Note: How to Recruit and Train Forces in Islamist Groups

After the terrorist operation in Tehran in June 2017, photos and names of some of the suicide bombers were released by security forces. However, no official information was provided about them beyond this. Various speculations were raised regarding their ethnic backgrounds, and some dismissed these speculations. In any case, very little information about them has been made available to the public. This information is necessary to understand how they are recruited, their motivations, backgrounds, training, and organization. Security agencies in Iran do not provide information to the public unless there is a propaganda goal in mind. Therefore, it is very unlikely that more information will be given about the perpetrators of the attack on the parliament and the Khomeini shrine. However, understanding the behavior of such individuals is not entirely closed off. By looking at the recruitment methods and training of Islamist terrorist groups, both Shia and Sunni, one can somewhat infer their educational and occupational status, how and why they are recruited, and their ideological training. The question is: what social class do members of Islamist terrorist groups come from? What is their level of education? How do they prepare for membership in these groups? What kind of training do they undergo? And how and why are they attracted to such groups? Observations by the author from the forces recruited into the Basij (considering three times of membership in the Basij for deployment to the war fronts in the years 1981 and 1982) in Iran, as well as reports regarding the characteristics of those recruited into Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, Ansarullah, Jundallah, the Taliban, ISIS, and Boko Haram, show that Islamist groups use a very similar model for recruitment and training. The ambitious leaders of these groups target dissatisfied youths (the losers) and use ideology to fill the void of social status, jobs, and education for them. The recruited individuals for propaganda and organizing forces are often university-educated, from middle-class families, and familiar with some aspects of Western civilization, enough to incite hatred and selectively manipulate. Their understanding of the countries and groups they consider enemies and against whom they propagate is very simplistic and rudimentary. However, this level of understanding is sufficient for their activities in recruitment and ideological training. An increase in understanding of the enemy naturally leads to a dissipating of some hatreds. For this reason, those officials of the Islamic Republic with Basij and revolutionary backgrounds, when living in Europe and America for several years (as diplomats, traders, or students), experience a decrease in their hatred towards the West. Ignorance plays a fundamental role in fostering hatred. Operational elements are locally recruited operatives with minimal education (reading and writing literacy), from low-income families, unemployed, dissatisfied with the existing situation but with tribal pride (tribal, patriarchal, and human-fearing): "Of about 50 individuals I have seen in the past two years accused of affiliation and inclination towards Al-Qaeda, these two were the only educated ones among them; the rest were mostly from the lower classes of society and economically weak. Simple workers, bakers, street vendors, third-party market intermediaries, tailors, welders, etc. Their maximum educational level barely reached high school." (Bahman Ahmadi Amoui in his report from prison, Gooya News, June 11, 2017) Belief in religious texts and Sharia is a factor that is later adopted to achieve goals in a society where the majority are Muslim. Islamist groups use a very similar model for recruitment and training. The ambitious leaders of these groups target dissatisfied youths (the losers) and use ideology to fill the void of social status, jobs, and education for them. Taliban members have mostly been students of religious schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their social background is rural society and low-income families who send their children to study religion and learn the Quran from clerics. The influx of oil revenues with various motivations (anti-American, expanding influence) makes Islamist groups attractive to these individuals. Both Sunni and Shia Islamists have recruited from this category of individuals in Pakistan and Afghanistan: the Islamic Republic has recruited for the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun brigades to fight in Syria alongside Hezbollah and Wahhabis for wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria on the opposing front. Boko Haram members are attracted to the group with the motivation of receiving loans and fleeing oppression. Some are also forcibly recruited under the guise of conscription. Some ISIS forces have been recruited from among prisoners and criminals with a history in prison. However, non-local ISIS elements have a different story. According to a report published by the West Point Military Academy in the United States (April 2016), foreign members recruited into ISIS in Iraq and Syria (who mainly came from European and North American countries) were mostly educated individuals. Despite their higher education, they had a notable lack of job skills. Their administrative and technical skills were also minimal, and before joining ISIS, they had low-level