Note: Ahmadinejad's Supporters and the Ultimatum to Leadership

The letter from three hundred student activists, university professors, and clerics supporting Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was a significant event in the political arena. The importance of this letter lies in the fact that these individuals are former defenders of the conservative discourse and belong to the social base supporting Mr. Khamenei and the institution of the Supreme Leader, as well as the forces known as 'Velayati'. The publication of an open letter to the leadership, which carries critical and protest content, indicates a remarkable shift in political positions and at least a reconsideration of the belief in the 'absolute guardianship of the jurist' theory. This letter has multiple characteristics beyond its content that are important to address and will influence the formation of a new balance of power in the post-national protests of January 2018. This letter reflects the will of Ahmadinejad's defenders to shape a movement that negates both conservative and reformist factions in order to introduce themselves as a third current within the power structure of the Islamic Republic. The actions of Ahmadinejad's supporters have sent a message to the political arena that, firstly, they are seeking a political movement, and their main demand goes beyond reducing pressure on Hamid Baqai, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, and other close associates of the former president and their release; it includes proposing programs and demands in the public domain. Although their claim of having an independent lineage and framing Iran's problems since Ahmadinejad distanced himself from the dominant power does not align with realities and has posed a serious challenge to building trust in public opinion, their efforts to create political equations overshadow this. Essentially, there are serious doubts and questions about whether their true motivation is to distance themselves from power and attempt to regain lost positions, or if, as they verbally and publicly claim, their different political demands and perspectives based on gradual developments are their driving force. The second feature emphasizes their commitment to the discourse of the Islamic Revolution and religious governance and operating within the framework of the power structure and the constitution of the Islamic Republic. The signatories of the letter have stated that they pursue their demands within the framework of the system and are concerned about saving it from the deviations that have occurred. They are not seeking an oppositional position but, emphasizing a 'revolutionary-like solution,' claim to seek extensive changes in the political, social, economic, and cultural performance of the system, and are somewhat inclined towards the ultimate transformation within the tolerable framework of the Islamic Republic. However, they have not specified what their detailed solutions and programs for achieving this fundamental change are and how they intend to realize it. What emerges from the content of the letter is that they have sought to first depict the country's crisis situation and, by accepting this assessment, urge the top of the power hierarchy to make the necessary decisions for accepting the principle of extensive changes. A negative attitude towards the leaders of both conservative and reformist factions and accusing them of deviating from the ideals of the revolution and the system, opportunism, and conflicting with the people's demands, as well as the selection of rulers being a closed circle and intensifying the process of depoliticization, are other notable points of this letter. Another significant characteristic is their alignment and solidarity with the nationwide protest movement of January and emphasizing the uniqueness of the country's conditions in 2018. An analysis of the content of the letter reveals that, from their perspective, the current situation of the country is intolerable, and the lack of will among the system's officials could lead to the collapse of society. However, a deeper examination strengthens the hypothesis that their main intention is the collapse of the system. Ahmadinejad's supporters, while protesting his disqualification in the 2017 presidential elections, which they view as closing the last window of hope for fundamental reforms and restoring governance to the people, have expressed serious concerns about the performance of all system institutions, both appointed and elected, such as the government, parliament, intelligence apparatus, judiciary, Guardian Council, Basij, state media, and police, deeming them contrary to their existential philosophy. The main theme of this letter is directed at the leadership in the form of a respectful warning. They have pointed out that, given the extensive powers of the Supreme Leader in the constitution, the fate of the country and the choice between the dark path of maintaining the status quo or deciding for extensive changes and real fundamental reforms rests with Mr. Khamenei himself. This positioning is unprecedented among forces within the system that have explicitly criticized the leadership's performance and, in a way, have given him an ultimatum, holding him responsible for the country's and system's downfall based on his current decisions. They have assessed the country's foreign policy as negating independence, which includes a negative view of the JCPOA and de-escalation with the West on one hand, and criticism of the region's expansionist policies on the other. Monitoring the contents of the letter in foreign policy indicates the continuation of a confrontational foreign policy approach, albeit with minor adjustments, while still protesting the system's policies in the Middle East. There is a high degree of alignment between this letter and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's statements against the nuclear agreement with the 1+5 and his negative views on the system's policies in Syria during his presidency. However, it is not incorrect to say that the main content of this letter is directed at the leadership in the form of a respectful warning. They have pointed out that, given the extensive powers of the Supreme Leader in the constitution, the fate of the country and the choice between the dark path of maintaining the status quo or deciding for extensive changes and real fundamental reforms rests with Mr. Khamenei himself. This positioning is unprecedented among forces within the system that have explicitly criticized the leadership's performance and, in a way, have given him an ultimatum, holding him responsible for the country's and system's downfall based on his current decisions. They have explicitly questioned the leadership's assessment of the current state of the country and efforts to depict a positive and growth-oriented image of the country's conditions, deeming it erroneous. It seems that a passage from the letter that emphasizes the ineffectiveness of intensifying pressure and a police state, restricting the free flow of information, injecting limited money into society, and temporarily satisfying vulnerable groups, as well as reducing problems to superficial and minor issues, or directly or indirectly conveying the notion that the current situation of the Iranian people could not be any better, is directed at Mr. Khamenei. In their view, this framing has led to the complete loss of hope among the people. Therefore, the conclusion that arises is the primary role of the leadership in the current chaotic situation and the intertwining of the system's fate with his future decisions, which he does not have much time left for. The significance of distinguishing this positioning becomes prominent when, in the current political specifications of the country, most reformists have chosen to soften their stance against the leadership instead of standing firm. Naturally, given the historical behavior of the Islamic Republic and Mr. Khamenei's perspective, the response to this request will likely be negative, and it is highly probable that the signatories of the aforementioned letter will face harassment and the security siege around Ahmadinejad's movement will tighten. However, the above event and the aftermath of this positioning will further weaken the position of the Supreme Leader and reduce his supporters, while strengthening the demand for significant and extensive political changes. Of course, there is doubt that Ahmadinejad's supporters, with this positioning and in a situation where the country's problems over four decades have been limited to confrontations with Ahmadinejad and have remained silent regarding his negative performance during his presidency, can gain significant public favor. Their targeting of dissatisfied economic and livelihood groups also has low chances of success given that they have no means to fulfill their demands. Therefore, it can only be speculated that the outcome of the aforementioned letter will be an increase in the rift between Ahmadinejad's supporters and both factions of the system and the disintegration of the last ties connecting them with the leadership, necessitating the system to bring the scenario of controlling the president of the ninth and tenth governments to its final station.