Military Option Against Iran in Conversation with Fabien Heinz; 'The Regime's Survival is at Stake'

With the beginning of the new year in Iran and the end of the Nowruz holidays, the most important issue under scrutiny is the negotiations with the United States. In recent days, comments on this matter have intensified. In Tehran, on one hand, a group of Islamic Republic officials speak of readiness for indirect dialogue, while on the other hand, they threaten to respond to attacks. In Washington, multiple signals are being sent; on one side, sanctions are being imposed and names of individuals related to Iran's missile, drone, and other activities are being added to the sanctions list almost daily. Meanwhile, the Pentagon is advancing a full military posture in the Middle East, and U.S. lawmakers are discussing the advancement of a maximum pressure campaign. However, on the other side, the President of the United States and one of his closest advisors express a desire to reach a diplomatic solution. On the evening of Wednesday, April 1, 24 hours after a tweet by Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, which referred to Iran's commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons production, Steve Witkoff, Donald Trump's representative for Middle Eastern affairs, surprised observers with his 'excellent' response to the tweet. However, shortly after the reactions to this one-word response, it was deleted. The reasons for this response or who wrote it are still being discussed in Washington; however, what has now leaked to American publications is that there are two opposing approaches being debated in the White House regarding how to handle the Iran case: negotiation or military confrontation. What seems to be gradually believed by many Western officials is that if the diplomatic approach fails, military conflict will be inevitable. Although Gideon Sa'ar, the Israeli Foreign Minister, also stated on Thursday, April 2, that he would not be 'surprised' if indirect negotiations between Iran and the U.S. began. In this context, one of Tehran's bargaining tools or positioning is the talk of building nuclear weapons in the event of military attacks. Among them was Ali Larijani, an advisor to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, who emphasized on April 1 that 'military action against Iran is not without consequences,' addressing U.S. officials: 'If you ever go towards bombing by yourselves or by Israel, you will force Iran to make a different decision.' Ali Larijani claimed that in the event of U.S. or Israeli military action against Iran, 'the people will exert pressure' and the construction of a nuclear bomb 'will gain secondary justification.' In an interview with Fabien Heinz, a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Berlin, we asked him about these threats, the military option, and its seriousness. When Iran talks about building nuclear weapons, how seriously is such a threat taken? I really don't want to speculate. We know that there have been individuals within the regime who genuinely wanted Iran to advance and build nuclear weapons. We know that since 2003, the official position has been that Iran should expand its nuclear program without having a plan to build a bomb; that is, to build technologies and create capacities for bomb-making in the future; to decide but not take the last step. Has this changed? This issue ultimately is a bureaucratic internal dispute within a very ambiguous system. Therefore, it is difficult to know what the current mood is and what the Supreme Leader's approach is in this regard. If Tehran wants to move towards production of weapons, how would it do this? The question is, if Iran decides to build a bomb, what kind of bomb will it build? Will they build something that is portable, that they can put on a missile and shoot towards Tel Aviv? Or do they want to have a crude nuclear device that works, which can be built in the shortest time possible? That would be technologically different, but later could also be portable or just a display device? I say assessing all of this is very difficult. But when it comes to bombing nuclear facilities and Iran threatens to build weapons, does such an attack fundamentally prevent Iran from acquiring weapons? In my opinion, there is a conventional analysis that says the most that such an attack can do is buy time. You can bomb facilities, but you cannot bomb knowledge. Iran has knowledge, and if you bomb, they will just go underground and continue secretly, and detecting that will be difficult. But I can argue that today everything is a bit different because ultimately when you talk about destroying such a program, it really comes down to whether you can target positions and destroy targets. And I can say that the Israelis, especially the Israelis and Americans together, have the capability to do this in Iran. Can Iran's air defense stop a U.S. air attack on Iran? Are Iran's retaliatory capabilities sufficient to prevent such an attack? Maybe yes, maybe no. I mean, they were not strong enough to prevent Israel's attack on missile facilities. But the second part is really an intelligence discussion. I think we need to consider Iran's conditions and the conditions of its era. Now you have completely different technological opportunities and a lot of evidence that Western intelligence services have penetrated into the regime in Iran. Therefore, if you look at some of Israel's actions in the past, it seems that both Iran and some of Iran's partners like Hezbollah have been endangered by the Israelis. They have internal information, and if these countries decide to act, it will be problematic for the Iranians. Because you have an underground nuclear facility. Yes, but that one is still dependent on supply chains, which are chains that are dispersed throughout the country; specific technology that is produced in specific facilities. And if you can properly identify all these chains, you can severely disrupt the program. So I think there is a possibility that if there is a major attack, it could cause significant damage to the program. And finally, Mr. Heinz, do you think what we see from a military posture by the U.S. in the Middle East means planning for a military action or a positioning before negotiations or the start of a diplomatic process? Understanding this from the American side is difficult because it seems that the Republican movement has fragmented; so that some people are trying to avoid new conflicts in the Middle East at all costs, and others have a more hawkish policy towards Iran. Therefore, understanding and knowing that is very difficult. I say if you look at the speed of Iran's exercises or new information about Iran's new facilities, it usually indicates that they are concerned that the threat of military attack is serious. Of course, from Iran's perspective, it is important to remember that it was Donald Trump who killed Qassem Soleimani. Therefore, from Iran's perspective, it makes sense for everyone to take Trump very seriously because he killed one of the regime's highest officials. So the issue of regime survival is at stake, and this alone makes anything he [Trump] does – such as troop deployments and threats – a matter of significance.