Muqtada al-Sadr's Shift Towards Saudi Arabia; Decrease of Iran's Influence in Iraq

Muqtada al-Sadr, the Iraqi Shia cleric, has returned to the political scene in Iraq, explicitly stating that he is unwilling to reconcile with Iran and form alliances with major Iraqi groups that are close to Iran. Simultaneously, Iran is concerned about its diminishing influence in Iraq and is negotiating for the presence of its approved politicians in the new cabinet of the country. Reuters has reported that Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, is negotiating with Iraqi politicians. This week's program has raised the question of why Iran's influence in Iraq is decreasing and what impact this issue will have on the future relations between the two countries. With the presence of Haman Seydi, a Middle East studies expert and analyst based in the UK, and Javad Talai, an analyst on Arab and North African issues residing in Germany. Mr. Talai, let’s start with you. What is your analysis of Muqtada al-Sadr's rise in the recent elections in Iraq? In my opinion, Muqtada al-Sadr's rise is a sign of Iraq's political shift from Iran towards Saudi Arabia. Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr, who lived in Iran before the fall of Saddam's regime, had close relations with the Islamic Republic until about a year ago. However, these relations had weakened in recent years, and there were disagreements between him and the Islamic Republic over internal competition in Iraq. Last summer, Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr traveled to Riyadh and met with the new Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and after this trip, he indicated a shift towards Saudi Arabian politics to the extent that many observers and analysts believed that Saudi Arabia promised him substantial aid. Now, when news of his victory was announced after these elections, he issued a statement emphasizing the secular and pluralistic nature of the future Iraqi government and the reduction of foreign influence in Iraq, particularly referring to Iran. Javad Talai: "I believe that the future Iraqi government, which will not be strong—since only 44% of the Iraqi people participated in this election—will still lean towards Saudi Arabia and will attempt to implement the policy currently pursued by Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel in the region, which is to reduce Iran's influence." Let’s ask the same question to Mr. Seydi. Mr. Seydi, Muqtada al-Sadr was previously known as a radical Shia cleric close to Iran. What caused him to distance himself from Iran? Before answering that, I would like to say that it is still early to say that Muqtada al-Sadr has come to power. What has happened so far is his electoral victory. Whether this victory will lead to power remains to be seen; we had a negative example of this in 2010 when Mr. Iyad Allawi's coalition received the highest votes but ultimately, due to Iranian interventions, Mr. Nouri al-Maliki became Prime Minister. However, the likelihood of this repeating itself with Muqtada al-Sadr is not very strong because he has a stronger social base than Iyad Allawi. Regarding the reason for his shift, it seems very clear to me. They had a model in mind from the days before the Iraq war and before the fall of Saddam, which was the model of the Islamic Revolution. You remember, the first organization that Iran established for Iraqis was called the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution. After Saddam's fall, Iran tried to replicate its system in Iraq and turn it into one of its satellite countries, implementing the Shia crescent, effectively making Iraq's future conditions a reflection of Iran's current situation. This situation is very tragic. The people of Iraq, including their political leaders and Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr, see what the end or fate of the Islamic government in Iran was. They are informed through media about Iran's economic conditions, political, international, and internal situations, and the public protests that occurred last December when people, fed up with the 'ideal conditions of the government,' protested in a hundred cities against the Islamic regime and political Islam. All of this provides sufficient grounds and reasons for people like Muqtada al-Sadr to pursue secularism, to view the political Islam model as a failure, and not to want to be isolated in the Arab world and the free world, to avoid being surrounded by other countries, and to not bear the costs of Iran's wrong policies. All of this realistically leads Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr to conclude that if there is to be a prosperous and free Iraq, it must embrace secularism instead of political Islam, and it must have a technocratic government of specialists instead of a government of individuals affiliated with certain Islamic parties, which has made Iraq one of the most corrupt countries in the world in recent years. These reasons, in my opinion, collectively led to these electoral events, and I reiterate that it is still early to say that Muqtada al-Sadr has come to power; he may come to power. Mr. Seydi, now that you mentioned an example from years ago, how likely do you think it is that Iran will interfere in the formation of the new Iraqi government again? Haman Seydi: "Iran intervened in the Iraqi elections. It intervened very strongly and effectively. All the expenses of the Popular Mobilization Forces were funded by Iran, and their candidate, Hadi al-Amiri, was unsuccessful. Also, Nouri al-Maliki, Iran's long-time ally who implemented Iran's policies from 2005 to 2014 for nine years, also failed. However, I believe Iran will not give up and will make every effort. While Iran tries, the conditions have changed; 2010 is not the same as 2018. Iran in 2018 does not have the same capacity and power as in 2010, and even recent developments are significant. I mentioned Iran's internal issues, and even regional and global developments for Iran, such as the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, which is a political blow to the Islamic Republic that Iraqi individuals and citizens in their cities see. They see that going down with Iran's rope has a heavy cost. In my opinion, while Iran will make every effort, the likelihood that it can impose a second individual as the prime minister instead of the first is low, and I believe it will not have that much leverage. Mr. Talai, I want to know your opinion on Mr. Seydi's remarks. How much do you agree with him that Iran does not have the same power it did even eight years ago, and its influence has decreased? I completely agree with his views. Iran made significant efforts to influence the elections. The main force supported by Iran in Iraq, as he mentioned, is currently the Popular Mobilization Forces, which, to my