National Reconciliation: A Hollow and Fruitless Plan to Approach Khamenei

Following the death of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and on the eve of the 2017 presidential elections, the religious reformists (the excluded faction from power) have proposed a plan called 'National Reconciliation.' Political activists from the reformist camp, both individually and collectively (in letters signed by tens of thousands), have supported this plan, aiming to turn it into a public demand. The non-excluded faction, which is sometimes present in the government and parliament, also supports it because this support carries no cost due to the ambiguity of the plan. But why 'National Reconciliation'? Where does the term 'national' come from? Is it intended for all opponents to participate in this plan or just the religious reformists? What is the goal of this plan? Do the reformists have the means to win over the opposing side or force them into reconciliation? Have they clarified the details of this plan? Who needs to reconcile? What reaction has the opposing side shown? Will this plan yield any results? The title is misleading, empty, and ironic. This plan is neither for 'reconciliation' nor 'national.' If it were for reconciliation, there should have been prior estrangement from the excluded religious reformists. The reformists demonstrated since the 2010 elections that there was no estrangement. Despite the killing of over a hundred people and the arrest of more than ten thousand, they not only did not boycott the 2010 parliamentary elections but many participated (Mohammad Khatami voted in Damavand). Even if they did not enter the 2010 elections as serious competitors, it was not because they wanted to boycott but because they knew they had little power (their effective forces were in prison) and all their candidates were disqualified by the Guardian Council (except for those like Mostafa Kavakebian who raised the flag of the Beyt after June 22, 2009). In the years 2013 and 2015, they did everything possible to hold the presidential and parliamentary elections magnificently. In terms of criticism and practical opposition, they have completely silenced dissent. Thus, there has been no estrangement from the reformists for reconciliation to take place. Even if the ice between the excluded religious reformists and Khamenei were to thaw (which is highly unlikely), calling this plan 'national' is ironic. Dozens of political groups and opposition movements are in exile, their forces are in prison, and thousands of political, ideological, and civil activists are imprisoned or have prison sentences hanging over them like a sword to silence them. Where do they fit into this national reconciliation plan, and what is their role? Can the reformists' attempt to gain a few hours for dialogue with Khamenei be called national reconciliation? Is national reconciliation possible without releasing political prisoners and holding free elections? Why the 'National Reconciliation' plan? The excluded religious reformists pursue three goals in presenting this plan: they want to find a way for direct dialogue with Khamenei after Rafsanjani's death, who was the intermediary between them and Khamenei; they know that without a channel for dialogue with Khamenei, they cannot continue to exist in Iran's political space: 'The reformist movement is aware that without broad communication with the leadership institution, it is either impossible to fulfill its duties or will be severely limited.' (Majid Ansari, parliamentary deputy of Hassan Rouhani, Mehr News, February 25, 2017). With this plan, they aim to engage in formal and open political activity without complying with the demands of the Beyt and security institutions and the IRGC, namely 'repenting for the 2009 sedition' and 'apologizing to the people,' just like in the 1990s when some prisoners and those under house arrest were released. National reconciliation, as it obliges both sides to adhere to certain conditions, dignifies the reformists as legitimate and constructive opponents; they want to mitigate the possibility of Rouhani's disqualification given the murmurs about it by proposing friendship and rapprochement. Rouhani's use of reformist forces in the cabinet and high management levels is one of the Achilles' heels that the reformists do not want to harm the Rouhani government in the upcoming elections. They view Rouhani's government as a rented womb for returning to power. All three goals seem meaningless to Khamenei and the security and military forces. First, if Khamenei saw a need to talk to Khatami and other reformist leaders, he would invite them for consultation or at least lift barriers such as media bans or travel restrictions. Khamenei did not even allow Khatami to visit him in the hospital. Second, the 'system' does not feel the need for an opposing faction under the title of legitimate reformists, and all its efforts over the past 28 years have been aimed at eliminating them. The government has paid a high cost to eliminate them and does not want this cost to be without benefit. No new political crisis or event has occurred in Iran for the system to feel the need for them. Third, the murmurs about