Mahdavi Azad: The JCPOA Will Remain a Anchor of Balance in Domestic Politics

What changes have occurred in Iran's political landscape before and after the JCPOA, and what effects will the JCPOA have on Iran's domestic politics, particularly the upcoming presidential elections? Mahdi Mahdavi Azad, a journalist and political analyst, has answered questions in this regard: Mahdi Mahdavi Azad has worked in many reformist newspapers in Iran and was the editor of the news site Aftab, affiliated with the Strategic Research Center. He currently resides in Bonn, Germany. Now that a year has passed since Iran and the 5+1 reached the JCPOA, when you look at the internal political landscape of Iran, can you see that there are differences in domestic politics before and after the JCPOA? If I were to summarize in one sentence, I would say that the changes brought about by the JCPOA were immense and profound. A large part of it was unprecedented. However, significant and new limitations were created, and large new pressures emerged, leading part of public opinion to conclude that the situation has not changed or has even worsened. In foreign policy, negotiations with the U.S. took place. The taboo of negotiating with the U.S. and the West was broken. However, crises in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and Syria arose, and consequently, it seems that we remain locked in foreign policy. In the economic domain, sanctions were lifted, we have relative currency stability, a reduction in inflation, and an increase in economic growth, which are undeniable indicators. However, the increase in administrative corruption, the repercussions of Ahmadinejad's era, the repeated bankruptcies of companies, and rising unemployment have made it feel like there has not been much improvement in the economy. In the social sphere, the opening of universities is evident. Social media networks are clearly facing less censorship, but the volume of crackdowns, new confrontations with parties, and concerts creates a new atmosphere that may lead part of public opinion to conclude that conditions have worsened. We see a similar situation in domestic politics as well. The increase in arrests under the pretext of infiltration, new strictness, erodes the sweetness of the JCPOA. In a nutshell, the achievements of the JCPOA are tangible, clear, and definitive. However, the country's regressions in various fields have led to a public sentiment, even among experts, that no significant change has occurred. You mentioned the social atmosphere and said you see an opening in universities or the virtual space; do you think this is a temporary issue or a institutionalized decision in the Islamic Republic that such an event should occur? We have heard a lot of recent statements from Ayatollah Khamenei regarding the Islamization of universities. A large portion of observers claim that the Islamic Republic organizes its social behaviors due to its ideological nature. A review of the past three decades shows that this argument is not very accurate. In fact, the Islamic Republic is a completely ideological government, but as the most ideological government in the world, it exhibits the least ideological behaviors. There are no principles or rules. During Ahmadinejad's era, as the most radical and extreme government in the past four decades, we witnessed more tolerance in the social sphere. There was the morality police, confrontations with women, new strictness in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, new regulations were passed, but what was felt in society was clearly less. As soon as Rouhani's government came to power, one of the first plans and the conservative faction's claim was that the situation of hijab in Iran had worsened. Another example is Khatami's government. In Khatami's government, after 1999 and the victory of the reformist parliament, the volume of social confrontations increased. The shrouded protesters who were in their homes during Ahmadinejad's era returned to the streets after Rouhani's victory. These types of social strictness of the Islamic government, although rooted in ideological issues, stem from the rulers' concerns and fears of losing their power. In fact, in this regard, what ultimately decides is not ideological issues but political concerns, professional affiliations, and numerous financial, economic, and security interests that compel them to carry out these harsh confrontations. I consider the current confrontations as temporary, aimed at discouraging the public on the eve of the 2017 presidential elections. The main goal of these confrontations, before it is to create an Islamic civilization as claimed by Khamenei, is to frustrate the public, dishearten social activists from their participation in past elections, and lead public opinion to the conclusion that our participation at the ballot boxes has little impact. Therefore, the ultimate goal of these confrontations is to keep people at home in future elections and guarantee the victory of the authoritarian faction with minimal cost. Mr. Mahdavi Azad, let’s return to the JCPOA story. In your opinion, which forces among the political factions in Iran have been strengthened by it? Did only the government faction and supporters of Rouhani in the 11th government manage to strengthen their position, or did other groups also benefit from the JCPOA? Until Rouhani's government, the political atmosphere of the country was divided into two poles influenced by the protests of 2009. On one side was the conservative faction led by the extremist core, and on the other side was all the political potential of the country, including reformists, technocrats, artists, social activists, national-religious groups, the Hashemi Rafsanjani faction, and ultimately the opposition abroad. As soon as the nuclear negotiations began and the groundwork for an agreement was laid, the political landscape of the country suddenly underwent profound and serious changes. In fact, the political atmosphere of the country was divided into two camps, those in favor of and those against the JCPOA. In the anti-JCPOA camp, this time the radical conservatives were joined by part of the opposition, and in the pro-JCPOA camp, this time all the political potential of the country was included along with a large part of the conservatives. Since then, until July 2015 when the JCPOA was signed, and until October 2015 when it was ratified in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and until now, when we are witnessing the post-JCPOA period, the factions and borders between political groups have almost blurred. This means that the classic structure of political activity that we knew in Iran and categorized into conservatives, reformists, and civil activists has been disrupted, and factions and various groups are now adjusting their relations based not on their motivations or financial and economic interests but based on their views on foreign policy and the country's outlook. For this reason, we see that some moderate conservatives like Hashemi Rafsanjani attack the moderate opposition abroad less, or the opposition seeking regime change abroad is more focused on attacking reformists than criticizing Khamenei and Mesbah Yazdi. I believe this state of confusion after the JCPOA still dominates the internal political atmosphere of the country, and we cannot say which faction has taken the lead. Moderates and technocrats have clearly made progress in domestic politics and broken the taboo of relations with the U.S., but on the other hand, authoritarian figures have also gained powers in the social sphere to impose new restrictions that even Ahmadinejad's era did not have. I think the current suspension of domestic political policy that we are witnessing will continue until the 2017 elections, and only after the 2017 elections can we make an accurate assessment of the political equations inside the country and the new equations that have emerged to understand which faction has been strengthened or weakened by these new developments. My next question was also about the 2017 elections. In your opinion, what could cause a surprising event in this election? Can the JCPOA and its effects have a direct role in the outcome of the upcoming elections? It seems that the JCPOA will still be the most decisive point and the anchor of balance in the country's domestic politics. The goal and desire of the extremist faction is to confront Rouhani's government with failure and to lead public opinion and Rouhani's voter base to conclude that despite the approval of the JCPOA, there has not been much change in the economy, we are still witnessing crises in foreign policy, none of the promises have been fulfilled in domestic policy, and even in the social sphere, strictness has increased and conditions have worsened. The strategic analysis of the extremist faction is that Rouhani received about 18.5 million votes in 2013, and the total votes of Rouhani's conservative rivals were slightly less than 18 million, with a vote difference of less than one million. Therefore, they believe that by reducing Rouhani's votes by one or two million, they can possibly win the election. However, I believe this strategic analysis is incorrect, and if the elections became completely polarized and went to a second round, Rouhani would likely receive around thirty million votes. Not because he has more popularity or merits, but because public opinion wholeheartedly welcomes the opening of foreign policy and the reduction of the nuclear crisis and will continue to defend it. With this situation, if the 2017 competitions move towards polarization over the JCPOA, which seems likely, anyone who stands in defense of the JCPOA will have a much better chance of winning the elections. I believe that despite all the efforts being made, we will not witness a significant surprise in 2017. The results are predictable. What is also predictable is that social pressures will clearly increase, and we will witness an increase in political confrontations with activists. However, we can predict public votes in Iranian society for various reasons that they will not differ much from the electoral arrangement in the 2016 parliamentary elections.