Kimbel: Reactor Fuel Supply is Part of the Solution

Multiple technical aspects have been cited as one of the reasons for the prolonged negotiations between Iran and the six countries. About 10 years ago, when Iran was negotiating with three European countries, its nuclear program was much more limited than today. Today, not only has the number of Iran's active centrifuges been reported to be around 9,000, but facilities such as the Arak heavy water plant, Natanz, and the underground facility at Fordow are also part of the equation. To achieve a comprehensive and final agreement between Iran and the six countries, analysts have suggested various paths to the negotiators. Some believe that Iran's nuclear program should be severely limited, while others, like Israel and some American lawmakers, argue that it should be completely dismantled. Another group of observers takes a more moderate approach and believes that by imposing restrictions on Tehran's nuclear program, steps can be taken towards verification. Regarding the technical aspects that are currently challenging and the prospects for reaching a comprehensive agreement, Radio Farda spoke with Darryl Kimball, who has been the executive director of the Arms Control Association in the U.S. since 2001. The Arms Control Association is a private, non-profit organization that informs about issues related to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This organization has published numerous reports on strategies to achieve a comprehensive and final agreement. Mr. Kimball, before we delve into the technical issues of this file, I wanted to ask you about the role of politics in these negotiations. Yukiya Amano, the director-general of the agency, also referred to this issue in recent weeks, stating that politics plays an important role in this matter. What is your opinion on this? If I'm not mistaken, Mr. Amano was speaking in response to a question about the potentially military aspects of Iran's nuclear program. Overall, my view is that the negotiations between Iran and the 5+1 are highly political and not just technical discussions about the practical needs of Iran's nuclear program. Judgments about such technical issues are intertwined with political perceptions. This is a very complex negotiation and one of the most complicated negotiations regarding the nuclear issue that I can recall because there are multiple issues that need to be resolved, and there are seven negotiating parties, and the political situation in the capitals of these countries is also complex. Therefore, politics is certainly part of the equation. Let's get straight to the complex issues. I want to start with the issue of uranium enrichment, which is considered one of the most challenging topics. We do not have enough information about the problematic nature of this issue, but the negotiators themselves have acknowledged this and say that this issue remains unresolved. Please explain why there is so much focus on this issue? First, I must say that in the years that both sides have negotiated about Iran's nuclear program, significant progress has been made on many issues that many believed would be impossible to resolve a year ago. For example, how to take actions that would prevent the Arak heavy water facility from being on the path to weapon production by reducing the level of plutonium production. But it is true. The uranium enrichment program has been one of the most difficult topics, and if they can resolve it, this will likely be one of the last issues they agree on. The reason for this is that this program can be used to produce low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel and electricity generation, but it can also be used to produce uranium that is enriched to a higher percentage for weapon production. Iran currently has 20,000 installed centrifuges, about half of which are active. These are centrifuges with a more basic design that are not highly efficient. However, in theory, this design could give Iran the capability to enrich at a weapon-grade level. One of the goals of the 5+1 is to reduce the amount of enriched uranium in Iran so that the country cannot take a large shipment of enriched uranium towards weapon production. However, on the other hand, Iran claims that it is its legitimate right to have a peaceful nuclear program and needs more centrifuges to produce uranium at a lower enrichment level for the reactors it is planning to build. But the 5+1 argues that this level of enrichment does not match Iran's practical needs because sufficient reactors to fuel them have not yet been built, and Iran does not have the technology to produce fuel from enriched uranium. As a result, both sides are looking for a solution in this area. I think it is necessary for Iran to agree to reduce the number of its installed and active centrifuges, as well as its enriched uranium levels for a few years, because in theory, this would reduce the country's capability to produce weapons and would require more time to produce weapons. Additionally, during this time, there will be sufficient oversight to prevent clandestine weapon production. Meanwhile, the Iranians must ensure that they will receive fuel during this period. On November 11, Iran and Russia agreed that Russia would build two new power reactors in Iran and also supply the fuel for these reactors. I think this is very important because it shows that Iran can receive reactor fuel from other countries for electricity generation and does not need to have an extensive program for enrichment and fuel production. Is this interpreted as a change in approach from Iran? I cannot say it is a change in approach or position. Iran has always emphasized that it wants to have the capability to meet its practical needs. One of these