Kimball: There Are Still Disagreements Regarding Sanctions Relief

While Iranian and American negotiators continue high-level diplomatic discussions on nuclear issues in Montreux, Switzerland, there is little time left for them to reach a political understanding. The latest round of negotiations in Geneva has reportedly seen progress, according to negotiators. However, it remains unclear whether this progress will lead to an agreement on the framework of a comprehensive deal by March 31. For this reason, Radio Farda has spoken with Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association in the U.S. Kimball believes that Iran and the P5+1 can reach a framework for a comprehensive agreement by the end of March, with a likelihood greater than 50-50. Over the past year, both sides have made significant progress on many important issues regarding the nuclear program and sanctions relief. However, the comprehensive agreement is very complex and involves many technical issues, requiring substantial work, and both sides must make final decisions on several remaining issues. Iran and the P5+1 had another deadline in November that they failed to meet. It is unclear what challenges they faced then, but it seems they could not agree on a formula to limit Iran's uranium enrichment capacity during the agreement. There were also issues regarding the pace and outlook for sanctions relief, and the duration of the comprehensive agreement was another obstacle. Recently, significant progress has been made regarding enrichment capacity, but there are still disagreements on sanctions relief, and work continues on the complex technical aspects of limiting the research and development of advanced centrifuges during the agreement period. The negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 are taking place while Iran is also engaged in discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On Monday, at the beginning of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, Yukiya Amano urged Iran to respond to the agency's questions as soon as possible, stating that non-cooperation is not a solution. Kimball suggests that Iran may be waiting for the outcome of its discussions with the P5+1 before continuing its cooperation with the IAEA. He emphasizes that Iran's nuclear facilities are under the agency's supervision, and Iran is cooperating in this regard. Amano's comments refer to Iran's actions over the past decade, which could have military dimensions. Iran and the IAEA developed a cooperation program in November 2013, where Iran was to respond to these questions, but there has been limited progress over the past year, and Iran has not provided necessary responses on some key issues. Consequently, Amano has repeatedly requested more prompt and extensive cooperation from Iran on these matters. However, it is clear that Iran will not take action in this regard until it reaches an agreement with the six countries and sees a prospect for the suspension and lifting of sanctions. It is also clear that until these investigations are completed, Iran will not see the lifting of the heavy sanctions it seeks. The agency has indicated that these investigations may take a year or more. Therefore, these two negotiations are interconnected and proceed in parallel, with the resolution and completion of these investigations depending on the timing of the step-by-step agreement that can be reached between Iran and the P5+1. Kimball does not believe there is a risk that if the parties fail to reach a comprehensive agreement, Iran's cooperation with the IAEA will face difficulties, or that Iran will withdraw from the NPT. He suggests that at least in the short term, this will not happen, but in the long term, it depends on future developments. The reality is that if an agreement is not reached in the coming weeks and months, new sanctions will be imposed on Iran, and Iran's nuclear program will continue to advance. In this scenario, one of the actions Iran might take is to increase its enrichment percentage from five percent to twenty percent or more, which could be used in weapon production. Iran will also activate more centrifuges, which means the time it needs to produce weapons will decrease. However, it is unclear how Iran will respond to the agency. It is evident that the situation will worsen rather than improve, and it is highly unlikely that Iran will cooperate with the agency regarding past activities. Therefore, it is in the interest of all parties to make necessary decisions in the remaining time and to compromise on some of their positions to achieve a win-win outcome.