Larijani Defends the IRGC: 'If the IRGC Were Not Present, Dozens of Attacks Like Paris Would Occur'

Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, stated at the beginning of the Parliament's public session on Sunday that if the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had not been present against what he called terrorists in the region, dozens of incidents similar to the deadly Paris attacks would have occurred by now. In mid-November of this year, the Islamic State group carried out deadly attacks in six locations in Paris, resulting in the deaths of 130 people. Morteza Mahdavi-Azad, a political analyst in Germany, explains why Larijani has defended the IRGC and its Quds Force: 'The first reason is the acute increase in international pressures on the IRGC. The IRGC has long been under pressure from the Arab coalition due to its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite groups in Iraq, and its interventions in Bahrain and North African countries. Recently, the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and the involvement of the Basij have significantly increased international pressures on the IRGC. Mr. Larijani felt it necessary to defend against these international pressures at this moment.' Mahdavi-Azad continues: 'The second reason is the public opinion in Iran regarding the attack on the Saudi embassy. The middle class knows that the attacking group was not independent. They are aware of this group's ties to the IRGC. By referencing the IRGC's role in combating the Islamic State group, Larijani attempts to mitigate internal dissatisfaction. The third reason is the proximity to the parliamentary elections. The IRGC is an undeniable and highly influential force in Iran's political landscape. Larijani's base is the IRGC, and he knows well that enmity with the IRGC on the eve of elections could mean the end of a political activist's career.' In his remarks, Larijani referred to the IRGC and its Quds Force as the eyes and light of the Iranian nation in ensuring security. Mahdavi-Azad, when asked how successful the IRGC's Quds Force has been in defending Iran and the Middle East against the Islamic State group, states: 'The IRGC has various functions. One of its roles is to confront the Islamic State group. It seems that the IRGC's Quds Force and its interventions in Syria and Iraq, whether right or wrong, enjoy the support of the majority of the Iranian people and elites. Even its interventions in Syria and Iraq are not met with harsh criticism from the West. The second aspect of the IRGC's performance is its presence in some countries, which is not favored by public opinion and the middle class in Iran. There is no serious justification for the IRGC's interventions in Yemen, Bahrain, and North Africa. It seems that there is a negative view towards this aspect. The third part of the IRGC's activities, which has always faced criticism, involves the IRGC's intelligence operations, its handling of freedom of expression, journalists, suppressing the internal political space, and ultimately the IRGC's economic activities, which nothing, even the IRGC's good performance against the Islamic State group, can diminish.' Larijani also addressed the U.S. Congress representatives, stating that the introduction of what he called ridiculous plans regarding Iran's defense capabilities, especially in missile and nuclear issues, makes the Iranian nation more determined to strengthen its defense capabilities. He criticized the recent U.S. Congress plan to impose restrictions on visa issuance and claimed that American representatives intend to undermine the nuclear agreement with Iran through this plan. According to this plan, citizens of 38 countries that do not require a visa to enter the United States must obtain a visa if they have traveled to Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria in the past five years. In late December, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's foreign minister, described these restrictions as contrary to the spirit of the JCPOA. Following this, John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, in an official letter to his Iranian counterpart, stated that the new visa changes would not prevent Washington from fulfilling its commitments under the JCPOA and that these changes would be implemented in a way that would not hinder Iran's legitimate economic interests. He mentioned various potential tools for this purpose, including issuing 10-year multiple-entry business visas, programs to expedite the issuance of business visas, and the authority of the U.S. President to suspend the implementation of the entry restriction law. Now, Larijani states that if the U.S. does not amend this legislation, Iran will respond in kind, and the members of Parliament will implement counter-plans. Jalil Roshandel, an international expert, states that Iran cannot reciprocate by imposing visa restrictions on Americans: 'Iran cannot issue visas for Americans under different conditions. On the contrary, it can issue visas on separate papers that are not stamped on passports, so that Europeans traveling to Iran are not reflected on their passports as having traveled to Iran.' However, Mahdavi-Azad believes that Larijani's reaction, rather than indicating a disruption of the JCPOA and opposition to the United States, signifies his support for the JCPOA and adds: 'Larijani is one of the most serious defenders of the JCPOA and the rapprochement of Iran-U.S. relations, but he faces serious pressures from the hardline faction, which considers any reaction in the United States as a violation of the JCPOA and immediately demands Iran's withdrawal from the JCPOA and its annulment. When Larijani says that we will pass a plan in response to this proposal, he is actually saying that the JCPOA has not been violated and Iran does not want to react harshly, and the response to a U.S. Congress plan is the approval of a plan in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, not the annulment of the JCPOA.' Nonetheless, Larijani states that if the U.S. government lacks unity in decision-making, other nations should not bear the cost. On the other hand, while the spokesperson for the 'Coalition Council of Principlists' previously announced that 'all individuals and principlist currents' are present in this council, Larijani stated that due to his presidency of the Parliament, he cannot participate in the Coalition of Principlists. According to Fars News Agency, Larijani said on Saturday, January 19, that he told Ayatollah Mohammadi Kermani, the Secretary-General of the Combatant Clergy Association, that he supports the clergy but cannot participate in the Coalition of Principlists due to his responsibility in the legislative branch. In recent weeks, a council named 'Coalition of Principlists' has been formed, and this council has elected Gholamali Haddad Adel as its spokesperson. Mohammad Nabi Habibi, Secretary-General of the Islamic Coalition Party, Hossein Fadaei, Secretary-General of the Martyrs' Society, Morteza Aghatehrani, Secretary-General of the Front of Steadfastness, and Sadegh Mahsouli, Minister of the Interior in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government, are other members of this council. Morteza Kazemian, a journalist and political analyst in Paris, states that Larijani's remarks confirm the rift between the Coalition of Principlists and adds: 'It seems that the gap between the moderates of the conservative camp and the hardliners and the differences between the pragmatists and the far-right in the right camp are quite noticeable. The difference of opinion and approach that has formed since about two years ago after the election of Mr. Rouhani and the beginning of serious discussions about nuclear energy constitutes the pragmatic rights or moderate conservatives and groups close to Mr. Mesbah Yazdi or part of the supporters of Mr. Ahmadinejad, and this gap has intensified day by day. Now, with Mr. Larijani's independent candidacy and his non-alignment with the hardline principlist factions, it has become quite evident. Although Mr. Larijani could have participated in this coalition, I believe he has respectfully distanced himself from this coalition. We are witnessing an increasing rift and difference of opinion in the principlist camp.' In addition to Larijani, who has no representative in this council, Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, a prominent principlist figure, has also denied his support for this coalition. Previously, some websites and news media in Iran had reported that the reason for Larijani's non-participation in the 'Coalition of Principlists' was the presence of the 'Front of Steadfastness' in this coalition.