Mohammad Khatami's Dilemma for the 'System': Weak, Harmless, but Untrustworthy

Khamenei's clear and direct response to the national reconciliation proposal presented by Mohammad Khatami, followed by harsh attacks and insults from Friday prayer leaders across the country (on February 18, 2017) and accusations from the spokesperson of the Guardian Council regarding the polarization of the political atmosphere and attributing this issue to the enemy (ISNA, March 5, 2017), reveals three characteristics of Mohammad Khatami in the political landscape of Iran: 1) A weak individual who can be insulted and have his rights stripped away without any cost (Khamenei did not express such clear opposition to Ahmadinejad), 2) An individual who is respected not only by segments of the public but also by some officials from the opposing faction, who do not wish to confront him harshly, and 3) An untrustworthy politician due to his opposition to the velayat-e faqih during his time away from power before the presidency, his legalistic views, and the respectful treatment he receives from some world leaders. He is a cleric who, when free from the constraints of official titles, shakes hands with women. Such a person cannot be trusted by the religious bureaucracy. For this reason, he has been ordered to be banned from leaving the country to prevent him from becoming a focal point for efforts against the regime and its totalitarian ideology. Additionally, due to the perception of his victimhood among some segments, he has been prevented from participating in public gatherings and media. Considering the above three characteristics, it can be said that Khamenei and his security and military apparatus view Mohammad Khatami as a danger to themselves that cannot be easily disposed of, and thus they have placed him under complete surveillance and pressure. They consider him a serious threat outside his home or country. Despite his weakness in confronting his opponents and being harmless to the velayat-e faqih, Khatami poses a significant dilemma for the government. What does the continuation of these restrictions mean? From Khamenei's perspective and the security, military, and judicial institutions under his oversight, Mohammad Khatami's political life has ended, and no conditions or plans can bring him back to the political arena, even if his return would be beneficial for the regime. However, this stamp of finality is not a directive, and political life cannot simply be ended by brute force. History cannot be reversed, and Khatami cannot be treated as if his presidency and the events of Khordad 2nd never occurred. The Ministry of Truth of the Islamic Republic does not work well everywhere. Even if Khatami himself wishes to return to being an ordinary citizen, he cannot. Ordinary citizens are not banned from leaving the country without reason, nor are they instructed not to have their images published in state media and newspapers. The reason for his media ban is the nature of the government, Khatami's social influence, and popularity among certain segments. Despite his inability to advance reform programs in public opinion, he is neither considered a corrupt figure nor a criminal. Corruption and crime are two labels that can be applied to most officials of the Islamic Republic. Just look at the ministers of justice and industry in Rouhani's cabinet or the two former heads of state, Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, in previous cabinets. These labels have been applied not only by opponents but also by some of their friends. However, even Khatami's enemies cannot easily apply these two labels to him. His presidency marked the end of extraterritorial assassinations. Domestic assassinations were also directed not by him but by the leadership apparatus. His shortcomings have been understandable to the people who voted for him because they know the character and methods of Khamenei, the IRGC, and the judiciary. A significant portion of the public still has a positive view of the smiling Seyyed of 1997. A brief statement from him can change the outcome of elections in a city under close electoral conditions. This influence, since it is not under the control of the office of the leader, must be eliminated or engineered. The difficulty of completely eliminating reformists in the 1990s was only possible through two plans: abolishing the supervisory oversight and limiting the power of the velayat-e faqih to the law, which allowed them to mobilize groups behind them for a decade in the political landscape of Iran and challenge Khamenei and his loyalists. Their return to the political scene will not be possible by taking time from Khamenei for Mohammad Khatami. The political elimination of Mohammad Khatami has been Khamenei's and the office's project since the second of Khordad, 1997. Even before his presidency, he was under pressure from security and military apparatuses. Khatami is one of the few high-ranking government officials in Iran who has tasted the attacks of Ansar-e Hezbollah. This project can be seen in the tone of the treatment he receives in Khamenei's supervised newspapers and the coordinated actions of state television, the judiciary, the National Security Council, and the judiciary. This collective insists on preventing any emergence and appearance of his voice, image, and film in both media and gatherings. However, completely eliminating him is difficult. They cannot kill him like Jafar Pouyandeh and Mohammad Mokhtari in the back of a van in the deserts of Tehran or dismember him like Dariush Forouhar. Khamenei tries to keep him away from the political scene by scaring and discouraging him and also by instructing the Friday prayer leaders' headquarters to issue coordinated insults against him. Why such a clear response? Khamenei has always seen himself as a lone opponent of the excluded reformists and has reacted; his hatred for reformists sometimes even exceeds his hatred for the West and Israel; 2) With this stance, especially mentioning the beating of a Basij member, he wants to create cohesion among his supporters and incite hatred, even though he knows Khatami is not in favor of stripping Basij members in the streets. He also wants to solidify the fragmentation and inactivity of opposing forces; and 3) He seeks to legitimize the exclusion of some reformists so that no one dares to invite them back into the political space. Ultimately, the national reconciliation plan or Khatami's fate. The message that the excluded reformists have received between the lines of Khamenei's statements is that the national reconciliation plan, from Khamenei's perspective, is a plan for Khatami's return as the leader of the reformist faction to the political arena, and from his viewpoint, this file is closed, and the plan to lift the house arrest is also off the table. They must realize that without any message or reform plan, they cannot return to the political arena. The return of the excluded faction to political activity without conditions in elections or invitations to participate in the February 11 demonstrations and pretending that national reconciliation (which for the excluded reformists means reconciliation between the excluded reformists and Khamenei) has occurred will not be possible. Appointment or social mobilization program? The reformists in the 1990s were able to mobilize groups behind them in the political landscape of Iran for a decade only through two plans: abolishing the supervisory oversight and limiting the power of the velayat-e faqih to the law, challenging Khamenei and his loyalists. Their return to the political scene will not be possible by taking time from Khamenei for Mohammad Khatami. They need a plan to challenge the office and the IRGC and also mobilize forces behind them. I will mention two examples for social mobilization programs. These days, in every gathering, whether at Rafsanjani's funeral in Tehran or protests against the management of Khuzestan province in the face of dust storms, the slogan "Our radio and television, our disgrace, our disgrace" is heard. Khatami has the capacity, if he takes a little risk, to turn the dissolution of the state radio and television into a national and official demand. In this case, it will be Khamenei who will seek an appointment with Khatami. Another issue that can become a social mobilization program and has a suitable background is widespread and structural corruption. Corrupt individuals like Ahmad Tavakoli (two examples are obtaining scholarships without taking exams and transferring land from the Foundation of the Oppressed in West Town to him for establishing a school at a low price) today raise the banner of fighting corruption with the establishment of the Transparency and Justice Watchdog Network, which no one can trust. However, if someone like Mohammad Khatami enters this area (who, despite two decades of efforts by the judiciary, has not been able to find anything in his file), it will naturally put significant pressure on the government, especially the IRGC and the office. It is these capacities that make Khamenei and the IRGC concerned about Mohammad Khatami, but apparently, these capacities must remain dormant like other capacities in Iranian society.