Rouhani's disqualification are more about controlling him further by the Beyt's agents, just like the negative propaganda against the government by the Beyt's propaganda apparatus, which aims to make Rouhani obedient to the Supreme Leader and is not seeking to eliminate him. Beyond that, in the elimination or retention of Rouhani, the only factor that will play no role will be the excluded reformists. The idea of a rented womb, given Rouhani's character as a person with three decades of security experience, is a false notion. Today, Rouhani benefits more from the reformists than they do from him. The lost place of the reformists in the system. The National Reconciliation plan is a tool for the excluded reformists to find their place in the political system after the Green Movement and the subsequent tensions, but the government has predetermined their place (house arrest and distance from power centers), and the excluded reformists have no leverage to force the rulers to reconsider their actions and opinions. Hassan Rouhani's reaction to this plan and its implicit approval is merely a matter of courtesy and appeasement because the government, as it has repeatedly indicated implicitly, cannot do anything regarding issues like the house arrest of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard, and in this matter, it should also do nothing to avoid putting itself against Khamenei and the Beyt. In fact, the positions of two of Rouhani's close associates, namely Majid Ansari (parliamentary deputy) and Mahmoud Vaezi (Minister of Communications), in referring the reformists in this matter to Khamenei are very telling: 'That Mr. Khatami and other reformist leaders emphasized that we should increase our relations with the leadership and the leadership institution is a necessity.' (Ansari, Mehr News, February 25, 2017); 'The entire nation and officials must stand behind the leader and pursue unity and solidarity.' (Vaezi, ILNA, February 25, 2017). They explicitly state that the reformists are in this matter facing Khamenei and his Beyt, and the government should be exempted from this issue. The plan is empty and lacks substance. Aside from a stylish title, the plan includes no specific framework or materials. Aside from the fact that the leaders of the excluded reformist movement want to go to Khamenei for a few hours of hand-kissing, what other expectations do they have from this plan? What actions do they want the opposing side to take or refrain from? What changes do they want to make in their own behavior (changes they have not made so far), and what are their red lines (if any)? What are the stages of this national reconciliation? Which groups should participate in this plan? None of this is clear. For this reason, the reaction to this empty plan has also been sarcastic and interpretative from the opposing faction, which clearly demonstrates its futility. The head of the judiciary regarding this plan states, 'Our insightful and discerning people do not have any fundamental disagreements or divisions where national interests and security are concerned that would require national reconciliation; therefore, this discussion lacks substance.' (ISNA, February 25, 2017). This means that Khamenei's close associates do not see critical and non-loyal reformists as part of the core government to be concerned about disagreements with them. Some reformists have also previously pledged unconditional allegiance to the Beyt and Khamenei, so there is no need for reconciliation with them. The core of the engaged forces in the government consists entirely of loyalists to Khamenei who share consensus in opinion and action. The political view of the opposing faction towards the excluded reformists is not that of a rival political movement but rather as criminals and traitors. Mohammad Reza Bahonar considers national reconciliation meaningless from this perspective, stating, 'It is reconciliation between the criminal and the judge.' (Alef, February 25, 2017). When the goals of a plan are not explicitly stated, others will express it through insinuation: 'The reformists' intention behind the national reconciliation plan is the freedom of the sedition leaders.' (Rouhollah Hosseinian, head of the Islamic Revolution Document Center, Mehr News, February 24, 2017). The empty hands of the excluded reformists. Today, the excluded reformists do not have the power to mobilize social support because they have no specific demands (unlike the 1990s when they demanded the cancellation of the Guardian Council's oversight and the limitation of the powers of appointed institutions and the leader); they have neither a powerful party (the licenses of the Participation Front and the Mojahedin of the Revolution have been revoked), nor an independent media to present their ideas and policies, nor structured connections with existing civil institutions. They have not offered an alternative set of policies to the existing ones for the opponents of the government to rally behind them. Therefore, why should Khamenei and his close associates read their plan and count on it, let alone react to its (unstated) details? For this reason, the national reconciliation plan will quickly be forgotten.