Montazeri's Circle as the Link Between Reformists, Moderates, and Principlists

The special court ruling against Hojjatoleslam Ahmad Montazeri, a graduate of the Polytechnic University, is worth examining from various angles. From one perspective, the heavy sentence of 21 years in prison and the stripping of clerical robes, which has been reduced to 6 years of prison and a 3-year suspension of clerical status, indicates the severity of the justice crisis within the judiciary and the further decline of the repressive apparatus reliant on the institution of the Supreme Leader. After the severe shock caused by the release of an audio file of Ayatollah Montazeri's remarks during a meeting with the judicial delegation regarding the mass executions of 1988, which revived this major crime in the eyes of society, particularly the younger generations, high-ranking officials of the regime and institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards, the judiciary, revolutionary courts, the Ministry of Intelligence, and the Assembly of Experts reacted with panic and haste. Support for the unjust ruling, contrary to human rights standards, attributed to Ayatollah Khomeini, and its justification, alongside the scenario of linking Montazeri's household to the recent activities of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, shaped the initial reactions. Then, the special clerical court intervened and initiated a quasi-judicial and security process by summoning the son of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri and the son-in-law of Ayatollah Mohammad Mahdi Rabbani Amolshi. This court, which has no standing in the legal structure of the Islamic Republic, ultimately deviated from fair trial standards and unjustly condemned Ahmad Montazeri to heavy punishment for the baseless charge of releasing confidential documents. Although the immediate goal is to punish Ahmad Montazeri and take revenge on the Montazeri household, the broader political aim is deterrence against the release of similar audio files that could have shocking consequences for the political system and undermine its legitimacy, including the sanctification of Ayatollah Khomeini and his political and religious legacy. The special clerical court had serious issues with Montazeri during his life and after his death. Initially, this court was established as a branch of the judiciary at the beginning of the revolution to deal with clerics opposed to the revolution who had collaborated with the Pahlavi regime and were labeled as 'fake clerics' by the new government. During the reform period, controversial cases involving Mohsen Kadivar, Asadollah Bayat, Seyyed Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha, Hassan Youssefi Eshkevari, and Abdullah Nouri were prosecuted and sentenced in the special clerical court. This period marked the last confrontation of Ayatollah Montazeri with this court, which he deemed illegal and damaging to the clergy's reputation. Now, it seems that in the post-Montazeri era, the confrontation between the special clerical court and the Montazeris has evolved into a direct and face-to-face conflict. The court's extreme radicalism led to its closure upon Montazeri's request. However, the controversial case of Mehdi Hashemi prompted Ayatollah Khomeini to order the establishment of this court in a new form, directly under the supervision of the Supreme Leader, with prosecutor Ali Razini. Eventually, with Khomeini's direct intervention and advice, this court issued the death sentence for Mehdi Hashemi and punishments for other defendants in the case. This was the second confrontation of Ayatollah Montazeri with the special clerical court. Following Khamenei's leadership and the intensification of political rifts within the power bloc, the special clerical court entered a new phase of activity as a de facto independent branch of the judiciary under the leadership of Mohammad Nik Mohammad Rezaei, targeting clerics affiliated with the left faction, Montazeri's current faction, and followers of Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Shirazi in political cases. However, in the attack on Ahmad Montazeri, not only the close associates of the current Supreme Leader and various factions of the principlists and security and military forces were active, but many reformist and moderate figures also collaborated with the government's project. A few reformist and moderate figures, such as Mostafa Tajzadeh and Ali Motahari, deemed the release of the audio file acceptable. Even Mahmoud Sadeghi, a brave representative in parliament who, relatively speaking, cautiously insists on reformist demands and the rights of the people compared to other representatives of the Hope faction, made unjustified statements condemning the above action. The focus of the attacks from reformists and moderates was on Seyyed Hassan Khomeini and the Center for the Publication and Development of Ayatollah Khomeini's Works, led by Mohammad Ansari. Hashemi Rafsanjani and the Baran Foundation also collaborated with them. This unprecedented collaboration during Khamenei's leadership recalls the reaction to Ayatollah Montazeri's critical remarks in the autumn of 1997, when nearly all government factions condemned Montazeri's statements criticizing Khamenei's false clerical authority, his authoritarian approach, and his violations of the constitution. However, from a broader historical perspective, it reveals the shared interest of the two main political factions in the regime in preventing Montazeri's leadership. Montazeri's disagreements with the Society of Teachers of Qom Seminary regarding the judiciary and his confrontation with graduates of the Haqqani School, aligned with the right faction in the IRGC, Asadollah Lajevardi, and the then-Minister of Intelligence, caused the right faction to distance itself from Ayatollah Montazeri. However, when Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini and his aligned group, known as the Third Line, became disillusioned with gaining a dominant position in Montazeri's household and influencing him similarly to the office of the founder of the Islamic Republic, the project to prevent Montazeri's succession was initiated by the senior figures of the left faction of the regime. Existing evidence, including Mehdi Hashemi's last letter to Ayatollah Montazeri before his arrest, indicates Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's collaboration with this project. In fact, the interests of both factions of the regime converged after 1986 to weaken Montazeri's position in the power bloc. However, due to greater control over the levers of power, the left faction and the ancestors of today's reformists played a larger role in the illegal removal of Ayatollah Montazeri from the vice-presidency of the Supreme Leader, which ultimately stemmed from the fundamental disagreement between Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah Khomeini over the future of the regime, governance methods, and interpretations of the guardianship of the jurist, leading to the issuance of the famous letters of 6/1 and 8/1 in April 1989 and the illegal dismissal of Ayatollah Montazeri. Now, after the issuance of the unjust ruling against Ahmad Montazeri, the senior reformists have remained silent, and no dissenting voices have been heard from them or their intermediary forces. Most representatives of the Hope faction, who have claimed to defend the rights of the people while sitting in the green chairs of parliament, have also not protested. Therefore, just as most reformist and moderate forces bear moral responsibility for collaborating with the scenario in the issuance of this ruling, they have also contributed to strengthening the position of the special clerical court in the aftermath of the ruling, further casting doubt on their claims regarding national sovereignty and the observance of citizens' rights, and reinforcing the suspicion of instrumental treatment. Thus, it is not incorrect to say that the Montazeris and their resistance against their historical, human, and freedom-seeking positions still represent a point of convergence and a link between the left and right factions of the regime.