knowledge, were supposed to be integrated into the Iraqi army, meaning their members would be employed in the Iraqi army, but this issue remains unresolved for now. This situation could create a significant crisis in Iraq that Iran could potentially exploit to its advantage. However, the possibility of it having a decisive influence and replacing someone with Muqtada al-Sadr, if he takes on the country's responsibilities, is very weak. Mr. Seydi's point is entirely correct. Iran is still in a very weak position, under pressure from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and with U.S. support. It has to bear the burden of sanctions, and internally it has no remaining base, public dissatisfaction has weakened it significantly, and under these conditions, it is very difficult for it to continue its previous policies in Iraq with the commitments that have arisen there and with the experiences that the Iraqi people have, as Mr. Seydi mentioned. Iran does not have the chance to do what it did five or six years ago and place someone in power instead of Muqtada al-Sadr. The only thing it can do is to try to somehow include some of its past supporters, like Mr. Nouri al-Maliki, in the new government so that they can consider the interests of the Islamic Republic in some areas. Let’s not forget that Saudi Arabia, given the internal economic crisis in Iraq, with its substantial revenues, can provide significant economic support to the new Iraqi government, which could be a strong incentive for Iraqis. Because to rebuild their devastated country, in which the Popular Mobilization Forces have also played a role similar to ISIS in some areas, Iraqis can use this opportunity to alleviate their economic crises. Mr. Talai, you mentioned Saudi Arabia. Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr has stated that he does not want other countries to interfere in Iraq. You also mentioned that he was directly referring to Iran. What about the proximity to Saudi Arabia? Can we say that Saudi Arabia is now intervening in Iraq in some way? Interventions cannot be direct. Neither from Iran nor from Saudi Arabia. They have both conducted a proxy war in the past years in Syria and Iraq, which later extended to Yemen. Now, what Saudi Arabia can do is to strengthen Sunni parties and groups against Shia parties and groups like Muqtada al-Sadr, who have distanced themselves somewhat from Iran. This strengthening can occur in two ways: first, as you know, Iraq and Saudi Arabia share a significant border, so Saudi Arabia can assist Iraq through this route. Secondly, it can provide substantial financial aid because Iran is not in a position to spend money on these countries like before. It is heavily entangled in Syria, and its primary goal is to maintain Bashar al-Assad's regime. Therefore, the scene seems somewhat more open for Saudi Arabia compared to Iran. Mr. Seydi, let’s return a bit to the various parties and groups in Iraq. What role do you think the Kurds play in the current political scene in Iraq? Well, the first Kurdish party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Mr. Barzani, has now become the fourth party in Iraq, which could be decisive in determining which party to ally with. It seems that they are close to Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr, and the probability that Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr and the Kurds or a significant portion of the Kurds will ally is very strong. Additionally, Islamists in Kurdistan have been significantly weakened, meaning that out of the 55-56 seats the Kurds have won, they have only obtained 5 seats, which was not the case before. This should also be considered that Kurdistan could be the key to Muqtada al-Sadr's connection with the West because Muqtada al-Sadr had poor relations with the West, especially the U.S. He is still on the American blacklist, I believe. However, the Kurds have good relations with Europeans and with the West and the U.S. They may likely use this diplomatic channel to improve their relations with the West. Another point is that Iranian-affiliated movements like Nouri al-Maliki and Hadi al-Amiri played a negative role in last year's events in Kirkuk. Now, in the Kirkuk elections, the Kurds have regained the majority of seats. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan alone has won 7 out of 12 seats in Kirkuk. Perhaps this also provides another ground for cooperation and rapprochement for Muqtada al-Sadr as a new movement, and the Kurds can enter into an alliance with them and raise their demands regarding holding a referendum or implementing Article 140 of the Constitution that was established, and use this as a basis for participation and cooperation. Mr. Talai, it has been discussed that Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr is allied with secularists. The coalition he has includes both secularists and communists. How is it that a radical Shia cleric has now come closer to pluralists and secularists? Well, the experience of the past ten or thirteen years has shown Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr that if he wants to dominate in Iraq, he will never have a chance. His force alone is never sufficient to govern Iraq. Therefore, he must choose his allies. If he goes towards Shia supporters of the Islamic Republic, they are not aligned with him. The other force in Iraq, as mentioned, includes at least part of the Kurds and secular forces. Communists, of course, have traditionally been present since the time of Saddam Hussein and have sometimes had several ministers in the Iraqi cabinet, but they are not a major force. The major forces are those supporting Iyad Allawi, Kurdish forces, and supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr, and to some extent, Shia supporters of Ayatollah Sistani. He can form a coalition government from this combination of forces that has a chance of continuing governance. The issue in Iraq, now fundamentally, should be said that it is no longer a matter of religion. The differences between Shia and Sunni are also tools in the hands of foreign forces, but what is most important in Iraq is building Iraq, the prosperity of Iraq, ensuring water, electricity, food supplies, and infrastructure for the people of this country. A government can succeed in Iraq that can remove these problems from the people's path by attracting more and maximum forces while also attracting foreign investment, which is very important. You know that Iraq's oil exports in recent years have multiplied compared to the Islamic Republic, becoming the second-largest oil exporter in OPEC. Therefore, with these oil revenues, if a large national force takes control of the government in Iraq and if tribal and religious wars come to an end or are alleviated, there is a chance for building Iraq. However, I am concerned about one issue.