Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf: A Multifaceted Politician or a Desperate Principlist?

Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, a general, commander, pilot, doctor, mayor, speaker of the parliament, and a constant presence in presidential elections, had not won any elections prior to the twelfth parliament. This time, with less than three million and 400 thousand votes (14% of the votes), he once again tasted defeat in his long-held dream of presidency; not only against a candidate from the opposing political spectrum but also against a rival from the so-called "Revolution Front" in which he has a stake. Qalibaf was born on September 1, 1961, in Torghabeh, Mashhad, and quickly married their neighbor Zahra Mosheer at the age of 21. He participated in the Iran-Iraq war during his youth and rose through the ranks as a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). During the war, he held positions such as commander of the Nasr Khorasan and 25 Karbala divisions, and after the war, he was appointed as the deputy commander of the Basij Resistance Force. From the Khatam Headquarters to the Command of Law Enforcement, Qalibaf became the commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters in 1994, a significant economic arm of the IRGC that has taken over numerous economic projects in recent decades, becoming a major competitor to the private sector in various industries. Qalibaf's presence in law enforcement is another noteworthy aspect of his career. A year after the events of July 9, 1999, when plainclothes forces attacked the large student dormitory at Tehran University, he was appointed as the commander of law enforcement. Four years later, similar incidents occurred at the university. Qalibaf has always claimed that he tried to prevent the escalation of tensions during those events. In the 2013 presidential election, he claimed in an interview at Sharif University that Mohammad Khatami's government had issued a permit for the attack on the university dormitory in 2003, which he prevented. A week after that interview, an audio file of Qalibaf was released that completely contradicted his claims. In that audio file, Qalibaf stated: "In the 2003 university dormitory incident, I went to the Ministry of Interior's Security Council meeting and spoke very harshly; remarks that were even rude, and I do not want to repeat them here, but I forcefully obtained the police's entry permit and shooting order." A few days later, during the 2013 election debate, Hassan Rouhani, Qalibaf's rival in that election, provided a new account of that meeting, stating: "Mr. Qalibaf, I did not want to bring this up, but you forced me. The discussion was about you saying let the students come so we can use gas to finish them off." This title has stuck with Qalibaf since then, and many in Iran's political space know him as the "Gas Commander." Searching for the presidential dream in the cockpit, he achieved his best result in that election, coming in second with 16% of the votes. However, this was not Qalibaf's first and last appearance in elections; he had attempted to reach the presidency directly from law enforcement eight years prior in the 2005 election. In that election, Qalibaf took a different approach; in his campaign images, unlike in 2013 and 2017, there was no sign of a scarf, and he preferred to be known as a doctor and pilot. Many posters from 2005 show him posing in a pilot's uniform next to an airplane, asking people to vote for him while wearing a gold ring on his left hand. However, Qalibaf also placed fourth that year with nearly four million and 100 thousand votes. Years of corruption in the municipality, Qalibaf then went to the Tehran Municipality as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's successor and remained there for years; the longest tenure of anyone as mayor of Tehran. Qalibaf's time in the Tehran Municipality was marked by numerous extensive corruption cases involving him and his close associates. In one famous case, Eisa Sharifi, who was his deputy during Qalibaf's 12 years in the municipality, was sentenced to 20 years in prison for financial corruption. Sharifi, who even took over the municipality in Qalibaf's absence, was not tried until after Qalibaf's tenure ended. Qalibaf's financial corruption and that of his associates did not stop there; in the "astronomical houses and properties case" revealed by Yashar Soltani, the director of the Architecture News website, he was accused of widespread corruption but was not summoned to court, while the whistleblower was imprisoned. Additionally, in other cases, it became clear that Qalibaf was involved in extensive violations related to the "City Bank," which operates under the municipality. Yet again, no case was formed against this former IRGC commander. In the case involving the "Imam Reza Charity Foundation," which Zahra Mosheer, Qalibaf's