Nikki Haley's Visit to Vienna and Questions Surrounding Parchin

The outcome of U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley's visit to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna on Wednesday could play a decisive role in the Trump administration's decision to certify or withhold certification of Iran's compliance with the nuclear deal by the three-month deadline ending October 17. The U.S. Treasury Department is legally obligated to review Iran's compliance with the JCPOA every three months and inform Congress through the State Department. The continuation of the lifting of nuclear sanctions and the issuance of commercial and banking licenses for institutions and companies dealing with Iran is contingent upon this certification. Since January of this year, despite indicating a 'violation of the spirit of the JCPOA' by Iran, the current U.S. administration has confirmed Iran's compliance with the commitments under the nuclear agreement of July 15, 2015. Nikki Haley is considered one of the most stringent critics of the Islamic Republic and the nuclear agreement, repeatedly calling for more oversight on the implementation of the JCPOA. Before her meeting with IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano on Wednesday, Haley mentioned to Reuters 'Iran's past behaviors,' referring to actions that allegedly involved the Islamic Republic in high-yield explosive tests (neutron firing) and efforts to build a nuclear bomb trigger at Parchin. During the two-year-long nuclear negotiations, verification of Iran's past nuclear activities and 'possible military dimensions (PMD)' was among the most challenging aspects of the discussions, often halting or threatening to halt negotiations. Only after Amano's visit to Tehran in July 2015, and his meeting with Hassan Rouhani and Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic, and the signing of two confidential documents referred to as 'documents' outside Iran, was the signing of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 made possible. Based on numerous pieces of evidence, including Amano's own statements during the final days of negotiations claiming that a 'separate agreement regarding Parchin would be reached with Tehran,' the IAEA's inspectors' visit to Parchin and environmental sampling there was considered the most complex knot in the negotiations. During the U.S. envoy's visit to Vienna on Wednesday, Haley's main question to Amano concerned the continuation of the agency's inspections in Iran and the possibility of renewing their visit to Parchin based on commitments that the Tehran government accepted under the 'voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol.' The U.S. motivation in this specific case is to ensure prevention of tests that Iran was accused of conducting at Parchin before 2003. To meet this demand, Nikki Haley raised a quiet request in Vienna for a visit to Parchin and environmental sampling from the site. Haley asked Amano: 'Are you monitoring the sites where secret activities previously took place (Parchin)? Are you able to access these areas (for a renewed visit)?' Is the U.S. looking for a pretext? The U.S. alone spends eight million dollars annually on the agency's inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities, and the current administration, which calls the JCPOA a 'very bad deal,' wishes to keep Iran from returning to pre-agreement conditions. Recent statements by Hassan Rouhani in Parliament and Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, regarding 'a quick return to pre-JCPOA conditions' and '20% enrichment in a few days' strengthen the White House's suspicions about keeping the path hidden or visible for Iran to return to the status before the nuclear agreement. The refusal to allow visits to Parchin is more a result of Tehran's sensitivity to revealing its military secrets than a product of internal government bargaining between supporters and opponents of the nuclear agreement. Reports suggest that in the final year of nuclear negotiations, the Iranian government was apparently prepared to agree to a one-time visit to Parchin; an action that had previously occurred in 2005 without any acute sensitivity. If the U.S. insists on inspections of Parchin and the Islamic Republic opposes such inspections, Iran's (voluntary) implementation of the Additional Protocol would effectively be suspended, and this suspension could not only be considered a violation of the 'spirit of the nuclear agreement' but also a clear breach of its commitments, compelling the U.S. president to withhold certification of Tehran's compliance with the nuclear agreement; an action that does not necessarily mean a complete U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement but could mark the beginning of its gradual end.