One of the serious challenges of the Islamic Republic during Khamenei's era is the creation of heroes: Despite the introduction of Ayatollah Khamenei as the 'Leader of the Revolution' in government and state propaganda, there are no longer revolutionary figures in the country to produce heroes. The era of defensive war, where defenders of the country were called martyrs, has also come to an end. Officials have left no room for self-sacrifice and helping others to create heroes. The story of 'Martyrs of the Shrine' has not gained traction and will not, as most of the dead are not Iranian, and intervention in the Syrian war only has legitimacy in government propaganda. Under Khamenei's rule, there is neither the capacity to produce new martyrs domestically nor abroad. In this regard, bones labeled as 'unknown martyrs' are constantly buried in public centers, the origins of which are unclear, whether they are remnants of war casualties or not. The government is looking for excuses to create heroes. The regime wants heroes to continue claiming revolutionary status and justify its expansionist ambitions with its revolutionary identity. Officials know that with the power they possess in the country, their revolutionary identity is meaningless within a national framework; they consider themselves revolutionary on the international stage and want to overthrow the established global order and seize supreme power. Even when they resort to diplomacy under pressure, they label diplomats as revolutionary and heroic. The fake and hollow heroes of the 'system' are usually selected from among the Basijis and Guards who are present in military interventions abroad or are killed, regime terrorists abroad, activists in the Islamic Republic's military programs, diplomats who insult Western officials or shout in negotiations, and those convicted in Western courts. However, after a while, not even a single Iranian citizen remembers their names, nor does the regime care for them. Many of them, after their expiration date, are labeled as 'non-affiliated' by the 'system', exiled, labeled as counter-revolutionaries, or even executed (like Shahram Amiri). This is why one day the executioners of Syrian children and women (like the commander of the Quds Force and Iranian and non-Iranian members of the IRGC and Basij in Syria), one day the Guards who illegally detained American sailors and extracted televised confessions from them against international law, one day terrorists who return to the country in exchanges involving foreign hostages of the regime, one day negotiators with Westerners (like the JCPOA negotiations), and another day international traffickers who violate the laws of their host country for material gain are introduced to society as heroes. The latest of these heroes included Shahrzad Mirgholikhani, who was ultimately exiled with various accusations such as espionage and illicit sexual relations (she was sentenced to five years in prison in the United States in 2007 for attempting to smuggle night vision cameras into Iran), Shahram Amiri, and Rasoul Daryaei Isfahani, who was part of the nuclear negotiation team and later arrested on espionage charges. How do they become heroes? It is enough for someone to have done something for the regime - like participating in the purchase of military equipment that is prohibited from being sold to the Islamic Republic or assassinating opponents abroad - and then get caught. If they do not get caught, despite serving the regime, they are not heroes, and their names will not be heard because they have received their share from the deal (in case of smuggling) or their fee (in case of assassination). But if they get caught, they become political prisoners, and prisons in the U.S. and Europe become hell for them to have a place in the regime's anti-imperialist propaganda that is broadcast to leftist and Islamist groups worldwide. When such a person is released from prison in Europe or the United States, they are immediately invited to the most expensive international propaganda apparatus of the Islamic Republic (Press TV), and not only are they given the opportunity to tell their story, but they also receive positions there and become so close to the head of that institution that after reaching the presidency of the state radio and television organization, they are employed as the eyes and ears of that person or reach positions in the Ministry of Science or other organizations and agencies (like Farhad Daneshjoo), as if the managerial posts of the country are chocolates to be gifted to those who have engaged in terrorist and illegal activities in other countries. The role of security agencies in these hero-making processes directly intervenes in directing the propaganda apparatus. According to Sarafraz, the head of the state radio and television organization, 'Ms. Mirgholikhani, who has a five-year prison record in the U.S. due to her intention to buy night vision cameras, began her collaboration with the Press TV network at the recommendation of security agencies and her media work experience.' (Jam-e Jam, February 6, 2016) The head of the organization