wife, managed, it was revealed in 2016 that the mayor had allocated 60 billion tomans from the municipality's budget to this foundation. Moreover, his son, Elias Qalibaf, was mentioned in 2015 in connection with a 1,200 billion toman corruption case involving the Cooperative Foundation. The collection of corruption cases surrounding the Qalibaf family was not yet complete; in April 2022, the "Sismoni Gate" scandal was revealed when Qalibaf's family traveled to Turkey to buy a baby shower gift for their daughter, Maryam, and returned with 300 kilograms of goods. In this case, too, not only did nothing happen to the Qalibaf family, but the whistleblower ended up in prison. A true love for the Presidential Building, over the years, Qalibaf has also become known for his overwhelming desire for the presidency. He had run for president in 2005, 2013, and 2017; three defeats and one withdrawal out of fear of defeat. In 2017, under pressure from principlist factions, he ultimately withdrew in favor of Ebrahim Raisi, but even this action did not prevent Raisi's severe defeat against Hassan Rouhani. Four years later, the core power in the Islamic Republic concluded that the only way for Raisi to win was through the disqualification of all candidates by the Guardian Council, creating the conditions for the judiciary chief's victory. Qalibaf is now in his second consecutive term in parliament and occupies the speaker's chair. Qalibaf; from the foot of Khamenei's pulpit to the most security-oriented speaker of parliament. In this year's election debates, he again took a different approach, trying to test his luck for the presidency with a different strategy as the multifaceted man of politics in Iran. In 2005, he sought to capture the votes of the middle class left behind by Khatami's government, presenting himself in stylish suits and with a gold ring in hand and in his pilot uniform to voters. In 2009, Qalibaf was smart enough to realize that the central government's core still favored Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and did not run in the elections. In 2013, he followed a new model, attempting to attract the hardline faction within the government with his statements. Scarves and dusty shirts and pants were replaced by stylish suits. In his comments, he no longer paid attention to the demands of the middle class and focused on attracting the votes of hardliners and government supporters; however, Qalibaf likely miscalculated and did not realize that a purer option for this purpose was present on the scene, and a significant portion of the votes from the "Hezbollahis" went to Saeed Jalili rather than Qalibaf. In 2017, Qalibaf changed colors again, this time trying to attract the votes of the impoverished class of society with the discourse of "96 percent and 4 percent." Qalibaf introduced himself as the representative of the 96 percent of society who were fed up with the corruption and plundering of the 4 percent, such as members of Rouhani's government. However, that year too, Qalibaf ultimately had to exit the scene in favor of Ebrahim Raisi. In 2021, he again showed intelligence like in 2009, realizing that that year's election belonged to Ebrahim Raisi. The new Qalibaf, three years later after Raisi's sudden death, returned to the competition. During the recent elections, he tried to display a mix of all the personas he had presented in the previous three elections. Qalibaf, who previously experienced failure in debates against Hassan Rouhani and emphasized that his government would not interfere in important foreign policy matters, had ceded the competitive ground to Rouhani. This time, he allowed Saeed Jalili to showcase the hardline and ideological face of foreign policy while distancing himself from this conflict. Qalibaf even tried to present himself as supportive of negotiations and the nuclear agreement, in contrast to Jalili, to avoid repeating the bitter experience of 2013, where his approaches allowed Rouhani to capture public votes. He also learned from the aggressive approaches of 2017 and this time, both in debates and in campaign advertisements, adopted a calm and dialogue-oriented persona, indicating that discussion and controversy were no longer useful. He, of course, utilized previous experiences to support the demands of the impoverished class while still being careful not to overdo it and avoid the similar polarization of 4 percent and 96 percent; an approach that, due to the heavy corruption cases related to him, his family, and his associates, does not quite suit him. Qalibaf in 2024 is a concoction of years of presence as a general, commander, pilot, mayor, and speaker in the political arena of the Islamic Republic; a colorful collection that this former IRGC commander has used to prepare himself for achieving his long-held dream of sitting in the chair of the building on Pasteur Street, but none of it worked, and he remained unsuccessful.