Learning from Algeria

What we Iranians call the regime and authority, referring to Khamenei, is termed power in Algeria. Just as we say and write that all our problems relate to the regime and authority, ultimately to Khamenei, Algerians say that power is the source of all our misfortunes. Just like in Iran, where we describe a non-transparent network of the Supreme Leader's office, military, security forces, and family oil mafia intertwined and named it the regime, Algerians have the same definition of power: Bouteflika; the man of peace but thirsty for power? Only with two differences; instead of the Supreme Leader's office in Algeria, a handful of members of the Central Committee of the Liberation Movement sit, and the rest is the same as what we have: some military leaders, security personnel, oil mafia, and big brokers. And like in Iran, all of these have created a complex network that makes fundamental decisions behind closed doors: only the name differs. Algerians use the French term for power. Everyone uses its French word, and when they want to talk about this power, they say the French word 'le pouvoir.' Even the illiterates. And everyone knows that it refers to the same network that divides money and positions among themselves in impenetrable backrooms. Iran and Algeria have countless similarities. Now, just as the regime in Iran has reached a deadlock, power in Algeria has also fallen into a fateful crisis. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who is hospitalized in Switzerland and is almost in a coma, wants to become president for the fourth time at the age of 82. He, like Ahmad Jannati in Iran, symbolizes the aging regime of Algeria. Bouteflika also belongs to the revolutionary generation and has been in power for over 50 years. They all, like the victorious revolutionaries of Iran, gather around the oil and gas table, which is the only major source of income for the country. 95% of Algeria's foreign income comes from oil and gas sales; now, due to the drop in oil prices in the global market, the regime and the entire society have been plunged into crisis and deadlock. Thousands of opponents of Bouteflika protested on March 8 in Algiers. Nearly 30 years have passed since the Algerian Arab Spring, which led to a civil war and left more than 150,000 dead. The current generation, which today demands more freedom in the streets of Algeria, does not remember this bloody war. Let alone the revolution that succeeded 57 years ago, where old men still divide power and wealth in the name of this revolution. This is another similarity between Iran and Algeria. The civil war in Algeria, which had Islamists on one side and military and security forces on the other, continued with unimaginable violence for six years, and it is etched in the collective memory of Algerians. Bouteflika played a significant role in ending this civil war and national reconciliation, and for this reason, not long ago, he enjoyed special respect among the people. It is no coincidence that these days in the streets of Algeria, we always hear: 'Silmiyah, silmiyah, peaceful and non-violent.' Perhaps this is one of the hopeful similarities between Iran and Algeria. Just like in Iran, the opposition in Algeria is scattered, and they all have disagreements. This is what allows the powerful to remain in power. The fundamental and fateful difference between Iran and Algeria is that Algeria, unlike Iran, has a more or less secular and civil constitution. Therefore, the rulers of Algeria can overcome the country's crisis more quickly. They just need to find a successor for Bouteflika that all power factions agree upon. Bouteflika's era is over. The elections scheduled for April 18 are hardly feasible. Perhaps Bouteflika's death, which is not far from imagination, will somewhat calm this crisis. Then the Constitutional Council must announce the transition period and plan new elections within a specified time as provided by law. Bouteflika has long reached the end of his life, both physically and politically.