No One Talks About the Role of the Leadership of the System

The nuclear agreement or understanding of the Islamic Republic with the 5+1 has created a wave of joy and gratitude towards the Rouhani government and its diplomatic apparatus, specifically Mohammad Javad Zarif, the foreign minister. The role of the skilled and prominent diplomat of the Islamic Republic and his colleagues in achieving the recent agreement—regardless of the judgment on the content of the initial understanding—is assumed and undeniable. Likewise, the position of the moderate government head in pursuing dialogues with Western parties, particularly the United States, is acknowledged. However, why does no one mention the role of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic in this recent historical event? In a regime based on the rule of the jurist, there are many paths leading to the leader of the system. It is unlikely that anyone would deny that in the field of diplomacy, especially in a very important arena such as nuclear energy and dialogue with the West—especially the United States—it is the highest authority of the system who is considered the guide and the final decision-maker. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, at the core of the central power, issues commands for strategic actions in consultation with his military-security companions and pragmatic conservatives around him, or dismisses projects. In recent years, especially after the reformist period (President Mohammad Khatami from June 1997), Ayatollah Khamenei has fully entered the realm of foreign policy and has increasingly played a role. For instance, his role in the lack of rapprochement and dialogue between Tehran and Washington during the presidencies of Khatami and Clinton is undeniable. Or in changing the trend of interaction with the West regarding nuclear energy, the head of the political system adopted a similar approach to Ahmadinejad. The formation of negotiations after Obama came to power in the U.S. also did not begin during Rouhani's presidency. The core of power, assessing the negative and destructive consequences of sanctions on the economy, defined and pursued a new direction from the last months of Ahmadinejad's second term. As Ali Akbar Salehi, Ahmadinejad's foreign minister and head of the Atomic Energy Organization, has explicitly pointed out. This trend, with Rouhani's victory and Zarif's ascendance to the top of the diplomatic apparatus, began a new era and progressed with greater speed and depth. Especially since the slogans and programs of Rouhani and the direction of his electoral supporters showed a noticeable interactive approach. The social wave advocating reconciliation and agreement, alongside the alignment of moderate and pragmatic conservatives with the desired diplomacy of the moderate government, made the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic more comfortable in pursuing a new policy. The specific position of the leader in negotiations: Multiple statements from the top of the political system regarding nuclear energy and dialogue with the U.S. have been one of the influential factors in the negotiation process and the course taken in recent months (after Hassan Rouhani's victory in the 2013 elections). Although Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly and emphatically expressed distrust towards the political behavior of the West—especially Washington—he has simultaneously stood behind Zarif and his colleagues in the diplomatic apparatus and supported the conciliatory approach of the moderate government. He even emphasized in his important Nowruz speech (beginning of the year 1394) that in Iran, 'no one' is opposed to negotiations. He also stated a significant point that had an undeniable impact on the dialogue with the 5+1, asserting that 'the lifting of sanctions must occur without any delay upon reaching an agreement.' He added: 'The Americans repeatedly say we will sign a contract with Iran and then see if they comply, we do not accept this... This is an American deception.' A significant observation that was also expressed differently in the previous February: 'If they agree, they should decide on the generalities and details in one session.' Despite all this, he did not abandon his explicit support for the dialogue-oriented and interactive approach of Zarif and his colleagues. For example, last Esfand (March) during a meeting with the Assembly of Experts, he referred to the negotiating team selected by the president as 'trustworthy, caring, and good' individuals who 'are making efforts and are truly accepted.' It is evident that if Rouhani and, at a more specific level, the negotiating team (Zarif and colleagues) did not feel supported by the Supreme Leader, they would not have been able to deepen and continue negotiations and reach an understanding with the 5+1. Victory or defeat of the leadership: Regardless of the judgment on the quality of the understanding (victory or defeat) and its content, it is not only Rouhani's government and Zarif's diplomatic apparatus that have been responsible for the matter. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, if he does not have a greater share than them, is a different and special partner in this understanding (regardless of success or failure in it). From the perspective of nearly all those concerned with national interests and the majority of peace-seeking Iranians, achieving the initial understanding is a source of joy and a significant success; because it prevents the continuation of immeasurable damage to the country and reduces the likelihood of external conflict and threats. From this angle, the realistic role and will of the top of the political system in achieving the understanding should not be overlooked. Regardless of what the motivations of the first person of the system for negotiation and reaching an agreement have been, the reality is that he has played a distinct and undeniable role in the realization, continuation, and success of the dialogues so far. Thus, both