Military Balance of Countries in 2015

"The International Institute for Strategic Studies" in London, which researches global security, political risks, and military conflicts, published its annual assessment on the military capabilities and expenditures of 171 countries in a book titled "Military Balance 2015" on Wednesday, February 11. The institute's report states that following the global financial crisis in 2008, most NATO and European member countries revised their defense spending, leading to a reduction in military forces, while the United States has strengthened its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East by reducing its forces in Europe. According to the report, the security of EU neighboring countries has significantly weakened compared to 2008 due to increased instability in North African and Middle Eastern countries, coupled with the Ukraine crisis and the assertive behavior of Russian forces. Global military expenditures increased by 1.7 percent in 2014, while the share of U.S. military spending in total global military expenditure has changed. In 2010, U.S. military spending accounted for 47 percent of total global military expenditures, but by 2014, this figure had decreased to 38 percent. In contrast, nominal defense spending in Asian countries increased by 25 percent since 2010. In the Middle East and North African countries, nominal defense spending has nearly doubled since 2010, which, when considering exchange rates and inflation effects, equates to a 40 percent increase in real defense spending during the same period. In Russia, real defense spending averaged 10 percent during this period, with most of this expenditure going towards the "government rearmament program." However, continuing this trend may be problematic due to falling oil prices in global markets, fundamental issues in the Russian economy, and international sanctions unless the Russian government prioritizes the defense sector and reduces budgets for other sectors. The military spending ranking for 2014 shows that the U.S. remains at the top of the global military expenditure table, with the highest military expenditures in 2014 allocated to 15 countries: the U.S. at $581 billion (down from $600.4 billion in 2013); China at $129.4 billion; Saudi Arabia at $80.8 billion; Russia at $70 billion; the UK at $61.8 billion; France at $53.1 billion; Japan at $47.7 billion; India at $45.2 billion; Germany at $43.2 billion; South Korea at $34.4 billion; Brazil at $31.9 billion; Italy at $24.3 billion; Israel at $23.2 billion; Australia at $22.5 billion; and Iraq at $18.9 billion. Based on this ranking, Saudi Arabia ranks third in the world, with its military spending increasing by 35 percent compared to 2013. India's military expenditure, ranked eighth, shows an increase of nearly 19 percent compared to 2013. In the Asia-Pacific region, military spending in China and South Korea has increased by 15 and 8 percent, respectively, compared to 2013, while Japan has reduced its spending by 7 percent during the same period. The report notes that estimating military expenditures in Middle Eastern and North African countries is challenging due to a lack of transparency, ambiguities in administrative bodies, insufficient legal oversight, and the use of financial resources outside the national budget. The report states that Bashar al-Assad's position in 2014 has strengthened compared to 2012. The U.S. government's decision in 2013 to forgo airstrikes against Syria after Damascus cooperated in dismantling its chemical weapons and the reluctance of Western countries to assist opposition groups, along with the emergence of ISIS, allowed Assad to launch offensive operations and regain some lost territory, significantly neutralizing opposition actions. As a result, a significant part of Homs has been liberated, and the position of opposition groups in Aleppo has weakened. These relative successes have enabled Assad's regime to control a significant part of the central Kurdish corridor connecting Damascus to Aleppo and coastal areas. The report adds that Assad has adapted to the current situation on the battlefield while maintaining military superiority over opposition groups, leading to successful urban combat tactics by government forces and militias. Additionally, in 2014, the Assad regime reorganized large military units into smaller, more agile ones and promoted young commanders to key positions, increasing the effectiveness of units on the front lines. In 2014, key Syrian units like the Republican Guard and the Fourth Division remained loyal to Assad and maintained their operational readiness, while the regime increased the use of barrel bombs and chlorine after abandoning chemical weapons. However, the report notes that due to the disruption of the country's conscription system and a decrease in conscript personnel within the Syrian army, the country has increasingly relied on militias, which in some cases has weakened the command hierarchy, created tensions between military personnel and militias, and led to operational inefficiencies. Nevertheless, Hezbollah has provided significant assistance to Assad's regime, and evidence suggests that the Islamic Republic is involved in recruiting and training pro-government militias, as well as that IRGC personnel have been involved in the siege of Aleppo. Researchers at the International Institute for Strategic Studies further add that in 2014, the continuous and consistent military assistance from the Islamic Republic and Russia to Assad's government continued, while arms supplies to opposition groups were sporadic and scattered. In the first half of 2014, Damascus strengthened its position through an unwritten (de facto) agreement with ISIS, forcing its opposition groups to fight on multiple fronts. However, this agreement was violated in the second half of the year with the expansion of ISIS-controlled areas in Syria and the siege of the army's military base in Raqqa. Heavy casualties in Raqqa and the slaughter of Alawite militias in the area led to increased political protests for the resignation of the Syrian defense minister. According to the report, in 2014, the U.S. pursued a dual policy toward Syria, meaning it provided some opposition groups with limited amounts of weapons and equipment to test their effectiveness and credibility while allocating a $500 million budget to train and equip opposition groups. This government plan was accepted by Congress but was not implemented due to severe disagreements between the U.S. government and opposition groups. The U.S. wanted opposition groups to prioritize fighting ISIS, but these groups did not accept the U.S.'s preferred priority, considering Assad and his regime their main enemy. The report notes that ISIS has a better performance in Iraq and Syria with a force of 30,000 to 35,000 members compared to other groups, stating that ISIS has a decentralized structure and its nature is a combination of what is seen in military infantry units, terrorist groups, and insurgent groups. Nearly one-third of ISIS members are foreign jihadists who have joined the group from 80 countries, including Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. The members of this group are highly motivated, and its command structure consists of officers, some of whom are former al-Qaeda members, with several former officers from Saddam's time in command positions in Iraq. In Syria, ISIS commanders are a mix of Syrians and foreigners who have joined the group from various countries and regions, including Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, and North Africa. According to the report, the United Arab Emirates has made continuous efforts in recent years to showcase and strengthen its military capabilities. The country sent 1,000 military personnel as part of the "International Security Assistance Forces" known as "ISAF," which was commanded by NATO, to Afghanistan, and its air force participated in air operations against ISIS last year. Concurrently, the UAE has sought to modernize its air force, focusing on advanced technologies and achieving drone capabilities. The country aims to purchase several "Predator" drones from the U.S. while also producing its own drones. The report adds that the UAE faces human resource constraints and thus hires retired Pakistani or Jordanian military personnel, although these individuals are in lower or middle job categories, and the commanders of its forces are Emirati. The report notes that the armed forces of Iran (Army, IRGC, and Basij militias) number 523,000 personnel, with the army being the largest military organization in Iran in terms of personnel, but the IRGC is the strategic priority of the Islamic Republic, capable of executing various operations due to its diverse capabilities. Regarding Iran's naval forces, the report states that with the division of labor between these two forces, the operational domain of the IRGC Navy is in the Persian Gulf, while the Navy of the Army has strategic and extra-regional missions. In the air domain, Iran's air force suffers from outdated equipment, and the Islamic Republic continues its persistent efforts to refurbish and optimize old weapons while increasing production of various weapons such as rockets, missiles, drones, radars, and mines. The Islamic Republic's success in this area is relative, as it requires advanced technology from abroad.