New US Sanctions: 'An Attempt to Contain Iran's Power Projection in the Region'

Since Donald Trump, the President of the United States, announced a new strategic policy towards Iran in his speech, activities in this regard in Washington have peaked. There isn't a day that discussions about the path ahead don't occur in the halls of Congress, both in the Senate and the House of Representatives, or in the famous think tanks of the capital. This path is not uniform even among supporters of the government. Some say the JCPOA should be preserved while increasing pressure on Iran. Others argue that the US should withdraw from the JCPOA and pave the way for a comprehensive agreement, while another group believes the JCPOA should be annulled to facilitate regime change in Iran. In contrast, supporters and defenders of the nuclear agreement continue to try to sway public opinion towards their logic. They argue that even if this agreement is not the best, it prevents Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and without it, an ambiguous and potentially dangerous situation will arise. Regarding the latest actions in the US Congress and the approval of two sanction laws in the House of Representatives, Radio Farda spoke with Michael Singh, the CEO of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Mr. Singh previously served as the Senior Director for Middle Eastern Affairs at the National Security Council. Mr. Singh, we are witnessing significant movements in Washington. In the past two days alone, two laws have been passed in the House of Representatives, one concerning Hezbollah and the other regarding Iran's missile activities. Do you think these sanctions are what the White House was waiting for? Yes. There is significant concern in Washington about what Iran is doing in the Middle East; the presence of the Revolutionary Guards in places like Syria and Iraq, as well as the presence of forces we consider Iran's proxies, such as Hezbollah or militias in Iraq and Syria, which overshadow the sovereignty of governments and US objectives in the region. As a result, I see these laws as a somewhat limited attempt to respond to Iran's efforts to project power in the region, and these actions align with the White House's goals. Congress has sixty days to decide the future of the JCPOA. Are these actions in line with that, or are they parallel to that process? This is a parallel mechanism and has little to do with the nuclear agreement or that sixty-day timeframe. When the President spoke about the Iran strategy, he made it clear that he does not want Congress, at least for now, to reinstate nuclear sanctions, as this would lead to the collapse of the agreement. These new sanctions are non-nuclear and do not violate the JCPOA, so it is possible to maintain the agreement while imposing such sanctions that are not related to the JCPOA. Some critics of this approach say that if Congress continues to impose sanctions in this manner, we will reach a point where the level of sanctions becomes the same as during the nuclear sanctions and leads to a violation of the agreement. What is your opinion on this? We must consider that not all sanctions are designed equally. The sanctions that were lifted under the JCPOA were very stringent. They prevented Iranian oil exports and cut off Iran's connection to the international financial system, and they were not just US sanctions but multilateral sanctions. The new sanctions are very targeted, targeting specific individuals or entities and imposing penalties on them. Therefore, they have a serious qualitative difference from previous sanctions, and I believe they will not have a similar impact on Iran as the nuclear sanctions did. One of the clauses of the agreement was that the parties to this agreement would not deter the market from economic relations with Iran. Do you think these sanctions and the environment they create will not be in this direction? I do not think the United States is trying to deter companies from trading with Iran. However, it wants to warn American, European, and other companies not to trade with entities like the Revolutionary Guards or Hezbollah, so that such connections do not inadvertently provide financial assistance to these groups' actions in places like Syria and Iraq. As a result, there is no prohibition on trade between European and Iranian companies that are not related to the Revolutionary Guards or Hezbollah. The goal of these sanctions is to prevent money, weapons, and support from reaching groups that the US considers terrorists or non-state groups supported by Tehran. As I understand it, you believe that after sixty days, the JCPOA will remain intact, and currently, the intention is not to collapse the JCPOA. Yesterday, the Israeli Minister of Intelligence stated in an interview that if the Trump administration fails to amend the nuclear agreement, Israel will consider military options. Do you think the ongoing process in Washington will meet the expectations of America's allies? What the government clearly states, and I think Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has said several times, is that they are not trying to dismantle the JCPOA, but rather trying to strengthen the JCPOA and address what at least the Trump administration sees as the mistakes of this agreement, and the most important path for doing this is diplomatic discussions with our allies in Europe. I think the government is currently focused on this issue. If this path does not work, a second path certainly needs to be considered, but what that second path might be is currently only speculative.