New Saudi Rulers and Recent Developments in the Middle East

King Salman, the newly ascended king of Saudi Arabia, last week appointed his nephew Mohammed bin Nayef as Crown Prince and his son Mohammed bin Salman as Deputy Crown Prince on the same day. This replacement in the highest ranks of the Saudi monarchy made headlines, especially since, contrary to the will of Abdulaziz, the founder of the House of Saud, the new Crown Prince is not one of Abdulaziz's sons. Furthermore, both the Crown Prince and the Deputy Crown Prince are young graduates of American universities. According to some observers, this shift marks the beginning of a new era for Saudi Arabia, characterized by closer ties with the United States on one hand and a demonstration of initiative in foreign policy within the Arab world and the Middle East on the other. This initiative, as noted by these observers, could be heralded by the military attack on Yemen last month, even before the new power structure in Saudi Arabia was established. But will this new arrangement allow for continuity in certain aspects of Saudi foreign policy? What consequences will this shift have for the currently strained relations between Riyadh and Tehran, especially following Saudi Arabia's military attack on Yemen? Three guests this week on the Views program will address these questions: Hassan Hashemian, an expert on Arab affairs in Turkey; Hossein Alizadeh, a former diplomat of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Finland; and Habib Hosseini Fard, an international relations analyst in Germany. Mr. Hashemian, you regularly follow issues and events in Saudi Arabia. Were there signs of these changes previously, or was this transformation at the top of the power hierarchy in Riyadh unexpected for you? Hassan Hashemian: I expected such a change; however, the environment in which this change was to take place had not been very conducive before, but now it has become more favorable, especially since Prince Muqrin has been ill for a long time and has been away from his duties. Considering the Decisive Storm operation, which was primarily carried out by the two individuals who are now the Crown Prince and Deputy Crown Prince, there was a significant opening for them. Prior to this operation, it was not widely believed that it would gain support in the Arab world, the Islamic world, or even internationally. However, when the operation took place, public opinion in the Arab world strongly supported it, and with Resolution 2216 issued by the Security Council, it gained international backing, along with some limited successes inside Yemen that prevented the fall of Aden and stopped the Houthis from advancing to Bab-el-Mandeb. All these variables combined to help Salman establish his theory that a new generation of the House of Saud should be in power and make way for the grandchildren of King Abdulaziz. For this reason, they have taken power in this manner. Mr. Alizadeh, it was mentioned regarding the events in Yemen. Has the nature of Saudi policymaking fundamentally changed with Mohammed bin Nayef, King Salman's nephew, in the position of Crown Prince, and Mohammed bin Salman, King Salman's son, as Deputy Crown Prince, or do the policies remain largely the same? Hossein Alizadeh: Until recently, Saudi Arabia was known as a conservative country. A conservative country in regional developments always stands behind a larger country and does not get involved in conflicts. After all, the term conservative has a universal meaning. We are now witnessing a very important juncture not only for Saudi Arabia but for the entire Middle East, where Saudi Arabia is transitioning from a conservative country to an authoritarian one. Iraq during Saddam Hussein was a country that intervened militarily and dictated its terms to neighboring countries, even extorting money and behaving in an authoritarian manner. This is very significant for us from Iran's perspective. We need to understand what is happening in our periphery, and the reason Saudi Arabia is moving from a layer of conservatism to authoritarianism has a very clear reason. The Arab world has so far revolved around its two major powerful countries: Iraq and Egypt. Both are currently witnessing conflicts and tensions that have weakened their power. With the decline of this power, another country must replace them, and what better country than Saudi Arabia, which is increasing in population, strengthening its oil power, and enhancing its military capabilities. What is happening in the internal arrangement of the country, as per your previous question, indicates that the targeting and planning of this government is to become a regional authoritarian power, and from now on, we should consider Saudi Arabia as a significant power in the Middle East. Thank you, Mr. Alizadeh, you addressed the reasons and roots. Now I will ask Mr. Hosseini Fard about this. Mr. Hosseini Fard, what backgrounds might have led King Salman to appoint Mohammed bin Nayef as Crown Prince instead of delegating the position to one of Abdulaziz's sons, despite Abdulaziz's will? Habib Hosseini Fard: It seems that this frozen and stagnant political structure within Saudi Arabia necessitated changes. Family and tribal disputes wanted to restore their dominance in power after King Abdullah's death; this was also a factor. A very important point in these changes is the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States. That is, regardless of the fact that after the events of 2003, the issue of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Iranian nuclear crisis somewhat strained the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S., we see that since the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia has fundamentally lost its previous trust in the U.S. It believes that there is no strong and stable ally like the U.S. to rely on in its regional policy. We see that in the case of Bahrain, it acts independently and sends forces there. Even in the case of Yemen, we see that the U.S. Secretary of Defense stated that when Saudi Arabia wanted to start the attack, it informed us. Not that we were unaware, but they initiated the attack in this manner. Overall, this Iranian nuclear crisis and the proximity that the U.S. may have with Iran has increasingly placed Saudi Arabia in a position where it must rely more on itself and its regional forces and the cohesion and alliances it forms in the region. All these reasons have influenced its foreign policy, making it somewhat more aggressive, moving away from proxy wars, and engaging in confrontation with its main rival, Iran, as we see in Yemen. However, it seems that Saudi