No to Negotiation; Power or Fear?

As the value of one euro reaches 10,000 tomans in Iran, and the price of each gold coin surpasses three million tomans, the leader of the Islamic Republic stated: "The idea of solving problems through negotiation or relations with the United States is a clear mistake. Negotiating with the U.S. has no benefit." Ayatollah Khamenei's recent remarks predictably stoked the flames of Iran's crisis-ridden economy under sanctions and threats; the price of gold coins reached nearly three million and 200 thousand tomans. At a meeting with ambassadors, diplomats, and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the head of the political system once again sought to criticize and negate the idea of solving the country's problems through negotiation or relations with the U.S. Khamenei's new comments, on one hand, indicate a significant gap between the approach and foreign policy desired by the core of power in Iran and the views and desires of the majority of society; on the other hand, it is a new witness that even the body of the diplomatic apparatus is inevitably forced to "justify" this issue and comply with the opinions and assessments of the system's top leader. Predictably, the central power, relying on its available hard resources, continues to impose its political-ideological projects and orientations on the majority of Iranians. This observation is independent of judgments about the negative impact of economic pressures and U.S. sanctions against Iran, especially following Trump's strange decision and the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. Power or lack of power? The rulers in the Islamic Republic (especially the system's top leader and the aligned security-military current around him) avoid negotiating with the United States and continue to beat the drum of conflict and dispute, describing this confrontation as a sign of their "power" against the world's primary power. But is this approach a sign of the political authority's power in Iran? A few days ago, the head of Rouhani's office, the President, clarified: "What they say about Iran seeking to negotiate with the U.S. has not been the case until now. When Mr. Rouhani went to the UN headquarters, it was Mr. Trump who made eight requests for dialogue with Mr. Rouhani, but Mr. Rouhani did not accept this request." This very important news was new evidence that the political authority in Iran, contrary to claims and propaganda, still lacks the necessary confidence and power for direct negotiation with its most significant international problem. The hard core of power in the Islamic Republic avoids direct dialogue with Washington, while even Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea, welcomed direct negotiations with Trump. Putin, Tehran's main supporter, also recently engaged in discussions face-to-face with Trump. However, Ayatollah Khamenei has a different orientation. "Fighting against America" defines and clarifies part of the political-ideological apparatus of the current political authority in Iran, and serves as a pretext for the continuation of authoritarianism within the country and the suppression of critics and opponents; moreover, the continuation of the non-democratic authority in Iran is linked to certain regional projects and policies. Raising the flag of fighting against Israel, supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, or military-security presence in some regional countries are among these cases. All these policies have been defined and designed without referring to public votes (consultation with Iranians in the form of a referendum) and are pursued. As the official policy of the government for not negotiating with the U.S. has never found the opportunity for broad and safe discussion in the public sphere, it continues in an imposed manner. From Ayatollah Khamenei's perspective, negotiating and reconciling with the White House would mean the end of all this, and in a sense, the end of the Islamic Republic as he and the aligned authoritarian figures see it. Without a referendum and free, fair, and just elections, when there are no "free, fair, and just elections" and candidates for parliamentary or presidential representation pass through the Guardian Council's supervisory corridor, it is evident that those who enter the executive or legislative branches are not direct and unmediated representatives of the majority of society and will not have the ability and opportunity to present different discussions from the wishes and demands of the political system's top. Thus, we do not see a different viewpoint being expressed in the parliament, the diplomatic apparatus, or the executive branch. On another level, the lack of democratic authority in the central power and its disbelief in "public opinion" and citizens' views is the main cause of such a situation. By "public opinion," we mean a kind of aggregation or accumulation of individual thoughts about political issues that can influence the actions and behaviors of rulers. Public opinion also takes shape when, as Habermas puts it, citizens can freely consult and exchange views on issues of public interest and public benefit without coercion, problems, obstacles, or threats; moreover, the necessary guarantees for their gathering and assembly are provided, allowing them to freely join together and express and promote their thoughts. Unfortunately, this situation is missing in today's Iran. Although online social networks have significantly affected restrictions and prohibitions, in the balance of hard power of the political authority and the soft power of civil society, the upper hand still belongs to the ruling authoritarians. The core of power in the Islamic Republic also sees no necessity to refer to society in the form of a "referendum" and even seeks to continuously filter and select those present in the political power structure through supervisory oversight, choosing and aligning from among the more "insider" individuals. Power or fear? Contrary to the promotional image that Ayatollah Khamenei seeks to present of himself and the government, the avoidance and indeed the flight of the political authority in Iran from negotiating with the United States is a significant and tangible sign of lack of power. This point, contrary to the wishes of the political system's top, will ultimately be detrimental to the system—and of course to Iran—because it encourages the other side to continue and intensify pressures. The aforementioned conditions mean that the majority of Iranian society becomes trapped and victimized between the two harmful blades of external economic pressure and sanctions and the threats of global far-right, as well as authoritarianism and despotism and the rise of the far-right within the country. This situation, alongside increasing dissatisfaction among the majority, will lead to the weakening of economic capacity, reduced risk-taking, and decreased social-political participation of the majority of citizens (especially in the cultural middle class). However, the likelihood of economic-social riots will continue to increase. An event whose outcome is uncertain, whether it will lead to the reproduction and intensification of authoritarianism after suppression or to a meaningful change in the policies of the authority.