Mosul and Aleppo Along the Road from Iran to the Mediterranean

Why did the Islamic Republic of Iran agree to the non-participation of its allied Iraqi Shiite militias (Hashd al-Shaabi) in the operation to liberate Mosul from the control of the Islamic State group? And how does this stance relate to Tehran's longstanding plans to create a communication route to the Mediterranean Sea? The British newspaper The Guardian reported last week that the Shiite militias of Hashd al-Shaabi are finalizing their plans for participation in the Mosul operation. The report notes that the Shiite militias will not have a direct role in the attack on Mosul to ensure that the Sunni residents of the city are assured that the operation is not motivated by religious reasons. The Hashd al-Shaabi militias will play a blocking role on the western side of Mosul to prevent the escape of Islamic State militants to their last major stronghold, the city of Raqqa in Syria. The Guardian wrote that by not entering the city of Mosul, the Shiite militias will have the opportunity to pursue one of their most prominent goals, which is to secure a sphere of influence in Iraq and Syria that leads to the Mediterranean Sea. After 12 years of war in Iraq and the bloody conflicts in recent years in Syria, Iran is now closer than ever to securing a land route that will stabilize its foothold in the region; a route that may change the way the Islamic Republic is present in Arab areas. An European official monitoring Iran's role in the past five years of warfare stated, "They are seriously working to achieve this goal." This official, who requested anonymity, added, "Iranians will be able to transfer forces and munitions between the Mediterranean Sea and Tehran whenever they want, and they will do this through secure routes that they or their representatives will secure." Discussions with regional officials, influential Iraqi figures, and residents of northern Syria indicate that this land route has been gradually taking shape since 2014. The route is complex, passing through the Arab part of Iraq, heading to northern Syria, and reaching northeastern Syria by passing through northern Aleppo, where Iran has now stationed forces. Turkey opposes this Iranian plan, mainly due to Iran's relationship with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), as a large part of Iran's plan is related to Kurdish areas in Syria. According to The Guardian, high-ranking government and security officials from Tehran, Baghdad, and Damascus, who are subject to Iran's foreign policies and the Quds Force, the IRGC's overseas branch, have laid out the details of this plan. This plan includes demographic changes in certain areas, which we are witnessing in central Iraq and will also occur in northern Syria. The implementation of this plan heavily relies on the support of a large array of allies, many of whom are not familiar with the essence of the plan. The road begins from the transit areas that Iran has used for sending forces and weapons to Iraq over the past 12 years. This is the same route that the Quds Force used to launch street warfare against American forces in Iraq with the help of its allies, and these allies are now playing a role in the fight against the Islamic State. American officials say that the groups "Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq" and "Hezbollah Iraq," which are supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran, are responsible for about 25 percent of American casualties in Iraq. These groups have become more influential since the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. One of the interesting contradictions in modern warfare is that after the return of American forces to Iraq to fight the Islamic State group, these Shiite militias sometimes carried out their operations with American air support. The Iranian road in question passes through Baqubah, the center of Diyala province located 60 kilometers north of Baghdad. The demographic composition of Baqubah has been Shiite-Sunni for hundreds of years. This city was one of the main tension areas in Iraq's recent civil wars. The road then goes northwest to areas that were under Islamic State control in recent months, via roads secured by the Shiite militias (Hashd al-Shaabi). The town of Sharqat in Salah al-Din province is one of the important areas in this plan. This town came under the control of Iraqi forces and Hashd al-Shaabi militias on September 22. A large number of Shiite militias are now present in the town of Sharqat and are preparing to move west towards Mosul; an area located about 80 kilometers southeast of Sinjar. Between this area and Sinjar lies the town of Tal Afar, which is still under Islamic State control and has historically been a homeland for Turkmen, Sunnis, and Shiites. A senior Iraqi intelligence official says that the area between Tal Afar and Sinjar is very important for the plan. Sinjar is considered the historical residence of the Yazidis, most of whom were killed or fled during the Islamic State group's attack in 2014. Kurdish forces expelled the Islamic State militants from the city in November 2015. Since then, the PKK militants who were present in Syria have been transferred to Sinjar. According to The Guardian, the Iraqi government has paid the PKK militants and linked them to the Hashd al-Shaabi units. Intelligence officials from Iraq and the West say that Falah al-Fayyad, the National Security Advisor of the Iraqi government, has agreed to this action. Abdul Rahim al-Shammari, one of the prominent tribal leaders in Iraq, who is very influential in areas near the Rabia crossing leading to Syria, is supported by Shiite militias and is close to Bashar al-Assad's regime in Damascus. Al-Shammari told the Observer newspaper, "I do not believe that Iran has a significant influence in our region." He continued, "There is no large force to provide us with military assistance, but in terms of ideology, the PKK takes care of the Kurds in this area, and there is no problem with their presence." The road in question, after the Rabia crossing, passes through the cities of Qamishli and Kobani and goes to Afrin. These areas are controlled by the People's Protection Units (YPG). Throughout the YPG's war, they have had various alliances, sometimes allied with the United States against the Islamic State and at other times standing alongside the Syrian regime. An European official says, "Iran believes it has stationed its affiliated units in areas where it is necessary, but we are not sure it has accurately assessed the scale of Turkish presence and power." Turkey has recently begun its intervention in northern Syria and may expand it. It is also present around Mosul, claiming that its action is to "prevent the demographic change in the region." Among all the areas from Tehran to the Syrian coast, Iran has concentrated its greatest power in Aleppo. About 6,000 Iranian-backed militants, most of whom are Iraqi, are present around Aleppo and are preparing for full control of the city. Those who have followed Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, in the front lines of the war in Syria and Iraq, or his participation in meetings in Damascus and Baghdad, say that he has invested the most in Syria. Ahmad Chalabi, the late Iraqi politician, told the Observer newspaper in 2014: "In a meeting I had with Soleimani, he told me that if we lose Syria, we will lose Tehran," he quoted Soleimani as saying, "We will turn every chaos into an opportunity." Control of Aleppo will be a crucial station in shaping this road. This road passes near two villages in northern Syria that have historically been Shiite-populated. A high-ranking official and other Iraqi officials say that the road in question leads towards the suburbs of Homs, the fourth largest city in Syria; then it goes north and passes through the Alawite bases in Syria; an area that has been secured by Russian air power for Assad over the past year. This road, for which Iran has made significant efforts and expenditures, ends at the port of Latakia, which has not fallen out of the control of Syrian military forces during the war.