New Agency Report: Lifting Sanctions in Spring Next Year

The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has predicted in the first report on the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic following the signing of the nuclear agreement on July 14 in Vienna that if Tehran fulfills its commitments regarding verification of suspected military dimensions and rolling back conventional activities, the gradual lifting of sanctions will likely begin after March of next year. The new report from the Agency, published on August 27, indicates that the Director General's final report to the Board of Governors will be presented before a final decision is made regarding the date for the lifting of sanctions on December 15 of this year. Among the criticisms that domestic opponents of the JCPOA in Iran raise is the negotiators' disregard for the red lines set by the Supreme Leader, who previously emphasized that the lifting of sanctions is not a result of nuclear negotiations and should occur simultaneously with reaching an agreement. According to the agreement, the gradual lifting of sanctions is conditional on the fulfillment of commitments accepted by Iran and is subject to confirmation by the IAEA. The reciprocal commitments of Iran and the 1+5 group, which include verification of activities suspected of having military objectives and limiting Iran's nuclear activities, are set to begin on October 17 (90 days after the July 14 nuclear agreement). According to Amano's latest report to the Board of Governors, Iran has increased the output of enriched uranium produced by IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz from an average of 217 kilograms per month to 227 kilograms. Based on this report, as of August 7, Iran's current stock of enriched or processed uranium consists of 7.845 kilograms of uranium gas with a concentration of 3.5 percent and 4.304 kilograms of uranium in various chemical forms. One of the conditions for lifting sanctions is to reduce this stock to 300 kilograms of uranium gas and to remove the remaining uranium after processing (converted to uranium oxide) from Iran. According to the Agency's report, 4.304 kilograms of uranium gas has been transferred to the uranium oxide production site for conversion to powder, but the factory's yield has been very weak, with only about ten percent of the transferred stock converted to uranium oxide 235 with a concentration of 5 percent so far. The new report states that Iran has halted all research and development activities regarding the use of advanced centrifuges beyond the IR-1 and has adopted the same approach regarding the injection of gas into these types of centrifuges. Many observers of Iran's nuclear activities expected the issue of inspections at Parchin and the (secret) agreement between Amano and Iran regarding verification of activities suspected of having military dimensions to be addressed. Regarding Parchin, the Director General's report indicates the continued examination of satellite images and the observation of construction machinery at the suspicious site, as well as the construction of an annex building at the site. According to the report, Amano claims that Iran has resumed new activities at this site following the July 14 agreement. Reza Najafi, Iran's representative at the Agency, called an analysis published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Washington regarding the resumption of soil washing and construction at Parchin 'ridiculous,' and Javad Zarif similarly dismissed its content. The Amano report remains silent on two secret agreements that are said to have taken place between the Agency and Iran. A notable point in the potential agreement between the Agency and Iran, which has sparked heated discussions in the U.S. Congress, is the method of sampling from the suspicious site at Parchin, which is said to have been agreed upon by the Agency to be conducted by Iran without the presence of the mentioned institute's agents. The Director General's silence in the new report and the potential agreement with Iran may align with U.S. policy, which appears to overlook past activities suspected of having military dimensions in exchange for halting ongoing activities and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons; a justification of means to achieve the main goal.