Lessons to be Learned from the Iranian Elections

The elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, for 290 and 88 seats respectively, were the first held in the country after the nuclear agreement and were met with significant enthusiasm. Approximately 55 million of Iran's 80 million population were eligible to vote, with 60 percent participating. Many Iranians were aware that due to the Guardian Council's oversight and the disqualification of numerous candidates on grounds such as security reasons, religious factors, lifestyle, and loyalty to the Supreme Leader, they would not be able to vote for their preferred candidates. Nevertheless, millions participated, perhaps to assert their political presence and create even small positive changes, or to prevent undesirable candidates or extremists opposed to the nuclear agreement, political and economic ties with the West, and social freedoms from entering these assemblies. This election can be seen as a competition within a limited and controlled non-competitive framework. It is also regarded as a referendum on President Rouhani's nuclear agreement. Similar to previous elections, many people identified themselves not as reformists, moderates, independents, or conservatives, but rather as supporters or opponents of the nuclear agreement. The unexpected victory of reformists, particularly in Tehran where they secured all thirty seats in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, will undoubtedly strengthen Rouhani's government and prepare the ground for its main policies, especially in enhancing trade relations with the West, commitment to the nuclear agreement, lifting sanctions, and improving relations with the European Union and the United States. However, these changes will be very slow for two reasons. Firstly, neither political faction, reformists nor conservatives, holds a majority in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Secondly, despite Rouhani and the reformists' victory in the Assembly elections, it should not be overlooked that control over the country's political and economic life remains largely in the hands of conservative institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards, the Ministry of Intelligence, the judiciary, and the office of the Supreme Leader. It does not seem that the experience of the sixth parliament, which faced suppression by the Revolutionary Guards after the reformists' victory in the Assembly elections, will be repeated this time, as Rouhani, unlike the then-president Khatami, enjoys the support of the leadership and, due to his moderate stance, is able to balance between the right and left factions. Regarding Iran's regional policies, it should be noted that the positions of none of the candidates from reformist, conservative, or moderate groups differ concerning Iran's role in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. There seems to be an unwritten agreement among the entire spectrum of political activists regarding Iran's regional policies. On the other hand, none of the candidates crossed the red line of criticizing the positions of the leader and senior members of the Revolutionary Guards regarding regional policies. In terms of the people's demand for higher human rights standards, freedoms, and social justice, press freedom, expression, and assembly, we will not witness significant changes, as these matters are managed by the judiciary, the Basij, the Revolutionary Guards, and the Ministry of Intelligence, not the Assembly, which is controlled by conservatives. Shahram, a 35-year-old computer engineer from Tehran, states, 'All these candidates make promises, but when they come to power, no changes are observed.' Furthermore, contrary to what is reflected in the media, the elections in Iran were not a binary choice between reformists and conservatives. The significance of this election was more about the choice between voters and those who do not vote. Nearly 40 percent of eligible voters—about 20 million people—made it clear by not participating in the elections that they do not trust the country's political institutions. Some of those who did vote aimed to show the authority that they are still capable of maneuvering within the framework of controlled political institutions. Nasrin, a 32-year-old teacher from Shiraz, says, 'I voted, but not because I support any of the candidates. My preferred candidate was disqualified. I voted because I did not want to allow a conservative candidate to enter the Assembly. My vote was a choice between bad and worse.' Another noteworthy issue is the higher participation of people from wealthier cities in the elections and the greater inclination towards reformist and moderate candidates among them compared to those from poorer cities. This likely indicates that the effects of lifting sanctions are not yet felt among lower-class individuals. The role of social media, such as Telegram, was very prominent in these elections. Young Iranians used these platforms to encourage their friends to vote and disseminated information about which candidates to support in each city. The youth vote was significant in the elections, considering that 60% of Iran's 80 million population is under 30 years old, born after the revolution, and dissatisfied with the country's conditions and the positions of conservatives. Conservatives suffered a heavy defeat in the competition for 88 seats in the Assembly of Experts, which is responsible for selecting the Supreme Leader. Rouhani's moderate group and its supporters won 15 out of the 16 seats in this Assembly in Tehran. The defeat of two conservative clerics who were inclined to succeed Khamenei (Ayatollah Yazdi, former head of the Assembly of Experts, and Mesbah Yazdi, a close supporter of Ahmadinejad) could significantly influence the selection of a moderate leader after the 76-year-old Khamenei's death. Since the leader of Iran has the final say in the most important domestic and foreign policies, the rise of a hardliner or a moderate leader will steer Iran in completely different directions. A moderate leader, unlike a conservative leader, will be more inclined to establish relations with the West and the United States. It appears that the Islamic Republic of Iran is moving away from the ideas of extremists and closer to the position of Rouhani and his allies. However, changes will be slow until the leader's lifetime, as extremists will still hold power in most economic and political networks in Iran.