issues is that Iran should be able to produce fuel for its reactors. However, the agreement with Russia may indicate that there is a fuel supplier like Russia, and I believe that by reducing the level of enrichment to half of what is currently being done, this could help achieve a comprehensive solution. Previously, the leader of Iran set red lines for the negotiators, one of which was the capability of 190,000 SWU in Iran. Do you think the new agreement with Russia is in line with such a red line or contrary to it? I think it is in line with the red lines. It seems important to correctly understand the precise concept of what the leader of Iran meant by practical needs. The practical needs that were mentioned to him, which we have heard about before, are that if Iran completes the reactors it hopes to build in the next 15 to 20 years, it will need more higher-efficiency centrifuges in the coming years. To produce 190,000 SWU, about 120,000 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges are needed. Therefore, one way to supply fuel for the reactors is for Russia to produce this fuel for several years, and it seems that this is part of the solution that Iran and the P5+1 are moving towards. The mid-term practical need for nuclear fuel is currently related to the existing reactor in Bushehr. Therefore, the figure that the leader of Iran mentioned is directly related to the needs of Bushehr in about 10 years. Mr. Kimball, Iran is negotiating with six global powers while also engaging in discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although these negotiations are held separately, they impact the process of the 5+1 negotiations with Iran. In recent weeks, several reports have emerged regarding Iran's cooperation with the agency. How do you assess this cooperation, and to what extent do you see this as a challenge in the 5+1 negotiations with Iran? Yes, one of the important issues in a potential final resolution will be that Iran and the 5+1 agree on a broader monitoring system compared to today, particularly including inspections of locations that Iran has not officially identified in connection with its nuclear program. The reason for this is to confirm that Iran does not have a clandestine program underway. Therefore, I believe both sides understand that this must be part of the final solution. The issue aside from this discussion is the agency's investigations into activities that are believed to have been carried out by Iran in the past (about 10 years ago) that may have military dimensions. Iran has not fully cooperated with the agency in this regard over the years until last year when both sides agreed on a cooperation program to address the agency's questions. Iran has cooperated and responded to some questions, but not all of them. I believe such investigations will not conclude by the third of Azar, and the agency needs time to obtain answers to its questions and confirm that Iran is not continuing these past actions. The agency certainly cannot definitively find answers to all questions regarding past actions, but it continues its investigations. As long as the agency does not reach a complete conclusion on this matter, it is unlikely that the international community will lift all sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program. Therefore, if the parties reach a comprehensive and final agreement, I believe this will be an important incentive for Iran to continue its cooperation with the agency in a way that allows this body to reach a final conclusion; a final conclusion that I hope will be that the agency states it is confident that Iran is not engaging in actions aimed at acquiring information for weapon production. How do you see the prospects of reaching an agreement by the third of Azar? Is it possible to achieve a comprehensive and final agreement? I believe an agreement is achievable. I do not have direct access to what is happening at the negotiation table, but what is clear is that progress has been made in some areas, and the parties are working hard to resolve a few remaining issues. What is likely to happen is that the parties will agree on the main issues and solutions for them but will say that they need more time, for example, a few weeks, to reach conclusions on the technical aspects of each of these issues for implementation. However, if both sides emphasize reaching an agreement, if the leader of Iran makes the right decisions and shows enough flexibility, I believe it is possible to achieve a comprehensive agreement that is a win-win outcome. An agreement that will take several years and will lead to the lifting of sanctions that have severely impacted Iran and will also address the international community's concerns about the nature of Iran's nuclear program. You mentioned several years. As a final question, regarding this challenging issue, I wanted to ask what you think is a reasonable number for the duration of this agreement? Answering this question is difficult. My guess for this timeframe is between 10 to 15 years. However, this timeframe includes multiple phases during which each party must take actions. Therefore, during this time, significant deadlines will be set, and limitations for short-term, mid-term, and long-term will be established. Additionally, Iran must agree to actions such as additional agency inspections and access to certain locations, which will take longer than the time it takes for Iran and the six countries to reach an agreement. Therefore, this agreement will be multi-phased, and some commitments will need to be implemented beyond the duration of this agreement. However, I believe what is much more important than the timeframe of the agreement is the details of it and the ability of both parties to fulfill their commitments.