rightly acknowledges the accusations against this individual but justifies it by changing the subject - from the wife of a smuggler to a translator: 'She spent five years in prison while only being present as a translator at the camera purchase meeting.' (Ibid) Shahram Amiri was presented to society as a hero by Foreign Ministry officials and later pursued on espionage charges by security agencies and ultimately executed by the judiciary. The case of Daryaei Isfahani is also in the hands of security agencies. The same security agencies that create heroes from smugglers and terrorists also strip the hero of their benefits because they know very well how they have elevated a fake hero. The former head of the state radio and television has explicitly explained this section: 'Security agency agents summoned her and asked why she published a book or why she interviewed with the media, and asked Ms. Mirgholikhani to leave the country... Initially, they accused her of absurd espionage, and then when they had no evidence, they retracted their statement. The accusations and labels that have been raised about her in some media and social networks, such as espionage, embezzlement, infiltration, and having illicit relationships, stem from immorality. There was no accusation that they did not attach to her.' (Ibid) Apparently, Mirgholikhani overstepped her boundaries and met with individuals she should not have met. She met with Mojtaba Khamenei and gifted him her book (her personal Facebook). This made security agencies more sensitive to her, and they requested her excuse. The end of a mission or political cleansing? In the case of Mirgholikhani, the head of the state media attributed her dismissal to political and administrative reckonings with the state radio and television organization instead of acknowledging the expiration of the fake hero's usefulness for security agencies: 'Such behavior and its highlighting in some media indicate that the designers of psychological operations against the national media have a special project underway, while a month has passed since the issue, and even illegal actions such as stealing her laptop and personal photos and not providing a convincing response or even not giving a single page of explanation from the relevant authorities made me feel the need to provide explanations in this regard.' (Jam-e Jam, February 6, 2016) It is surprising that the head of the broadcasting organization is astonished by the scrutiny of security agencies in the private lives of Iranian citizens while the network under his authority was broadcasting forced confessions obtained by those same agencies during his presidency at Press TV. In the case of Shahram Amiri, who was introduced as a nuclear scientist and lived outside Iran for a while, the same scenario was followed. When he returned to Iran, he was welcomed as a hero, but shortly after, his family members expressed ignorance about his fate. The delusion of power of the managers The former head of the state radio and television demands explanations and accountability from agencies that do not consider these actions within their scope of duties: 'Such behavior towards her was illogical... These gentlemen should explain why they treated her this way.' (Ibid) Apparently, the managers of the Islamic Republic, even at the level of the head of the state broadcasting organization, do not know under whose oversight they work and how limited their powers are. Security and military agencies in Iran have a decisive and final role in these matters, and when they introduce someone to cooperate with propaganda agencies, they naturally reserve the right to dismiss them one day. In the case of Daryaei Isfahani, Foreign Ministry officials initially denied reports from security officials that had leaked to their affiliated news agencies, but judicial officials confirmed that he was under investigation. Such denials will not affect the course of the case. In the case of Shahram Amiri, no one even bothered to correct contradictory news.
Mirgholikhani, Amiri, Daryaei Isfahani: A Small Step from 'Hero' to 'Spy'
The article discusses the challenges faced by the Islamic Republic in creating national heroes, particularly under Khamenei's leadership, highlighting the fate of individuals who were once celebrated as heroes but later accused of espionage or other crimes. It emphasizes the regime's reliance on fabricated narratives to maintain its revolutionary image while exposing the precariousness of those labeled as heroes.
👥 Key Players
⚡ Actions
📰 What Happened
Iranian regime seeks to create heroes from spies and political prisoners to maintain revolutionary identity.
- Iranian government arrest Shahrzad Mirgholikhani, Shahram Amiri, Rasoul Daryaei Isfahani
- Iranian government execute Shahram Amiri
- Iranian government designate Shahrzad Mirgholikhani, Shahram Amiri, Rasoul Daryaei Isfahani
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
The Iranian regime is desperate to create heroes to justify its actions and maintain power.
📝 Key Evidence
🏷️ Entities Mentioned
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%