Note: Changing Iran's Behavior Without Changing the Government; Obstacles and Possibilities

Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, in his recent interview with Voice of America, which was essentially an explanation and clarification of previous twelve-point demands, pointed out important points worthy of examination. The most significant point of Pompeo's recent interview was that not only is the U.S. government not seeking to change the Iranian government, but it is also not supporting foreign groups that demand a change of government. He added that his support for opposition groups outside Iran will continue only as long as they align their goals with those of the U.S. in this regard. From Pompeo's perspective, 'behavioral change,' rather than 'regime change,' is at stake. These statements somewhat clarified the position of Iranian opposition groups abroad. They do not believe in any degree of behavioral change by the Iranian government but rather demand its outright overthrow. In their view, the regime has proven over the past thirty-nine years that it is 'irreparable,' and only its overthrow can be effective. Of course, John Bolton, Trump's National Security Advisor, who had previously attended meetings of opposition groups, has also never spoken of regime change after accepting his advisory position; although those close to him have said so in opposition gatherings. It can even be imagined that there may be differences of opinion between the State Department and the President's National Security Advisor's office, just as such differences have always existed in U.S. administrations. Iranians do not forget the deep differences between Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor, and his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, which led to strange fluctuations and profound changes in the U.S. government's approach to the Iranian revolution. Pompeo's reference to the fact that regime change is in the hands of the Iranian people is, of course, entirely justified from the standpoint of diplomatic norms and international law. No country can call for the overthrow of another member state's government in the United Nations. The demand for overthrow is usually not in the explicit text but in its margins and in the latent implications of the text. However, the U.S. Secretary of State, who is a law graduate from Harvard University, emphatically distanced himself from this position in his recent statements, saying that regime change is in the hands of the Iranian people. This statement is not only legally valid but may also be based on two other practical considerations. One is to declare the Iranian people as the agent and not give them false hope regarding the overthrow of the regime. The second is that he may believe, like the British Foreign Secretary, that regime change, like what happened in Iraq, leads nowhere but may result in the emergence of a military government led by individuals like Qassem Soleimani. However, the main question is to what extent the Islamic Republic can transform and change in line with Pompeo's twelve demands. Is the 'behavioral change' that Mr. Pompeo envisions truly feasible, or does only regime change fulfill those demands, and is the demand for 'behavioral change' merely a veiled call for 'regime change'? In response, it must be said that Pompeo's demands almost all fall within the 'red lines' of the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has previously stated that, for example, the withdrawal of Iranian forces and their allies from neighboring countries is 'not the work of any sane person' as it means abandoning Iran's 'strategic depth.' Essentially, those changes, even at lower levels, contradict the historical structure of the Islamic Republic, and their implementation would mean a major shift in the composition and configuration of internal factions and forces. Abandoning Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and the Shiite militias supported by Iran in Syria, which are mainly composed of Afghan and Pakistani Shiites, or ceasing support for the 'Houthis' in Yemen, would mean abandoning the claim of 'leadership of the Islamic world' and 'struggle against global arrogance' that has been put forth by Mr. Khamenei and his military arm, the Revolutionary Guards. In this regard, Pompeo is correct that this is also the demand of the Iranian people. People declare in a thousand ways that these interventions and supports, especially in Lebanon and Syria, are the product of the heartfelt desires of Iran's leader. It should be noted that the Palestinian issue has been declared at least once as the main national issue by all Arab governments, and then they all abandoned it. This is not a problem that can be solved by the force of regional countries, and it has not been a concern of Iranians. However, this issue of the Arab world, when the Arabs themselves have abandoned it, Mr. Khamenei has taken up and is calling for the revival of Islamic 'dignity.' For this reason, implementing the Secretary of State's demands, while aligned with the national demands of Iranians, faces insurmountable and complex problems within the system of the Islamic Republic. Lengthy negotiations and transactions with regional countries and the U.S. that could somehow secure Khamenei's demands and his continuity in power may be a solution to this problem; however, given the history of these negotiations in the region and especially Khamenei's sensitivity to maintaining his position (of which he is somewhat aware of its illegitimacy), his acceptance of any compromise in this regard is highly unlikely. The Islamic Republic is unlikely to easily accept missile activities and the development and increase of missile ranges. That government considers missiles as its only defensive-offensive line. However, in a hypothetical deal where the West provides advanced aircraft sales to that government, the Islamic Republic would probably agree to keep missile ranges at a low level. The likelihood of such a deal is, of course, very low. However, nuclear activities are more flexible. Mohammad Javad Zarif's reference to the possibility of negotiating 'within the framework of the JCPOA' refers to this matter. The Islamic Republic will likely agree to extend the 'sunset clause.' That government has sufficiently benefited from this lever and does not want to risk European enmity or, worse, the risk of bombing its current facilities. In this case, the government will negotiate. Regarding the freedom of Iranian-Americans and Robert Levinson (if he is alive), the likelihood of negotiation and prisoner exchanges is also very high. Based on what has been said, the likelihood of significant behavioral change in the Iranian government along the lines proposed by the U.S. Secretary of State without changing the Islamic Republic is not impossible but is negligible. At a ceremony where Mr. Pompeo was responding to senators' statements in the Senate, Republican-libertarian Senator Rand Paul criticized Mr. Pompeo's plan and questioned it for not specifying appropriate rewards for changing Iran's behavior. This criticism seems to be valid. Giving a general promise means not doing anything. So perhaps Mr. Pompeo is not that serious about the demand for changing the behavior of the Islamic Republic without changing the government.