manual jobs. This phenomenon is also seen in locally recruited individuals by the Basij, Hezbollah, and the Taliban, as well as non-local members (Afghans and Pakistanis) of the Quds Force of the IRGC. It seems that joining these forces, given the relatively good payments they offer (considering the general income level), and the opportunity for social advancement, has also been a form of escape from their difficult job situations. Most individuals who join the Basij in Iran have dropped out of school and are looking for a place to gain status (social advancement) and income. All these individuals have received their religious training to the extent of reading the Quran and becoming familiar with Sharia from local mosques (in Quran sessions, religious schools, or weekend religious classes). The network of clerical education in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan provides instructors for such teachings. Reports on the religious training of the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistani schools (Stephen Tankel, The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, King’s College London, 2009) mention these teachings. In a one-week class, Quran reading can be taught to individuals (understanding it is not necessary). How to refer to the fatwas can also be taught in a few days. After that, individuals can find answers to their jurisprudential questions on a case-by-case basis or by phone and text message. Anything beyond that not only does not deepen their religious beliefs but creates doubt and skepticism in them. In this regard, the religious knowledge of members of these groups is very limited, and this limitation is intentional and planned. It is possible that the clerics who provided them with religious training did not specifically intend to cultivate terrorists, but they laid the foundations of religious beliefs and familiarity with Islamic Sharia so that they could later be mounted on the horse of political power ambition. Few mosque clerics explicitly endorse terrorism, but they transfer the foundations of Islamism and do not explicitly reject terrorism. This political training is summarized in the transmission of five main and central points: Members of these groups should not be loyal to the country they live in, the class they belong to, the profession they have, or the university they attended, but only to Islam (Islam as identity) because only Islam saves humanity; The West and modernity are the source of all human miseries, and Western civilization has no achievements other than women's freedom ("corruption") and hedonism and infidelity and innovation; Existing governments in the Islamic world (except for the Islamic Republic, ISIS, and the Taliban) are all puppets of the West and must be removed; In opposition to the West, one must return to the early days of Islam (reviving the emirate, caliphate, or Islamic government); A study conducted by King’s College London particularly emphasizes the jihadist forces' views on modernity and its role in class divisions in the Islamic world. (War, Violence, and Terrorism in the Contemporary World by Harith Syed) Westerners covet Islamic lands and must take any action to cut off their hands; The most important action is to gain power, resist Western governments, and destroy opponents (secular agents of Western governments) (the eternal war of Islam and infidelity, or "resistance"); Islam is sufficient for human life, and all desires and needs should be sought within it; Sharia is designed for a healthy and prosperous life (Islam as Sharia); and there are only two types of societies: the Ummah and the lands of infidelity. Everything that comes from the lands of infidelity should be avoided as much as possible (Islam as community). These five teachings have three features that make them attractive to potential and actual members: They are simple, and all the complexities of the world and rival narratives and viewpoints are ignored in them; The model of this type of political education has been Marxism. Simple teachings like "class struggle" and "the bourgeoisie as the agent of imperialism" in Marxism have been replaced by the struggle of "Islam and infidelity" and "secularism as the agent of imperialism" in Islamism; All problems are attributed to the West, and blame is shifted elsewhere; Naturally, individuals are pleased with this perspective because they are not required to exert effort and feel responsibility; it is enough to portray themselves as victims (in Marxism, it is enough to be from the working class. You can do anything wrong forever and you have been a victim of the "system"); and in these teachings, giving oneself a good feeling, self-righteousness, and superiority replaces the call for reason, knowledge, and learning. Using reason and knowledge is always more difficult than finding a good feeling without doing anything. For this reason, the materials of the propaganda apparatus of governments and Islamist movements (including the speeches of their leaders) are filled with hollow praises of supporters who are considered equal to or even better than the community of the Prophet of Islam. The cognitive deadlock that newly recruited members experience before recruitment (due to isolation, marginalization, humiliation, rejection from society or family, and a sense of hopelessness) aids in the acceptance of such views. The elevation of individuals from losers to heroes and martyrs can be very motivating.