Lessons from Assad's Fall for Khamenei, His Supporters, and Domestic Protesters and Exiled Opponents

The government that remained in power 13 years after the onset of civil protests from its citizens, having ignored those protests and relying on Russia, the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and internal repression, fell within 10 days to an armed insurgency opposing the Syrian government. Bashar Assad, the ousted Syrian president who had re-secured his presidency with 95% of the vote in June 2021, fled to Russia after his fall, marking the beginning of a new era in Syria. Ayatollah Khamenei appeared four days after Assad's fall before a group of government supporters and spoke about the lessons of the 'Syrian incident' for them. However, the lesson Khamenei referred to was a reiteration of his past statements that one should not be 'negligent' about what he has termed the enemy over the years, which was precisely what Bashar Assad did. In the 'first paragraph' with guests on this radio program, Saeed Qasemi-Nejad, a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in the U.S., and Meysam Badamchi, a political philosophy graduate in Turkey, we discussed the lessons of the fall of the Syrian dictator for the leader of the Islamic Republic, government supporters, domestic protesters in Iran, and the opposition abroad. Qasemi-Nejad believes that Syria was the heart of the 'Resistance Axis' for the Islamic Republic, and after Assad's fall, Tehran propagated the narrative of Assad's separation from this axis as a psychological warfare tactic. He argues that Khamenei's response to recent events, from Israel's retaliatory response to Iran's missile attack to Assad's fall, is more realistic than that of other Islamic Republic officials and that he has somewhat accepted defeat. The director of the Iranian Liberalism Studies Center also notes that the costs incurred by the Islamic Republic in Syria and the permission Assad granted Tehran for this presence do not justify Assad's separation from the Resistance Axis for the ideological supporters of the Islamic Republic, which is why Khamenei is trying to convey the message of 'we will return' in a phase of 'Shia victimhood.' However, Badamchi does not see Khamenei as more realistic than his associates and emphasizes the duality within the Islamic Republic's governance, the government, and even the Parliament under the presidency of Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. This political philosophy graduate describes the change in Tehran's tone regarding the armed opponents of Bashar Assad in state media and the distortion of the nature of Iran's military presence in the language of some government officials, such as the Speaker of Parliament, as a form of 'political pragmatism.' Badamchi also considers the 'failure of Bashar Assad to engage with the Syrian people,' which was reflected in the statements of government officials after the fall of the Syrian government, as absent from Khamenei's remarks, stating that Khamenei looks in the mirror and sees that he too does not pay attention to his people and naturally did not want to exacerbate this aspect of the situation. Qasemi-Nejad refers to the slogan 'Leave Syria, think about us' that a group of Iranian protesters chanted during their protests, stating that the Islamic Republic has no interest in hearing the people's demands and engaging with them. According to Qasemi-Nejad, in ideological dictatorial regimes—such as the Islamic Republic and Bashar Assad's regime—the idea of engaging with the people and reform is not feasible because moving towards reform coincides with the collapse of these governments. Qasemi-Nejad believes that the Islamic Republic, lacking political legitimacy and having a failed foreign policy, is economically unable to meet the people's needs, and its government propaganda under the title 'Shia Crescent' has also failed. He assesses the Islamic Republic as being in its most vulnerable period and hopes that with the arrival of the elected U.S. President, Donald Trump, and the resumption of the 'maximum pressure' policy, this policy will be accompanied by 'maximum support' for the Iranian people. However, Badamchi describes the hope for changes in Iran linked to the inauguration of the elected U.S. President as 'optimism' and refers to what he calls 'U.S. rent to Israel in the Middle East,' stating that this has disrupted the balance in the Middle East. According to this political science researcher, Israel has targeted Syria's military infrastructure in its recent attacks and seems to not want any neighboring country to have even basic infrastructure. In response to these remarks, Qasemi-Nejad states that in Syria, there is a group that, despite claiming to have reformed, is still the former al-Qaeda group. Israel does not want chemical weapons and some military equipment left over from Assad's regime to fall into the hands of Sunni jihadist groups. Qasemi-Nejad also mentions that such concerns were also held by intellectuals at that time, questioning why the West grants concessions to Israel. The result was the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic and the economic misery of the Iranian people. Qasemi-Nejad continues by referring to a return to what he calls the positive experience of the Pahlavi dynasty as a solution to escape this situation. Qasemi-Nejad, who is considered a close figure to Prince Reza Pahlavi, believes that since the monarchy is the only institution that has legitimacy and popular support, and the prince is not a rival to any individual or group, it is the only opportunity that can bring the ship of revolution and transition to the shores of security, prosperity, and freedom. However, Badamchi rejects Qasemi-Nejad's view, stating that in today's Iran, no single movement is dominant. This political science researcher points to the multipolarity of Iranian society and states that the problem for monarchists is that they demonize all events of 1979 and present the narrative as if everyone has supported the rule of the jurist. He criticizes the emphasis on the slogan 'Reformist-Principlist, the story is over,' deeming it unrealistic and a manifestation of what he calls the totalitarianism of monarchists. The translator of the book 'An Introduction to Political Philosophy' considers the contradictory nature of the Islamic Republic's constitution as a reason that makes structural reforms in the government difficult or impossible. He believes that with discourses such as those of Mostafa Tajzadeh, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Mehdi Karroubi, which are based on structural reform, these contradictions should be avoided. Qasemi-Nejad states that the developments in Syria and the fall of Bashar Assad have shown Iranians how weak the Islamic Republic is. According to him, recent developments could also weaken the morale of the repressive forces. However, he emphasizes that what brought Assad down were his military forces that, for whatever reason, stopped fighting. Yet, Badamchi believes that no transformation, even if Prince Reza Pahlavi wishes it, will happen without cooperation with a part of the pragmatic body of the Islamic Republic's governance, such as these reformists and also the armed forces, of which we have no information from within.