Lausanne Statement; Wins, Losses, and Consequences

It is gratifying that the first step has been taken for Iran to distance itself from a self-made abyss created by the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. This abyss has been deepened by extremists on both sides, from domestic hardliners to Netanyahu's government, along with American warmongers and the despotic Arab sheikhs of the Persian Gulf. Are the people of Iran the losers? A point worth mentioning is this reality: since there is no foreseeable benefit from Iran's nuclear program for energy production, especially enrichment, any reduction in it as a result of nuclear negotiations does not contradict Iran's national interests. Even if all of Iran's enrichment program were to be halted, it would not only not harm the economy but could actually benefit the country. Those who still harbor illusions about the security provided by a nuclear program, despite the Supreme Leader's fatwa against the production and use of nuclear weapons, should learn from the examples of Pakistan and North Korea that in today's world, security that serves progress and prosperity is not achieved through a few nuclear bombs but through normalizing political behavior both domestically and internationally, expanding comprehensive regional and global cooperation, and joining the ranks of human civilization. Unfortunately, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have led the country towards a catastrophe with their nuclear program, the consequences of which have not only inflicted immediate losses of several hundred billion dollars on the national economy—losses that are now evident in all areas of the country—but have also resulted in several years of separation from the march of civilization, which may require decades to compensate for this scientific and technological lag. However, it is gratifying that conditions have arisen in Iran and the West to take the first step towards a comprehensive agreement. The fate of Iran's nuclear program could have been addressed years ago without all these devastating costs if the Iranian government had not been so obstinate about its enrichment program. What remains now is a nominal enrichment program, whose main feature is preserving the regime's dignity; otherwise, it does not remedy any other pain in the country. The only element of Iran's controversial nuclear program that is necessary for the country is the Arak heavy water research reactor, which fortunately remains intact with reassuring modifications. It can be assumed that for the Islamic Republic, after years of deafening propaganda regarding its nuclear program, especially uranium enrichment, an agreement that involves renouncing or severely limiting it would be at least intolerable in terms of dignity. Therefore, negotiators and the West have tried to formulate the Lausanne statement in such a way that while accepting the Iranian government's serious limitations on its nuclear program and thereby alleviating Western concerns, it allows for an interpretation compatible with the regime's dignity. Moreover, it seems that the naming of this document as a statement and possibly not announcing certain figures was also aimed at this objective. This tendency permeates the entire statement. Specifically: Enrichment Maintaining a certain level of enrichment capacity that can be measured against the number of 9,000 active centrifuges was a red line for the regime. On the other hand, for the West, prolonging the 'breakout time' required preventing the accumulation of enriched uranium. The result is that it has been agreed that existing and future enriched reserves will be transferred outside of Iran. Mr. Zarif spoke of selling these materials to foreign countries, which is likely another way of saying they will be transferred to Russia and possibly converted into fuel rods for the Bushehr power plant if their quality is suitable. Regarding the Arak heavy water reactor, as anticipated, it has been agreed that with design changes that significantly reduce the amount of plutonium produced, alongside prohibiting the reprocessing of its fuel waste in Iran and especially sending it abroad, Western and 1+5 concerns will be alleviated. The Fordow enrichment center has also received special attention from the West, and this relatively secure underground facility will become a research center, allowing the regime to maintain the appearance that it is not being shut down, but no enrichment activities will take place there for 15 years, and furthermore, fissile materials will not be introduced. A total of 1,000 centrifuges, about 90% of which are inactive, will remain under continuous monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Whether this underground facility is suitable for establishing a research center with international cooperation is questionable, but it is not of importance at this moment. The second part of the statement pertains to international agreements related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), specifically referring to several matters: Code C3.1 One under the title of the amended C3.1 code addresses the notification time for NPT signatory countries to the Agency when establishing nuclear facilities, which has often been a point of contention between Iran and the Agency in recent years. Under the original C3.1 code, countries were required to notify the Agency at least 180 days before introducing nuclear materials to the relevant facilities. However, the amended C3.1 code obligates countries to report to the Agency as soon as they decide to construct nuclear facilities. Iran had referred to the original code regarding its nuclear activities, including in Natanz and Fordow, claiming compliance because they were free of fissile nuclear materials at the time of their discovery. In the meantime, in 2003, Iran accepted the amended code and retracted this commitment in 2007. Now, within the framework of the Lausanne statement, Iran has agreed to comply with the amended C3.1 code. The Additional Protocol Another significant point is Iran's accession to the Additional Protocol related to the NPT. The Agency has continuously requested NPT signatory countries to accept and implement this protocol. Countries that accept this commitment allow the Agency to inspect declared nuclear facilities more frequently and unexpectedly (with prior notice of up to two hours) and beyond that, from other locations related to their nuclear program, and even from places outside nuclear facilities that the Agency may suspect. Of course, arrangements will be made for these inspections that are mutually agreed upon with the possibility of third-party arbitration. Iran's voluntary acceptance of the Additional Protocol within the framework of the Lausanne statement is an important step towards resolving disputes with the Agency. The consequences of this are the Agency's control over the supply chain of Iran's nuclear program. Oversight of nuclear materials from mining to enrichment to fuel rods and finally to