those who are pleased with the understanding and those who are dissatisfied should direct a significant part of their joy or dissatisfaction towards the leadership of the system. Those who are satisfied should appreciate the first person of the political system for supporting the process leading to the understanding and encourage him to pursue this approach; and those who are dissatisfied should express their grievances to the first person of the system for submitting to this understanding and pursuing it, demanding a change in the leader's perspective. Interestingly, neither on the side of those pleased and satisfied with the understanding, nor on the side of the dissatisfied and upset, does anyone look to Ayatollah Khamenei and speak of his effective role—both in a negative and a positive aspect. The first person who is missing: Supporters of the understanding and the majority of the society pleased with the understanding do not have an empathetic relationship with the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. They see Rouhani and Zarif as a different part of the political authority. This group—believed by a significant portion of the satisfied—has managed to convince the leadership of their approach, and without their presence, the chances of this success would have greatly diminished. Independently of this, the majority of those satisfied with the understanding in society hold the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and his military-security companions responsible for imposing economic-political costs on the country. From this perspective, they have no inclination to praise and commend him—as they have for Zarif and Rouhani. Furthermore, in the established security situation in the country and the atmosphere filled with repression, intimidation, and violence, there is fundamentally no possibility of directly questioning the first person of the regime and criticizing him regarding the background and outcome of astronomical expenditures in the nuclear energy sector, and the economic-social consequences thereof (especially after the sanctions). In other words, only a thin layer of political activists have the courage for such inquiries and criticisms. On the other side, those dissatisfied with the understanding and opponents of reconciliation are so immersed in the absolute rule of the jurist or believe that the position of the head of the political system is free from retreat and concession that they never step into the realm of criticizing the leadership of the system. From the perspective of critics of the understanding, it is Rouhani and Zarif who, with a mistaken and anti-system approach, have been deceived by the West—especially the U.S.—or have been seduced by some promises, and despite Ayatollah Khamenei's lack of optimism towards negotiations and his distrust of Western parties, they have accompanied the leadership of the system with a thousand tricks until now. The leadership that plays politically: In this context, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, like the past quarter-century, plays a political role. Sometimes in the middle of negotiations, he speaks harshly or reluctantly about the negotiations and forces the counterpart to reduce its demands or concede to the Islamic Republic. Sometimes he expresses distrust towards the Western party—especially Washington—and places the responsibility for the outcome of the negotiations—if negative—on the moderate government and the negotiating team. At other times, he emphasizes that he has no opposition to negotiations and only objects to bullying and extortion. At yet another moment, he indiscriminately lists the concessions granted to the 5+1, describing it as 'heroic flexibility' and calling it a sign of the 'logic' of the Islamic Republic. Sometimes he threatens the counterpart with reciprocal sanctions (specifically gas and oil). At other times, he speaks of a 'good agreement' and explains the preference for 'not agreeing' over a 'bad agreement.' Alongside all this, he even references the acceptance of Resolution 598 and the end of the eight-year war as evidence and speaks of the 'logicality' of the political behavior of the ruling authority in the Islamic Republic. All of these are part of the evidence that documents Ayatollah Khamenei's effective role from the official and public podium of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and the highest political authority of the system. And these are independent of his involvement in decision-making processes behind the scenes of politics and at the core of central power. In this context, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic ultimately consolidates and reproduces an authoritarian regime based on the absolute rule of the jurist, far removed from the necessities and standards of democracy (from free and independent press to active parties and syndicates, and from free and fair elections to an impartial and fair judiciary). Ayatollah Khamenei intelligently continues the authoritarian system reliant on the person of the jurist without being accountable for the material and human costs imposed on the country—especially related to the nuclear energy issue. While he is, in any case, the first responsible and highest authority related to such important files. If he is a partner and companion in the understanding, he should be encouraged by supporters of the agreement to continue and deepen the interactive and peace-seeking approach, and also be urged to pursue a similar reconciliation domestically and assist in opening up the political space; and if he is not in favor of the recent understanding, he should be held accountable by critics regarding the reasons for the astronomical and unproductive expenditures in the nuclear energy sector, and due to his position in the system, explain the concessions that Tehran has made to the West. However, both supporters and opponents consciously ignore the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and try to bypass his unique and decisive role.