Note: 'Ahmadinejad's Followers'; A Gang or a Movement?

The story of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his associates becomes more interesting. A group whose eight-year managerial record, despite having about $600 billion, has faced fundamental questions and criticisms. Ahmadinejad began to noticeably distance himself from the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic in the second half of his second term. The challenge had already begun earlier, with the issue of his first vice president, Mashaei, (July 2009); however, Ahmadinejad's eleven-day house arrest (spring 2011) during the dismissal of the Minister of Intelligence, supported by Ayatollah Khamenei, and later his public dispute with the Larijani brothers in a famous public session of the parliament (February 2013) showed that Ahmadinejad's 'drift from the center' was more real than suspected. The story of 'Ahmadinejad's followers' entered a new phase after the end of his second term (which was linked to the 2009 electoral coup). They, who were under widespread accusations of embezzlement and misuse of available resources, significantly increased their criticisms against the judiciary and the Larijani brothers. This coincided with the increasing criticism of Rouhani's government. Later, in an unexpected and bold move, Ahmadinejad ignored the public recommendation of the system's first authority regarding not running in the 2017 presidential election. The reaction from the core of power was the disqualification of the former president and member of the Expediency Discernment Council by the Guardian Council. Since then, Ahmadinejad and his associates—especially Mashaei and Baghai—have adopted a harsher and more critical rhetoric against the central power. The content of their open letters and speeches has targeted almost all political governance institutions, except for the leader of the system, with sharp criticisms and even accusations. Their field and social activism, in the form of protest sit-ins, was another aspect of the promotional efforts of those who saw themselves on the brink of imprisonment. This protest, however, did not gain social acceptance and remained limited to a few close associates of Ahmadinejad. In this context, Ahmadinejad's open letter (a member of the Expediency Discernment Council) to the Supreme Leader, requesting the dismissal of the head of the judiciary, early presidential and parliamentary elections, and the release of all political prisoners, was another strange and noteworthy action. Hundreds of signatories with names and details, in an unprecedented content among forces sympathetic to the leadership, now stand behind Ahmadinejad, Mashaei, and Baghai. This is at a time when Baghai and Mashaei are in prison, and Ahmadinejad is increasingly facing the wrath, indifference, and sharp criticism of the media and government officials—even ministers from his own administrations. From this perspective, it seems that 'Ahmadinejad's followers' have shifted from being a political gang to a political movement. The issuance and enforcement of Baghai's prison sentence, and later Mashaei's arrest, brought the judicial-security threat against Ahmadinejad to its peak. These actions were not without meaning and message. The aforementioned trend made the description and evaluation of Ahmadinejad's followers (including him, Mashaei, Baghai, and Javanfar) as a 'gang' politically realistic. However, an important event has posed serious questions against this description of Ahmadinejad's followers (i.e., gang); the publication of an unprecedented open letter addressed to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, signed by 300 university and seminary activists sympathetic to Ahmadinejad and Mashaei, many of whom have been or still are responsible in organizations affiliated with the conservative camp. Notably, the number of signatories to this important letter later exceeded 800. Are Ahmadinejad's followers still a political gang or have they become a political movement? A political gang is a description of a group of individuals who lack breadth, a specific background, and supporting social forces, and conceal their political views and leadership organization as much as possible. In contrast, a political movement relies on accompanying and supporting organizations, is based on intellectual foundations and accompanying social forces, and also benefits from a specific political thought and predictable political behavior and actions. 'Ahmadinejads' were until recently a closed and limited circle of a few names; he, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Hamid Baghai, and Ali Akbar Javanfar were the few known figures of this group. Their field emergence and even noisy sit-ins did not receive significant social acceptance. However, after the open letter from several hundred Ahmadinejad sympathizers to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, it seems that this circle and closed group should be evaluated from a different perspective. Especially since the aforementioned letter is considered an unprecedented document in the Islamic Republic. Hundreds of sympathizers of the core of power in the Islamic Republic have openly criticized the most important political institutions; not only the three branches (executive, judiciary, and legislative) but also the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, state media, the Basij, and the IRGC, Friday prayer leaders, and even the seminary have been targeted by Ahmadinejad's associates' sharp criticisms. Among the signatories of the letter are members of the student Basij and some student organizations aligned with the central power (such as the Justice-Seeking Student Movement and the Islamic Students Association and the Justice-Seeking Students' Assembly) as well as the head of the popular Raisi campaign in the 2017 elections and the prayer leader and representative of the Supreme Leader in the mosque and the Basij base, and the seminary and university. They have frankly and fearlessly emphasized in a completely different judgment from the assessment of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic—expressed in his New Year speech—that 'the overall system is increasingly resembling a lifeless body and internally fragile,' and the country 'needs to begin fundamental and essential reforms.' Hundreds of signatories sympathetic to Ahmadinejad, Mashaei, and Baghai have stated in their open letter to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic that 'justice, freedom, democracy, and even sometimes independence are in an undesirable state in our country today.' The fact that 'Ahmadinejad's followers' criticize the 'raw positions' of the Assembly of Experts and Friday prayer leaders; or call the seminary 'sluggish' and caught in the 'dominance of the discourse of guardianship'; or consider the Guardian Council as 'the generator of closed governance cycles'; or openly criticize the 'unaccountable influence of the IRGC's intelligence organization in the country' and describe it as 'a factor of disruption in affairs'; or label the Basij as 'a lifeless, shallow, weak, and uncreative collection' and 'transformed'; all these are themes that have elevated the quality of criticism among forces affiliated with the system to an unprecedented level. It seems that various political factions and movements in Iran (from radical and extremist right to pragmatic and conservative principlists, from moderate reformists to reform-seekers and Greens, and from constitutional opposition to non-constitutional opposition) can no longer evaluate 'Ahmadinejad's followers' from the perspective of a 'political gang.'