Limited Distribution of the Book on Operation 'Valfajr 8' at Tehran Book Fair

The discovery of the bodies of several Iranian divers who lost their lives in Operation 'Karbalā 4' near the 'Abu Flus' area close to 'Am al-Rasas' in Iraq has once again brought various aspects of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, especially the role of military and civilian commanders in the continuation of the war after the liberation of Khorramshahr on May 24, 1982, to the attention of the media and public opinion. At the end of May, the Missing Persons Search Committee of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Iran announced that the bodies of 175 missing combatants from Operation 'Karbalā 4', which began on December 24, 1986, with the aim of capturing the city of Basra in Iraq, had been discovered. Shortly before the announcement of the discovery of the divers' bodies, a book titled 'Review of Operation Valfajr 8', featuring an interview with Mohsen Rezai, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at the time of the operation, was distributed in 500 copies at the Tehran Book Fair, but the news was overshadowed by the discovery of the Iranian divers' remains and did not receive much attention. This book had been published four years earlier, but Mohsen Rezai, after reviewing the updated version of the book in December 2010, had officially opposed its public distribution, stating that its distribution 'at the level of commanders and elites for experiential learning' was 'unproblematic.' According to conservative media, the book 'Review of Operation Valfajr 8' reached a very limited number of audiences at this year's book fair, and from its 'appearance, lack of ISBN, and small print run, it was clear that it was not yet intended for widespread publication and was only available to some researchers and commanders of the Sacred Defense.' Some members of the 'War Narrators' group at the 'Center for Documenting and Researching the Sacred Defense of the IRGC' accompanied Mohsen Rezai on a trip to Ahvaz in August 1986 and conducted an eight-hour interview with him regarding the background of this operation and its untold aspects. This interview was conducted with Rezai because Operation 'Valfajr 8', following Operation 'Bait al-Muqaddas' and the liberation of Khorramshahr, as well as several other operations, was put on the agenda due to the insistence of Mohsen Rezai to capture the 'Fao Peninsula' in southern Iraq. Besides Mr. Rezai, Mohsen Rashid, one of the founding IRGC members of the 'War Narrators' initiative and a former director of the Center for War Studies and Research, also reviewed the book before its publication. It seems that Rezai's opposition—likely aligned with Rashid's views—to the widespread distribution of this book stems from his significant statements in this interview regarding the country's conditions at that time and concerns about providing content for renewed criticism of military commanders during the war by critics. This speculation is reinforced when we revisit the discussions among senior IRGC commanders in a meeting in November 1985, which was held before the start of Operation 'Valfajr 8' to review the status of forces and available resources for its initiation. The 'bitterest meeting in Mohsen Rezai's life' occurred a few months before the start of Operation 'Valfajr 8,' also referred to as the 'Fao Operation.' Serious doubts existed among the IRGC ground forces commanders, who were responsible for executing this operation, regarding its initiation due to the limited forces and resources available. These commanders, believing that executing this operation was impossible with the existing limited resources, requested a meeting with Mohsen Rezai, the overall commander of the IRGC, to present their views on this operation and decide on its execution or cancellation. However, Mohsen Rezai, who refers to this 80-minute meeting as 'the bitterest meeting of his life,' attempted to persuade the attendees to support the operation after hearing the opinions of several commanders indicating limitations in resources and the number of combatants. This meeting, held on November 16, 1985, included Mohsen Rezai, Yahya Rahim Safavi (the commander of the IRGC Ground Forces), Gholamali Rashid (the deputy commander of the IRGC Ground Forces), Ali Hosseini Tash (the head of the IRGC Ground Forces Headquarters), Aziz Jafari (the commander of Quds Headquarters), Ahmad Gholampour (the commander of Karbala Headquarters), Abbas Mohtaj (the commander of Salman Headquarters), Mehdi Mobalegh (the deputy head of the IRGC Ground Forces Headquarters), and Ebrahim Sanjaghi (the liaison between the IRGC commander and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as the commander of the war). According to the transcript of the audio recording of the meeting, Yahya Rahim Safavi, the then-commander of the IRGC Ground Forces and responsible for executing this operation, tells the attendees that based on 'experience' from past operations, he has reached the 'definitive conclusion' that 'with the resources and capabilities we currently have, we cannot conduct a large-scale operation; this large-scale operation [although] is within the capacity of the Islamic Republic, but it is not within the capacity of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.' According to Rahim Safavi, this operation requires 76,000 Basij forces, but the IRGC currently has about 26,000, or one-third of that number, at its disposal. He adds that if the IRGC enters the operation with its current capabilities, it will 'face defeat' and states frankly: 'We cannot.' In response to Rahim Safavi's remarks, Mohsen Rezai refers to this meeting as 'the bitterest meeting of his life' and states, 'You have lost your trust in command, and you do not come to say honestly that we do not have trust.' Rezai speaks of 'the depth of the brake down below' and the creation of 'a dam above' for the war by officials, adding: 'Both that dam and your brake are precisely the deadlock that has arisen in the war.' He expresses strong grievances about the existing disagreements between the Prime Minister (Mir Hossein Mousavi) and the then-President (Ali Khamenei) and laments that members of parliament are so bold as to 'stand against the Imam.' Gholamali Rashid, the then-deputy commander of the IRGC Ground Forces, also states that the IRGC is no longer capable of undertaking 'large deals' like the 'Fath al-Mubin' operation, saying, 'The Islamic Republic should fight according to its capacity.' Abbas Mohtaj, the commander of Salman Headquarters, also states that the IRGC's capabilities have been continuously decreasing since the 'Fath al-Mubin' operation, saying, 'In the Fath al-Mubin operation, we deployed 140-130 battalions, but now we are combining all our capabilities, and it amounts to 70-60 battalions.' He adds, 'Even this limited operation requires double our current capability. That is, our current capability is half of what this limited operation requires.' Mohtaj criticizes the 'political' dealings of politicians with the war and the 'pressure' they impose on it, the resignation of some IRGC members, the 'problematic' situation of some Basij members, and the opposition of 'the families of martyrs and Friday prayer leaders' as factors affecting Iran's war capabilities. He adds, 'In the past month, despite all the propaganda we did, with all the rush we made, we sent 1,700 forces to Khorasan province, of which 800 were combatants, and the rest were cooks, service personnel, and workers.' Aziz Jafari, the then-commander of Quds Headquarters, also addresses Mohsen Rezai, saying, 'Brother Mohsen! Unfortunately, the resources of the country you are talking about are not in your hands. They are in the hands of those who do not believe. I say maybe these brothers want to prove what they said before, meaning once again say IRGC go operate there, and then when we return, they will say, see, you could not? Why did you say you could?' According to Jafari, the shortage of current forces is a result of the 'unsuccessful previous operations' of Badr and Kheibar. Reviewing the audio tapes containing the discussions of this meeting indicates serious disagreements among the war commanders regarding the initiation of a new operation despite the shortage of military forces and resources, as well as the impact of internal political tensions on the combatants, and could be one of the reasons for Mohsen Rezai's concern about the widespread distribution of his statements in the aforementioned book regarding Operation 'Valfajr 8.' These documents show that the Islamic Republic had been severely lacking in forces and resources for more than a year before the execution of Operation 'Karbalā 4,' yet despite its leakage, the operation was initiated at the insistence of some military commanders and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then-commander of the war. No independent and comprehensive research has yet been conducted on Operation 'Karbalā 4.'