Note: Four Strategic Errors of the Leadership of the Islamic Republic

The Islamic Republic has committed four strategic errors over the past four decades that continue to affect it: 1) Holding American diplomats for 444 days and occupying the embassy of another country, which was repeated in the attacks on the embassies of Britain, Denmark, and Saudi Arabia. The cost of this action has far outweighed its long-term benefits. With this act, the government was able to rid itself of competition from anti-American leftist groups but was forever introduced to the world as a government that disregards international law and is untrustworthy. Those who deal with the Islamic Republic today know well who they are dealing with: those who will exploit you if given the chance; 2) The massacre of prisoners in 1988. The silence of officials or Khamenei's accusation of 'swapping the roles of executioner and martyr' cannot cover up the Islamic Republic's massive crime in prisons. With this massacre, the Islamic Republic has established itself as a regime of mass killings and disregard for its own laws for anyone who does not deny the essence of the event. It is unlikely that anyone has a shred of human conscience left to approve this massacre and its perpetrators. This massacre has made the possibility of reform within the Islamic Republic very difficult. Those who beat the drum of reform cannot explain this simple point: how can a government whose Minister of Justice was a member of the death committee be called 'prudence and hope'; 3) Advancing an opaque nuclear program. We know the short-term damages from sanctions (around hundreds of billions of dollars), but we do not know the costs of this program and its long-term damages. This program has brought multiple security threats to the Iranian government and has not provided any security shield for it. Officials thought that with a nuclear deal, terrorism, human rights violations, and missile programs would not catch up with them, but the very existence of their nuclear program has made them more suspect; 4) Military intervention in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. This intervention has led to the expenditure of tens of billions of dollars in Syria, resulting in the misery of tens of millions of people in Iran. The share of the country's development budget, which creates jobs, was less than 2% of the national budget in the first four months of 1396 (2017). The earthquake victims in Kermanshah are still sleeping in tents in the cold season, and their children are freezing, while the country's resources are being spent elsewhere; many Iranian citizens have lost their sensitivity to corruption (due to its prevalence), but it is unlikely they will easily digest the death of children from the cold. The civil war in Iraq and Syria was not a threat to Iran. The military intervention in Syria was to facilitate the transfer of weapons and ammunition to Hezbollah and to challenge Israel, while the intervention in Iraq was to expand influence in that country. ISIS did not launch any attacks on Iran's borders. The Ministry of Intelligence's propaganda campaign announcing the arrest of ISIS forces in Iran was not accompanied by any evidence, and no news of their trial or execution was published afterward. The Islamic Republic's war in Iraq and Syria has not been a nationalist war based on national interests, and for this reason, mainly Afghan, Pakistani, Iraqi, and Lebanese forces have been employed in these wars. If ISIS had attacked Iran, why was the responsibility of the war against it assigned to the Quds Force, which conducts the Islamic Republic's military interventions abroad? The financial and human costs of the war should be attributed to the ambitions of the political, military, and religious bureaucratic officials of the Islamic Republic. Keeping millions of Iranians hungry and poor, and enmity with the United States and Israel are not among the Islamic Republic's strategic errors because it is based on these policies that security and military institutions have filled part of the army with the unemployed and migrants, justifying deficiencies, inefficiencies, and shortages, and attracting forces from among those who hate the West. Furthermore, the corruption and abuse of power that has encompassed officials without exception has not been a strategic error of the government because it has kept its loyal forces motivated for repression and the continuation of power. Without rent and privilege, a significant portion of the managers of the Islamic Republic would have fled from the government circle and will continue to do so. The government and its governmental, state, and semi-state institutions maintain their loyalty to the regime by granting resources to fake civil institutions, religious bureaucracies, propaganda institutions, and quasi-public companies (see Ahmadinejad's letter to the judiciary regarding the accusations against Baghaei, Club of Journalists, November 4, 2017). After suddenly taking control of the fate and resources of a wealthy country, officials realized how to smuggle, launder money, print money, sell currency, and extort ransom from other countries through hostage-taking, leading them to the illusion that they could promise anything they wanted. However, four decades of plundering show that resources are dwindling and yields are low, and those who are attacked by the Islamic Republic will not remain silent. The source of errors can be summarized in four origins of the Islamic Republic's strategic errors: 1) Being deceived by its own political propaganda machine. There is no media in Iran; everything is parts and screws of a large propaganda machine. Those who have tried to transition to media activity over the past four decades (in press and book publishing, and not in radio and television which are completely governmental) have been unsuccessful. Officials have limited themselves by closing channels of free information and keeping themselves away from challenges. Those who do not want to be challenged and have thin skins cannot govern a large country and a diverse, colorful, and demanding nation. This deception led them to approve the occupation of the embassy or the mass killings. Officials thought they could forever hide the mass killings in prisons or their nuclear program. 2) Becoming emotional at points of confrontation. The officials of the Islamic Republic have shown over the past four decades that instead of rationality and caution, ideological emotions, ambition, and totalitarianism dominate them. These secondary matters may lead to the mobilization of forces and the intimidation of others at times, but in the long run, they gradually evaporate, leaving only inefficiency, crime, and violence, which is not a good recipe for the survival of a government. It was only the anger of a regime in power and almost without serious opposition in 1988 that led the rulers to the massacre of those who were in prison and could do nothing. From any perspective, holding diplomats of one country in another country that is responsible for their security is an act that forever disgraces a government, and no one anywhere in the world can trust it. 3) Choosing unreliable allies. The Islamic Republic, with its anti-Western and anti-American tendencies, has sought to get close to dictatorial, communist, and anti-American countries from the beginning. No ally has emerged from any of them for the Islamic Republic. Russia and China are currently milking the Islamic Republic by exploiting the tension between U.S.-Iran relations. Other U.S. allies are only thinking of selling their products and not a long-term relationship. The Islamic Republic has no allies in the region except for regimes that it must spend tens of billions of dollars on annually. The illusion of closeness to authoritarian and communist countries was a motivating factor in committing a strategic error like the occupation of the U.S. embassy. The military intervention in Syria showed that the Islamic Republic still has no serious allies. 4) The illusion of unlimited resources. After suddenly taking control of the fate and resources of a wealthy country, officials realized how to smuggle, launder money, print money, sell currency, and extort ransom from other countries, leading them to the illusion that they could promise anything they wanted. However, four decades of plundering show that resources are dwindling and yields are low, and those who are attacked by the Islamic Republic will not remain silent. Sanctions have been one of these reactions that have put the Iranian economy under pressure. Even after a period of proclaiming that they welcome sanctions, officials have realized that sanctions are not good for them and must oppose them. The nuclear program, regional military interventions, and the occupation of embassies have played a significant role in sanctions. Strategic errors: inevitable or avoidable? Could the Islamic Republic have continued to exist without committing the four aforementioned errors? Was it forced or was it a choice? The Islamic Republic could have continued to exist without committing the four aforementioned errors. It is possible that avoiding these errors would have presented a different Islamic Republic before our eyes, but it would still have been the government of clerics and its guardians. There are many dictatorial systems that have continued to exist without a deceptive and costly nuclear program, mass killings of opponents in prisons, military interventions in other countries, and hostage-taking of diplomats from other countries. Of course, the system of Velayat-e Faqih, where the advisors and close associates of the leader are made up of eulogists, interrogators, and intelligence agents, commits such errors.