Lift of Sanctions and 'Increased Influence and Power of the Revolutionary Guards'

Reuters reports in an analytical piece that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran has benefited significantly during the period of international sanctions and will increase its wealth and economic power following the lifting of these sanctions. The report states that the ruling clergy in Iran has supported the economic power growth of the IRGC and has granted it special privileges and rewards due to its successful methods in circumventing sanctions, suppressing dissent within the country, and assisting Iran's allies abroad, particularly the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Now that the lifting of sanctions will lead the Iranian economy into a period of prosperity, it is likely that the IRGC will benefit the most from this change. At the same time, Iranian leaders will ensure the necessary budget for the IRGC's continued activities in regional crises, including the Syrian civil war. However, it should be noted that this military entity has not yet freed itself from sanctions. The U.S. government has emphasized that its 'legal sanctions against Iran's support for terrorism, human rights violations, and missile activities' will continue, and these sanctions have been approved and implemented against certain sectors of the IRGC and several of its commanders and officials. An Iranian businessman residing in Dubai, who deals with several companies affiliated with the IRGC, states: 'There is no chance of competing with the companies affiliated with the IRGC. In many cases, contracts are awarded to these companies even without entering a tender.' However, the IRGC has shown that it effectively defends its economic interests and power, and in recent years, when international sanctions isolated Iran from the international market and financial system, this entity was not weakened. A former Iranian government official close to Hassan Rouhani said: 'Even in the most difficult economic conditions in the country, the budget for the IRGC's domestic and foreign activities has not changed.' The IRGC initially solidified its economic foothold in the years following the Iran-Iraq war and increased its economic power and influence during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's eight-year presidency. The IRGC has led proxy wars against rival regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the U.S. by supporting armed Shiite groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. A senior security official in Iran stated: 'The IRGC and the Quds Force are Iran's main assets at the regional level, meaning the points where we are determined to defend our allies and oppressed nations. All factions of the Iranian government agree on this issue. A wealthy person can help his friends more.' With the resolution of the nuclear crisis and reduced tensions in relations with the West, Iran does not intend to end these policies. On the contrary, the Islamic Republic of Iran hopes that with reduced economic pressure on the country and the end of sanctions, it can allocate more financial resources to its extraterritorial activities. A senior security official in Iran believes that the financial resources of the IRGC and its extraterritorial arm, the Quds Force, will increase. According to him, 'the IRGC and the Quds Force are Iran's main assets at the regional level, meaning the points where we are determined to defend our allies and oppressed nations. All factions of the Iranian government agree on this issue. A wealthy person can help his friends more.' Iran has so far spent billions of dollars supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime and has recently sent its elite military units to train the Syrian army and for intelligence-security matters. The number of Iranian military casualties in Syria, including IRGC and Basij commanders, has increased in recent months, and foreign experts believe that at least three thousand Iranian military personnel are stationed in Syria. An Iranian official stated that with the improvement of the country's economic situation, the budget for the IRGC's extraterritorial activities will also increase. He added, 'It is clear that the country's leaders will allocate more budget to the IRGC. We do not seek war and crisis, but we will continue to assist our allies.' Domestically, from the perspective of Iranian leaders, the IRGC has played an important role in countering various periods of sanctions against the country. A Western diplomat familiar with the situation in Iran estimated last year that the IRGC's income from economic activities is between 10 to 12 billion dollars annually. The Iranian government has never been willing to disclose details and figures related to the IRGC's economic activities. However, an Iranian Ministry of Economy official stated that the IRGC is active in various economic and industrial sectors, including energy, tourism, automotive production, communications, and construction. Following the suppression of the protest movement after the 2009 presidential election, more economic privileges were granted to the IRGC. For example, one of the companies affiliated with the IRGC purchased the state telecommunications company of Iran for eight billion dollars. He added, 'Companies affiliated with the IRGC are active in various economic sectors of the country and have helped them resist against the unjust sanctions that have been imposed on Iran for several decades.' Following the suppression of the protest movement after the 2009 presidential election, more economic privileges were granted to the IRGC. For example, one of the companies affiliated with the IRGC purchased the state telecommunications company of Iran for eight billion dollars. Khatam al-Anbiya, the IRGC's arm in the construction industry, has secured several large contracts, including a 1.2 billion dollar contract for the construction of one of Tehran's metro lines. An Iranian businessman residing in Dubai, who deals with several companies affiliated with the IRGC, states: 'There is no chance of competing with the companies affiliated with the IRGC. In many cases, contracts are awarded to these companies even without entering a tender.' Since 2012, with the intensification of U.S. and EU sanctions against Iran's oil and energy exports, the IRGC has attempted to circumvent the sanctions by launching complex operations, usually carried out through Turkey and Dubai. An importer of parts and machinery for Iran's oil industry states: 'The IRGC started buying hundreds of small and medium-sized companies across the country and uses them as cover companies to hide its operations. These companies circumvented the sanctions in cooperation with foreign companies, and in most cases, cash was deposited into bank accounts in neighboring countries of Iran.' Iranian leaders have tried to fill the gap left by foreign companies in the oil and energy industry with companies affiliated with the IRGC. However, their expertise and experience in this area are limited. A former official from the hardline faction of the Iranian government stated: 'The IRGC has the necessary loyalty and commitment, but its affiliated companies lack the expertise, technology, and capability to implement these projects.' Lack of Unity The IRGC, loyal to Ayatollah Khamenei, supported the nuclear agreement with the international community following his directive. Experts believe that the IRGC is not a homogeneous and unified entity. Some IRGC commanders, like the hardline faction of the government, do not agree with the nuclear agreement with the U.S. and the potential opening of the Iranian market to Western companies and the end of the country's economic isolation. However, some other commanders view this change as carrying new opportunities. Nevertheless, experts believe that the IRGC is not a homogeneous and unified entity. Some IRGC commanders, like the hardline faction of the government, do not agree with the nuclear agreement with the U.S. and the potential opening of the Iranian market to Western companies and the end of the country's economic isolation. From the perspective of some IRGC commanders, threats from both foreign and domestic sources will increase in the post-sanctions era. However, some other commanders view this change as carrying new opportunities. One of these new opportunities is obtaining advanced technology and equipment needed to complete the South Pars project. Recently, prior to the lifting of sanctions, Bijan Zanganeh, Iran's Minister of Oil, stated that South Pars, the largest natural gas field in the world, would be operational by 2017. At the same time, billions of dollars of Iran's blocked funds in foreign banks will be released. Some experts believe that this money will be used for importing goods and technology for the development and modernization of various economic and infrastructural sectors of the country. In addition to receiving budgets and securing large contracts, the IRGC also benefits from preferential prices in insurance, shipping, and banking activities in the field of exports and imports. As foreign companies return to Iran, they will need a local partner and collaborator, which in large projects will certainly mean cooperation with companies affiliated with the IRGC. The changing landscape of 'proxy wars'; the war against the people in the streets of Iran.