waste management is ensured, thus alleviating Western concerns about the possibility of covert diversion of nuclear materials towards militarization. One reason that nearly all quarterly reports from the Agency's Directors to the Board of Governors have refrained from confirming the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program is that, based on Iran's refusal to accept the Additional Protocol and consequently the inability to access all desired centers and information, it cannot certify that Iran's nuclear program is entirely peaceful. Of course, this protocol was signed during Mohammad Khatami's presidency and was implemented voluntarily without being ratified by the parliament. During Ahmadinejad's presidency, this cooperation was terminated. Another issue raised in the Lausanne statement concerning the Agency is the necessity for Iran to respond to previous and current questions from the Agency and the need to resolve problems between the two. These questions from the Agency include, especially, the potential military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. A solution that satisfies both sides could play a fundamental role in both annulling multiple previous Security Council resolutions and lifting multi-faceted and unilateral sanctions. The next section of the statement addresses sanctions: Upon the conclusion of the comprehensive agreement in July 2015, EU sanctions and unilateral US sanctions will be lifted, although these lifts will depend on the Agency's assessment of Iran's compliance. The ambiguity and potential problem arising from this section pertains to whether the Agency will be satisfied with Iran's responses to its questions, especially regarding the potential military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. Another significant point in this statement is the confirmation of the comprehensive agreement by the UN Security Council through a resolution that can ensure the longevity of this agreement in the long term. In this regard, the annulment of multiple resolutions of the Security Council that led to these sanctions and formed the basis for the legitimacy of other unilateral and multilateral sanctions will be one of the most important issues, as both the annulment of these resolutions and the lifting or suspension of EU and US sanctions depend on the Agency's certification regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Enemies of the comprehensive agreement; Netanyahu and Iranian extremists With the Lausanne statement and the potential agreement in July between Iran and the 1+5 countries, the significant risk of broader sanctions is eliminated. However, there are many enemies of this agreement who will not rest until then. Individuals like Benjamin Netanyahu in the Middle East seek to spread chaos and dismantle potentially stable and powerful governments. They know that by increasing demands from the Islamic Republic, these individuals will not agree to an agreement, resulting in broader and more destructive sanctions, chaos, or war. As we have seen, they resort to any means, such as confronting the US President without adhering to diplomacy and even distorting the sacred texts of Judaism like the Book of Esther, to pursue three goals by exaggerating Iran's nuclear program and portraying it as a threat to the existence of Jews that has supposedly existed since the historical inception: First, to create an atmosphere of Iranophobia among Israeli citizens by exploiting the rhetoric of some Iranian officials, thereby attracting the attention of Israeli voters who feel a high need for security due to the tragedy in their history; Second, to help create chaos in Middle Eastern countries, aiming to sell Israel as the only safe island in the region to its Western allies while diverting attention from one of the fundamental problems in the Middle East, namely the Israel-Palestine issue, by keeping the focus on Iran's nuclear program, which has actually caused the most harm to Iranian citizens; and third, to ensure that under no circumstances does Israel's nuclear superiority in the region diminish. He has powerful allies in the Republican Party in the US, who have not yet learned from the disaster that George W. Bush's administration caused in Iraq and the Middle East and apparently still harbor dreams of regime change. Of course, Mr. Netanyahu also has allies within parts of the Iranian government, such as hardliners, Hossein Shariatmadari of Kayhan, or General Naghdi, the commander of the Basij, who pass the ball to him during sensitive negotiations in Lausanne by labeling the erasure of Israel as 'non-negotiable.' Arab Sheikhs The regime of Saudi Arabia, as the most despotic regime in the world, shaken by the first wave of freedom and democracy-seeking during the Arab Spring, fears that with a nuclear agreement and the potential rapprochement of a transformed and normalized Iran with the West, it will lose its significance as the main ally of the West in the Islamic world and the Middle East, thus endangering the sovereignty of its regime, composed of two to three thousand princes. To prevent such an issue, it fuels the fires of religious wars. Is the comprehensive agreement the end of the story? It is predictable that the potential nuclear agreement is not the end of the story. As long as the Islamic Republic defines itself as a revolutionary regime and does not accept the existing global order, and considering that any agreement will have ambiguous and interpretable points, the possibility of disputes resurfacing is likely. What are the requirements for a sustainable resolution of the dispute with the West? How can the Iranian government and regime react to such a situation: by abandoning revolutionary zeal and adopting normal behavior and normalization in global relations, renouncing claims of leadership in the Islamic world that fuel religious wars, refraining from unilateral and intrusive interventions in regional countries—like being overly involved in the Israel-Palestine disputes—and replacing this policy with constructive and peaceful interventions befitting a country with Iran's great potential. In this process, expanding constructive cooperation in the region in economic, political, and cultural fields, thereby intertwining the fates of regional countries to reduce hostilities and tensions, plays a key role, although it seems very far from reach. Fortunately, Mr. Hassan Rouhani, in his remarks following the publication of the statement, pointed out that the nuclear agreement is not the only goal but "the first step towards constructive engagement with the world" and then continued that "we will establish friendly relations with all countries with which we have good relations. With those with whom we have had cold relations, we seek better relations, and with those with whom we may have had tensions and hostilities, we want to end hostilities because undoubtedly cooperation and interaction are in everyone's interest." In line with these remarks, Mr. Obama in his interview...