Lina Khatib, Director of the Middle East Center at SOAS, London: Israel is a Useful Enemy for Iran

Lina Khatib, the director of the Middle East Center at SOAS University in the UK, believes that neither Iran nor Israel intends to move towards a full-scale war, and all their actions are organized with this principle in mind. This SOAS professor and Middle East issues expert also states that the people of Lebanon, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Israel blame each other for the situation the country finds itself in. In a detailed interview with Radio Farda, Ms. Lina Khatib, former head of the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, discusses the regional tensions. How do you see the tensions in the region? Are we approaching a full-scale war? Despite the harsh rhetoric, neither Israel nor Iran wants a comprehensive war in the region, although there is an increase in military activities and verbal threats. However, this does not mean we are approaching a full-scale war. Tehran knows that provoking Israel would come at the cost of total destruction for Iran, which is not something the Islamic Republic desires. Iran's proxy forces are taking actions, but even that is not at a level that would lead to a full-scale war. You believe that Israel is also not seeking a full-scale war, but actions like the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran do not suggest that the Netanyahu government is trying to provoke Iran and start a large-scale war? Although Israel has not officially admitted to playing a role in the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, I believe that action was intended to send a strong message to Iran, indicating that it has extensive intelligence access and the capability to conduct operations within Iran. Consequently, that action was more a step aimed at sending a message and creating strong deterrence rather than being a provocation. Why has the Islamic Republic postponed attacks on Israel? Keep in mind that it was not a senior commander of the IRGC who was targeted, but a Hamas leader. Therefore, I think Israel's intention was more to demonstrate its security and intelligence superiority to Iran, and with this action, it wants to tell Iran not to even think about provoking us because we have extensive access. However, Israel has previously targeted IRGC commanders. It seems that Israel intends to push Iran out of the gray area, and all their actions are aimed at ending the shadow war. Do you disagree? The shadow war you mentioned benefits no one. What happens between Hezbollah and Israel, as well as the flare-ups in other areas, has been limited, as I said. Although mistakes can happen, and no one can guarantee that everything will go according to plan, generally, I do not see an interest from Israel to move towards a full-scale war. Ultimately, I think everyone knows that in this conflict occurring in Gaza, there will be repercussions in other parts of the region, and no one will militarily dominate the other. Therefore, the only way out of this situation is diplomacy. How do you see Iran's policy in this dispute? In your opinion, what is Tehran seeking in these conflicts, and what approach is it following? Unfortunately, many actors in this conflict benefit from the continuation of tensions, but not at a high level. Therefore, it may be in Iran's interest for this tension with Israel to always exist but at a controlled level. Iran has historically used the Palestinian issue as a tool for its legitimacy and has gathered its proxy forces in the region with this approach. Therefore, if peace is established in the Middle East, if the Israel-Palestine conflict is resolved, a huge part of the legitimacy framework that Iran has used to justify its interventions in the Middle East would be eliminated. Thus, the ideal scenario for Iran is that neither a full-scale war occurs nor peace is established. Consequently, I believe Israel is a useful enemy for Iran. However, if the ceasefire negotiations in Doha and Cairo fail, what do you think Iran's possible response will be? Will it be similar to the April attacks? The April scenario between Iran and Israel clearly showed that neither side wants to provoke the other into a full-scale war. If Iran considered Israel an existential threat, it would have to activate all its proxy forces in the Middle East against Israel, which could lead to a devastating scenario for both Israel and Iran, as the U.S. would intervene if that happened. Can Lebanon's economy withstand the costs of war with Israel? Therefore, I think Iran tried to give negotiations a chance because it did not want to be seen as the cause of the negotiations' failure. However, if negotiations fail, we will likely face different conditions. How do you see Hezbollah's approach in this crisis? While some of their supporters want to strike Israel, a significant portion of Lebanese society wants this tension to end. Some of Hezbollah's supporters, including extremists, always want to hit Israel. However, many of their supporters do not want to see a confrontation with Israel because they remember the 2006 war and how devastating that conflict was for Lebanon. Many Hezbollah supporters now know that Lebanon is essentially a bankrupt country. Although Iran continues to financially support Hezbollah, the level of support is not comparable to what was seen in 2006. At the same time, Hezbollah faces a difficult choice and must maintain its credibility as Iran's greatest asset in the region. It is the most equipped Iranian-backed militia group. As I mentioned earlier, Iran has always used support for Palestine as a kind of legitimacy framework for itself and insists that it fights from the Lebanese border with Israel. Therefore, Hezbollah cannot stand aside and have nothing to do with the conflicts. For this reason, I believe Hezbollah has intervened in a measured way during this time; they participate in attacks against Israel but do not engage in actions that would lead Israel towards a full-scale war. Consequently, we see that Hezbollah combines its low-level military activity with extensive propaganda, and a widespread psychological war from the group's secretary-general is observed; something that Israel also executes similarly. However, it is expected that both sides will continue limited retaliatory attacks that do not escalate into a full-scale war. Israel also wants to send a message to Hezbollah by targeting its leaders inside Lebanon about how much it has the upper hand in terms of intelligence security. Therefore, for Hezbollah, launching a large-scale military action in these circumstances is not tactically wise. So you think Hezbollah may have the military capability to launch extensive attacks on Israel, but it is not logical because it cannot withstand Israeli retaliation afterward? Yes, exactly. Hezbollah has the military capability to do so. The group's arsenal is quite significant and can be very damaging to Israel. However, what prevents actual use is the situation in Lebanon. Moreover, Israel has shown that it has infiltrated Hezbollah's communication network, and thus, even if Hezbollah has military capability, it cannot use it, and as I said, it does not want to use it. And how about the people of Lebanon? How do they view the crisis and tensions? Do they blame Israel or Hezbollah or Hamas and Iran? The people of Lebanon blame all of them. I think the majority of the people of Lebanon did not want to see their country embroiled in the conflict between Hamas and Israel. Many people in Lebanon sympathize with the Palestinians, but they do not equate that with sympathy for Hamas and do not want Lebanon to be part of this conflict. They are angry with Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into this conflict because it was Hezbollah that initiated the attack on Israel after October 7, not the other way around. Therefore, I can say that the vast majority of Lebanese are anxious and angry. Of course, they have always been angry with Israel, as it is evident that Israel has always been a source of destruction for Lebanon. At the same time, Lebanese people are also angry with Iran because it supports Hezbollah. Moreover, most people are not sympathetic to Hamas either. Therefore, I can say that the majority of Lebanese feel trapped in a conflict they did not choose. And for the last question, how do you see the short-term, medium-term, and long-term outlook of these tensions in the region? It is difficult to predict this, as unfortunately, we are approaching the anniversary of the start of these conflicts, and there is still no prospect for their end in sight. However, I think in the short term, we can expect the continuation of the same violence in Gaza, the ongoing involvement of Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed groups. In the medium term, I hope diplomacy ultimately succeeds in reaching a ceasefire agreement. Perhaps we should wait for a new president to come to power in the White House. Not because this will change Israel's relations with the U.S., but because regional actors may prefer to reach an agreement with each other during a new U.S. administration. In the long term, resolving fundamental issues will be difficult. Issues such as settlements in the West Bank, political disputes among Palestinians, and also political tensions in Israel are becoming increasingly complex, and naturally, this makes resolving these issues more difficult. Moreover, there is Iran; experience has shown that you cannot separate the Israel-Palestine conflicts from Iran's interventions in the Middle East. Therefore, I think any real stability in the Middle East must include a strategy for simultaneously addressing these interconnected and intertwined issues, which will be very, very difficult to implement.