Looking East and 'Ingratitude': The Puzzle of Iran-Russia Relations

Within 9 days of announcing the use of Russian bombers from the Nojeh airbase for attacks against Assad's opponents, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced that these flights had ended. This was while just a day after this announcement, Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, stated that the flights were still ongoing. From the perspective of this note, the presence of Russian bombers on Iranian soil has become a 'puzzle' that requires contemplation, even if these operations have been halted. Given the sensitivity that the news of Russia's presence in Iran has sparked both nationally and internationally, this note seeks to examine the contradictory aspects surrounding this issue. The importance of this note lies in the inference from some officials' positions that, if necessary, there is a possibility of repeating such a decision for Russia to use Iranian territory again, even on a larger scale (air, sea, land). This note aims to clarify that such an unprecedented decision in the history of the Islamic Republic was made while they did not want public opinion to be aware of the concession given to Russia. Consequently, these officials even disregarded the parliament, keeping the news confidential until Russia, for its own reasons, announced the use of the Iranian airbase to the world. To analyze this contradictory puzzle, it is essential to review the sequence of events to gain a clear picture of the contradictory statements made by the Islamic Republic officials on this issue. Looking East amidst Russian Ingratitude; On August 15, the Russian news agency Sputnik first revealed the use of Russian Tu-22M3 long-range bombers and Su-34 fighters from the Nojeh airbase in Hamadan. It is noteworthy that the news of Russia's military operations from Iranian soil was announced by Moscow (not Tehran). According to available evidence, not only did the Islamic Republic not inform the public about this news, but it was also displeased with its disclosure by the Russians. The Iranian Defense Minister stated that this Russian action was 'ingratitude.' In other words, he considered the Russians to be 'grateful' if they did not disclose this confidential news. Second; on August 17, in the first reaction to this news, Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, said with a two-day delay: 'Our cooperation with Russia is strategic, and we have exchanges of capacities and capabilities in this regard.' Despite describing cooperation with Russia as 'strategic,' Shamkhani avoided confirming the news of Russia's presence on Iranian soil. Third; on August 18, Ali Akbar Velayati, senior advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, without confirming the news of Russia's military presence in Iran, unveiled the overarching foreign policy perspective of the Islamic Republic towards Russia. He referred to it as a 'new look to the East' and reminded that: looking to the East necessitates... strategic and strategic relations with countries like Russia and China. Fourth; on the same day, August 18, for the first time, Aladdin Boroujerdi, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament, confirmed the presence of Russian fighters on Iranian soil but reduced their presence to the level of 'refueling in Iran.' In this way, he sought to dismiss the concerns of those who believe such an agreement violates Iran's independence. Fifth; Boroujerdi's announcement that the Russians' presence in Iran was only for refueling came at a time when, on August 19, just one day after his statement, 20 members of Parliament wrote a letter to Ali Larijani requesting a closed session of Parliament to 'inform the representatives of the nation about the reasons and consequences of this decision.' From the text of this letter, it is understood that Parliament was not officially informed about such an unprecedented decision, especially since Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, another member of Parliament, declared this decision contrary to Article 146 of the Constitution, which states: 'The establishment of any foreign military base in the country, even for peaceful uses, is prohibited.' Sixth; in a sharp reaction to some representatives' requests to review this military cooperation with Russia, on August 22, Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan stated that what had happened was a decision of the system (read: the leader) and 'is not related to the Parliament.' From the content of the minister's biting remarks, it is understood that he does not consider the Parliament one of the pillars of the system and does not see the entry into this news as the Parliament's duty. Seventh; while the United States also described the aforementioned news as a potential violation of Security Council Resolution 2231, on September 1, Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan, in a somewhat thought-provoking assessment against the Russians' announcement of their presence on Iranian soil, described this Russian action as 'ingratitude and self-display.' It seems that the Iranian Defense Minister is unaware that Russia voted positively on each of the UN Security Council's resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran, and today expects 'gratitude' from Moscow. What is clearly inferred from the Minister of Defense's remarks is that he considers the Russians to be 'grateful' only when they do not disclose the confidential agreement for Russia's use of Iranian territory. Eighth; finally, in less than ten days from the news that Russia had disclosed, on September 1, Bahram Qasemi, the spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, in a new statement that is itself questionable, said: 'Russia's use of the Hamadan base has temporarily ended.' He clarified why this series of Russian operations began from Iranian soil, why it ended, and what 'temporarily' (for now) means. By putting together the news whose disclosure displeased the Defense Minister and the position announced by Ali Akbar Velayati regarding the Islamic Republic's new look to the East (read: Russia), it is understood that military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow has entered a new phase that even keeping it hidden from the Parliament was deemed necessary. This news was so troublesome that, according to the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, it has currently been halted 'temporarily' (read: for reasons of expediency), otherwise the spokesperson did not specify that they would not grant Russia access to Iranian territory again. The news of Russia's access to Iranian territory is so significant that Hossein Malaek, the former ambassador of the Islamic Republic in Beijing, described it as 'the most pivotal change in foreign policy since the Iranian revolution.' He writes on the Iranian Diplomacy website that 'domestic analysts consider the Iran-Russia alliance on the Syrian issue to be fragile and related to Russia's needs for its strategic balance with the United States. To validate this analysis, it is enough to remember that Moscow has voted positively on each of the UN Security Council's sanctions resolutions against Iran. Such a country has already made it clear that it never views Tehran as a strategic ally. What Russia seeks is to prevent NATO from expanding to Russia's borders in the international power balance. If we accept such an analysis from one of the ambassadors of the Islamic Republic, which is based on valid reasons, then we realize the depth of Velayati's error in stating that the Islamic Republic has a 'new and strategic look to the East' (Russia). The crux of the matter is nothing more than what the Minister of Defense has inadvertently expressed: that Russia is an ungrateful player. Previously, Moscow had shown this ingratitude by preventing the delivery of the S-300 system, delaying the completion of the Bushehr power plant, imposing crippling sanctions on Iran, and so on. Russia has nothing to hide from the Iranian public. Those who consider the Iranian public to be untrustworthy are the officials of the Islamic Republic.