conservatism will remain intact domestically. The presence of Mr. Mohammed bin Nayef at the head of the Ministry of Interior since 2012 indicates that this policy of closure and obstruction internally is regressing compared to what King Abdullah initiated from 2003 and 2004, and we will continue to witness conservative foreign policy within Saudi Arabia. Mr. Hashemian, it was mentioned regarding Saudi relations with the U.S. Both the Crown Prince and the Deputy Crown Prince are educated in American universities. Can this characteristic in itself help eliminate misunderstandings that arose after September 11 between Riyadh and Washington, given that most of the attackers in the 9/11 incident were Saudi citizens? Hassan Hashemian: What you mentioned is entirely correct. Most of those who carried out the September 11 incident were Saudi. Therefore, a widespread atmosphere against Saudi Arabia formed in the U.S. However, considering that these two individuals, as you pointed out, are educated in the U.S. and are somewhat familiar with American affairs, and in addition, Mr. Adel al-Jubeir, who is now the Foreign Minister and has spent most of his life in the U.S., has worked in media and communication with American intellectuals, they have been trying to eliminate the misunderstandings that have arisen. Moreover, Adel al-Jubeir has worked in the U.S. for years and has tried to distance Saudi Arabia's image from what was associated with September 11. Therefore, the efforts currently being made are precisely in line with eliminating the last types of misunderstandings in the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Mr. Alizadeh, you mentioned that Saudi Arabia is filling a void in the Arab world. Does this mean that from now on we should see Saudi Arabia as an innovator in foreign policy among many Arab countries, similar to how Egypt was during Nasser, or will Saudi foreign policymaking take a different shape after these transformations? Hossein Alizadeh: Yes. Not only should we consider Saudi Arabia as the focal point of the Arab world from now on, but given the discussion of moving away from conservatism and leaning towards authoritarianism that I mentioned, we should also see Saudi Arabia as the focal point of the Islamic world. That is, a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. I will give you two examples. In a showdown between Tehran and Riyadh regarding the survival of Assad's government in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Saudi Arabia was able to hold an emergency meeting, and Mr. Ahmadinejad also attended. The only country that voted to keep Syria here was Iran. All other countries stood behind Saudi Arabia and suspended Syria's membership in this organization. As we know, at Saudi Arabia's recommendation, this issue occurred exactly in the Arab League. Beyond the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, you can see how many resolutions Saudi Arabia has sponsored that were issued in the General Assembly condemning the Syrian government. I recall that Saudi Arabia was chosen as a non-permanent member of the Security Council last year, which can be a great honor for any country, but hours after its name was announced, it declared that it would not enter the council in protest that the Security Council could not fulfill its duty to ensure peace and security in the region. This was the first time in the history of the United Nations that this happened. As a protest, it said, I have been accepted, but I will not enter the council. Organizational diplomacy is one aspect of every country's power display. You saw the example of it in the Arab Council, in the General Assembly, in the Arab League, in the Organization of Cooperation... all these tools are well utilized by Saudi Arabia. One example of these tools that Tehran cannot utilize. Let me give you a simple example. Right now, Tehran is struggling to claim that Saudi Arabia is committing atrocities, etc. Why doesn't it request an emergency meeting of the Organization of Cooperation? Because it knows that in that forum, Saudi Arabia holds the upper hand. Therefore, if we consider the factors of internal changes in Saudi Arabia, along with its military power, its oil power that has brought prices down, and its media power, which has established Al Arabiya, and its organizational diplomacy that I briefly described, you can see what power is forming right next to us. From now on, we should expect numerous problems for the Islamic Republic. Not only for the Islamic Republic but for the long-term interests of Iran. If we witness Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen today, we should not doubt that this regional power will soon turn its attention to Syria, and there, the situation may escalate into a military confrontation between Tehran and Riyadh, which would not be unexpected. Mr. Hosseini Fard, what do you think? What impact could this shift have on Saudi Arabia's approach to Iran? Habib Hosseini Fard: Of course, it has begun to take on this new role. However, Saudi Arabia's capacities and capabilities are not unlimited. Consider that especially in the domestic arena, this dependency and closure and conservatism produce extremism. The fact that Mohammed bin Nayef is pursuing an iron fist policy in Saudi Arabia stems from this social situation. We see today that around 2,500 Saudi citizens are fighting alongside ISIS. This means that these internal problems and neo-conservatism leave doubts for Western countries regarding how much they can remain allied with it and rely on it as a major regional factor for improving the situation. On the other hand, consider that in Iran, especially if a policy change occurs, meaning that Iran's problem with the West somewhat improves and this relationship softens, particularly if Iran's policy towards Israel undergoes changes, this will further strengthen Iran's diplomatic capabilities to act regionally. Even now, we see that relative to Iran's efforts, a country like Pakistan has refused to accept Saudi Arabia's request to join and send ground forces or even participate in military operations. Even Turkey has. On the other hand, looking at Egypt, which has become financially dependent on Saudi Arabia, even Cairo has a different policy regarding Syria. Despite its influence in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia has not been able to prevent countries like Kuwait or Tunisia and Egypt from pursuing different policies regarding Syria. With all these conditions, as long as Iran does not adopt a more rational approach in its foreign policy and does not change its diplomacy somewhat, Saudi Arabia has the opportunity to maneuver.