late June of this year: 'The Westerners and their followers in the region intended to overthrow the political system of this country with the war they launched against Syria and to eliminate Syria from regional equations, but they failed... Everyone should observe the special privilege of the Syrian government, namely resistance, before their eyes.' The Hamas attack on October 7 last year allowed Israel to have a freer hand in crushing all those parts that Khamenei has introduced as powerful components of the 'Resistance Front.' Heavy blows were dealt to this front, and the extent of Israel's dominance and threat over the routes and airports of Lebanon and Syria also expanded. In other words, the policies that the Islamic Republic and the elements of the 'Resistance Front' pursued in the region, including the October 7 attack by Hamas on Israel, which received full support from the Islamic Republic, not only did not help the Palestinian cause and end the Israeli occupation but also resulted in greater catastrophe for these people. Subsequently, Israel's response to Hezbollah's rocket fire in support of Hamas led to horrific Israeli attacks on Lebanon; attacks in which Hezbollah, as the most powerful element of the Islamic Republic's 'Resistance Front,' suffered heavy blows, ultimately paving the way for the fall of Assad's regime, as another pillar of the 'front.' Khamenei's speech followed the same old pattern; that is, linking everything entirely to the conspiracy of enemies and that there should still be a slogan of resistance and no doubt in the policies and approaches of the government. This old and damaging pattern of Khamenei for national interests and benefits is repeated in almost the same words and phrases in all internal and external crises. The last heavy internal crisis in Iran was also subject to this same assessment by Khamenei. In explaining the unprecedented 'Women, Life, Freedom' protests, he stated: 'Pay attention! The design of these disturbances last autumn was carried out in the think tanks of Western countries. It was designed there. A comprehensive design was made; design in Western think tanks, financial, media, and arms support by Western security apparatuses. They supported it.' In his recent speech, he again used the same words and expressions to analyze the fall of Assad's regime: 'There should be no doubt that what has happened in Syria is the result of a joint American and Zionist plan. Yes, a neighboring government of Syria (Turkey) plays a clear role in this regard and has played it, and is still playing it - everyone sees this - but the main conspirator and the main planner and the main command room is in America and the Zionist regime. We have indications.' Just as Khamenei has not provided any evidence or proof regarding the direct involvement of the U.S. and Israel in the fall of Assad's regime, he has not provided any evidence regarding the 'indications' related to this matter. The Islamic Republic's basis in confronting internal crises, based on Khamenei's teachings, is based on the least official retreat and the continuation of the policy of 'victory through fear and terror' (al-nasr bil-ra'b) and repression. This policy, at present, is implemented with a confrontation combined with force and threats against the demands of society, within frameworks such as the 'Hijab and Chastity Law' and the continuation of filtering practices, and of course, day by day, it becomes less effective due to the political and civil resistance of society. Mehdi Karroubi, a protester against the 2009 election results who is still under house arrest, noted in a letter to Khamenei during the heat of the 2021 protest movement that the failure of the government's policy was such that: 'The theory of al-nasr bil-ra'b against this nation, worn out by oppression, humiliation, discrimination, and corruption, is no longer effective.' In the realm of foreign policy, the Islamic Republic has responded to increasing pressures in the nuclear file with actions such as further enrichment and threats to revise its nuclear doctrine; a response that is taken less seriously day by day and this aspect of the Islamic Republic's policy also creates further crises for Iran's national interests and benefits. For a large part of Iranian society, the incompatibility of the Islamic Republic's regional policy and 'Resistance Front' with the interests and benefits of the country is completely clear, and opposition to it has been expressed in various forms. Therefore, Khamenei's recent speech, more than being able to change the mindset of the majority of society, was aimed at alleviating doubts and questions that have arisen in the minds of various ranks of the IRGC and Basij and closer circles to the hard core of power and also among aligned and proxy forces in Iraq and Yemen. One can imagine that many of them, with the blows dealt to a large part of the 'Resistance Front,' may ask what all the costs and sacrifices for this front have resulted in, and whether today Iran's security and economy are more vulnerable than ever. In this intervention in the Syrian affair, according to the head of the Martyrs Foundation, 7,300 members of the IRGC and Basij or Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun forces were killed; a figure that may be higher than the actual number. The official debt of the overthrown Syrian government to Iran is also estimated to be between 20 to 30 billion dollars; a figure that does not include many other costs related to the presence of Iranian forces in this country and military aid. Ironically, despite the 'service' of the Islamic Republic to Assad's regime, it was never allowed to have extensive activities in the markets and investment projects in Syria, and Iran's share in the five billion dollar Syrian market, which remained under Turkish control, did not exceed 50 million dollars. What will happen to Syria after Bashar al-Assad? Questions that went unanswered and the threat to critics and questioners. Khamenei in his speech did not have a specific answer to the aforementioned questions and only, as always, promised that the resistance would emerge from the blows more resilient with the phrase: 'I tell you, by the grace of God, the extent of the resistance will cover the entire region more than before.' He called the opponents of Assad's regime in Syria an 'occupying' movement and promised that 'the areas occupied in Syria will be liberated by the valiant Syrian youth; do not doubt that this will happen.' Khamenei continued with statements that showed he himself was not sure whether his words would have an impact or be believable to anyone. In this regard, he called the increasing critics of the Islamic Republic's regional policy inside as those who empty the hearts of the people, are 'criminals,' and 'must be prosecuted.' This approach is apparently supposed to have practical consequences as well. Hours before Khamenei's speech, Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, the head of the Supreme Court, stated: 'We will definitely deal severely with those who pour water on the enemy's mill in cyberspace and falsely seek to propagate the enemy's power.' It is unlikely that this threat will have an effect and lead to a reduction in attacks by critics and opponents against Khamenei's stubbornness in pursuing his regional and international policies against Iran's interests. The opposite is likely to occur, and the extent of doubt, questions, and erosion within the loyal base of the government will not cease. The overlooked role of Russia. Ali Khamenei made no mention of Russia's role in recent developments. Unlike the Islamic Republic, which, for the reasons stated by Khamenei, could not prevent the fall of Assad's regime, Russia did not have such obstacles. However, its involvement in the Ukraine war and possibly some behind-the-scenes agreements necessitated that it not take fundamental action to save Assad's regime. This trend is not without concern for Tehran, as it may be repeated in a crisis situation for the Islamic Republic as well. Based on initial evidence, one can imagine that if the transitional situation in Syria, composed of various ethnicities and interests, progresses in an orderly manner and internal tensions and external conflicting interests in the post-Assad era do not turn into a situation of war and conflict, the damage and loss for Russia from Assad's fall will not be as much as for the Islamic Republic, and the relationship between Moscow and Damascus will remain at a normal and acceptable level. Perhaps this assessment has caused the Islamic Republic to be displeased with 'Moscow's insufficient efforts' to save Assad. However, Khamenei, given the lack of balance in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy and the continued need for Russia in the international arena, preferred to attack all parties involved and uninvolved in the Syrian affair but did not utter a word about Russia. Overall, the speech of the leader of the Islamic Republic after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime can be reminiscent of the saying 'whistling in the dark of the night,' which is unlikely to satisfy even the most faithful forces. If this speech continues to remain the guiding principle of the Islamic Republic's actions in the region and the world, it will serve as a basis for increasing pressures and the vulnerability of Iran's security and economy.