Not a Conservative? Leave Mashhad

Mashhad is under the control of conservatives. It has always been this way. Reformists have never had much chance to take over the management of this important religious, economic, and political hub; however, there has never been such a unified management of hardline conservative groups in Razavi Khorasan province. Razavi Khorasan province, and specifically its capital, Mashhad, has unique complexities. Mashhad is the birthplace of Ayatollah Khamenei and the site of his political struggles before the revolution, which has always drawn his special attention. For the past two decades, the first and most important annual speech of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic has been delivered in this city at the shrine of the eighth Imam of the Shiites. The presence of the Imam Reza shrine has made Mashhad one of the important centers for Shiites worldwide and has given its religious centers and seminary a special status. On the other hand, the role of the Astan Quds Razavi, the largest endowment organization in Iran with significant wealth and power, should not be overlooked in influencing the political atmosphere of the country. The numerous companies, economic influence, and special advertising position of Astan Quds Razavi have all made it one of the most important tools for spreading the policies and discourse approved by the Supreme Leader. The selection of Ebrahim Raisi as the custodian of this center also confirms this matter. Throughout his career, he has been considered a close and approved figure by Ayatollah Khamenei. Additionally, he is the son-in-law of Ayatollah Alamolhoda, who single-handedly advances the policies of the Supreme Leader in the province as the Friday prayer leader and representative of the Supreme Leader. So much so that the positions of Ayatollah Khamenei can be heard weekly, first openly in the Friday prayers of Mashhad and then in another tone from the pulpit of Tehran's Friday prayers. After the formation of Rouhani's government, Alamolhoda took increasingly hardline positions against the government's policies. He is someone who comments on all issues, from opposing the JCPOA and nuclear negotiations to increasing internet penetration in Iran and hijab. One of his most controversial positions was opposing the holding of music concerts in Razavi Khorasan and specifically in Mashhad, to the extent that he said: 'Want a concert? Leave Mashhad.' His opposition, of course, led to the cancellation of all concerts with the cooperation and collusion of the judiciary, and despite the reaction of Hassan Rouhani, the President, the government and the Ministry of Culture practically retreated and could not resist. The political position of Ayatollah Alamolhoda and Ebrahim Raisi was strengthened by the death of Ayatollah Vaez Tabasi, the custodian of Astan Quds Razavi. The death of this traditional conservative figure, who was accepted by all political factions, paved the way for more hardline conservative groups, and the patriarchal support of Ayatollah Alamolhoda increased their power day by day. This situation has progressed to the point where Mashhad is now a base for members of the Stability Front, a group close to the thoughts of Mohammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi. All five representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in this city are members of the Stability Front or supported by this current. All 25 members of Mashhad's city council are conservatives, and among them, 19 are members of the Stability Front. With such a surprising composition, it is not surprising that the mayor of this city is 'Solat Mortazavi,' the political deputy of the Ministry of Interior in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government and the head of the election headquarters in the tumultuous presidential election of 2009. The only area where reformists had hoped for a different composition after Hassan Rouhani's victory was the governorship of Razavi Khorasan, which was a point of contention for seven months and ultimately went to 'Alireza Rashidian,' a security figure close to the office of the Supreme Leader. IRNA, after this appointment, quoted Hossein Sobhaninia, a member of parliament, stating that Rashidian had worked for several years as the director of intelligence in Razavi Khorasan province and as the deputy minister of intelligence. Additionally, another member of parliament, Javad Karimi Qodosi, mentioned his background as the assistant executive of the office of the Supreme Leader and the head of the inspection of Ayatollah Khamenei's mission. It is natural that with such a powerful political base, dealing with reformists, closing the office of the 'Consultative Assembly of Reformists of Razavi Khorasan,' and preventing the holding of events and ceremonies such as the speech of Ali Motahari, the deputy speaker of the parliament, is not far-fetched. Especially considering that this was not the first time reformists faced such negative actions, and perhaps if it were not for the actual and legal status of 'Ali Motahari,' the incident would not have received widespread attention. According to reformists in this city, 'All normal and conventional facilities such as logistical, cultural, and economic resources are denied to them.' Hussein Ataheri, a faculty member of the political science department at Ferdowsi University, stated a few months ago in a meeting titled 'Pathology of the Tenth Parliamentary Elections' that 'during elections, nothing is available, and even outside election times, not a single mosque is made available for holding religious ceremonies for reformist forces in Mashhad.' This university professor also addressed another issue beyond these negative actions: 'In Mashhad, in addition to the municipality, there are groups under the name of NGOs that are non-governmental organizations, and I could say that 95% of these groups in Mashhad are under the control of conservatives. These organizations are the most important factor in connecting conservative forces with the underprivileged class.' According to Mahmoud Morviyan Hosseini, the director of the Islamic Propagation Organization of Razavi Khorasan, this province has 8,100 registered religious committees, and the activities of these committees are separate from the powerful networks of other religious and cultural organizations such as the Quran and Ahl al-Bayt Husseiniyeh, the Cultural Organizations Council, and organizations like these that target the underprivileged and marginalized class of Mashhad. A group that, according to statistics, is experiencing increasing growth in the city of Mashhad. According to Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, a member of parliament, 'The rate of marginalization growth in Mashhad is higher than in other cities, with 47,000 new marginalized individuals added annually.' With these circumstances, reformists, lacking central figures like Ayatollah Abai Khorasani, have no opportunity to assert themselves and have no influence over the underprivileged class of society. In such a situation, their hardline rivals, with overt support from figures close to Ayatollah Khamenei such as Ayatollah Alamolhoda, along with the collaboration of provincial judicial officials, the municipality, the city council, and the offices of parliament representatives, as well as aid from religious institutions and groups like Ansar Hezbollah Mashhad, are advancing. As the number of days until the presidential election decreases, the volume of such negative actions and the intensity of the political atmosphere in Mashhad will increase. Especially since this city has two major candidates with powerful political organizations and close to the positions of Ayatollah Khamenei. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the mayor of Tehran from Mashhad, has strong supporters in this city, and according to Mostafa Baqerzadeh, a member of the central council of the Stability Front in Mashhad, 'The set of the Promotion of Culture and Values of the Islamic Revolution, known as Motafav, is defined under the name of Dr. Qalibaf.' If he announces his readiness to enter the election, political currents will easily align behind him. However, the situation of the next potential candidate in Mashhad is even better than Qalibaf's; Saeed Jalili, a politician from Mashhad close to the Stability Front, has powerful supporters in this city. He is even backed by his brother, Vahid Jalili, the cultural deputy of the Mashhad municipality, who can organize financial and political support for him during the election season. In any case, whoever of these two decides to stand against Hassan Rouhani in the 2016 election will be supported by Ahmad Alamolhoda. Nevertheless, politics is not very predictable. Just as in the 2013 presidential election, it was Hassan Rouhani's name that emerged with a significant lead from Mashhad. However, it is unclear whether luck will be with Rouhani in Mashhad this time. Of course, he intends to stand against all 'extremisms' that he has called 'shameful' under the pretext of dealing with the ceremony of Ali Motahari's speech. In a letter to the ministers of interior and justice, he emphasized that 'the Ministry of Interior and the government of prudence and hope' are responsible for defending the 'fundamental rights' of the Iranian people and the people of Mashhad. However, Rouhani's actions to win the hearts of the people of Mashhad are too late. Groups including reformists and moderate currents are dissatisfied with his performance in Razavi Khorasan. They believe the government has yielded to Ahmad Alamolhoda and hardline conservative currents. The result of this negligence has been the takeover of Mashhad by conservatives.