Note: Iran's 'Nuclear Breakout' with Empty Hands After the US Exit from the JCPOA?

Recent statements by Nikki Haley, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, regarding continued discussions with European countries about the nuclear agreement and the necessity for its revision, have not increased the chances of the US remaining in the nuclear deal due to the unmet four preconditions set by the White House, just weeks before the seasonal renewal of nuclear sanctions against Iran (May 11). Finalizing the White House's policy on the nuclear agreement and preparing for the consequences of such a decision is the priority of the Trump administration's foreign policy team, which has taken on a new composition with the presence of Mike Pompeo (nominee for Secretary of State) and John Bolton, the President's National Security Advisor. Both Pompeo and Bolton are known critics of the nuclear agreement, and their views align with those of the US President. Therefore, their appointment indicates a much higher likelihood of the US announcing its exit (either definitive or conditional) from the nuclear agreement than remaining in it. The failure of European countries to meet the four preconditions set by the US for remaining in the nuclear agreement, coupled with the Islamic Republic's declaration of these preconditions as 'non-negotiable,' particularly concerning ballistic missiles and the lifting of the time limitations of the nuclear agreement (the so-called sunset clause), reinforces this speculation. In a situation different from other member countries of the so-called 1+5 group, the US and Iran are considered the main parties to the agreement, and the simple absence of even one of these two countries from the JCPOA means the practical end of the nuclear agreement. In simple terms, the result of the US exit from the nuclear agreement is the loss of its benefits for Iran, and adhering to JCPOA commitments without receiving benefits is not an option that the Islamic Republic would accept. Even if Tehran wishes to remain in the JCPOA and continue cooperation with European countries after the US exit, internal pressures will force the government to reconsider this decision. The result of Iran's exit from the nuclear agreement would be a return to the situation before July 14, 2015, which, according to reports from American and non-American sources, placed the Islamic Republic just months away from a nuclear breakout and the capacity to conduct its first nuclear explosion test; a topic that, according to a recent report by the Associated Press, Yossi Cohen, the head of Israel's Mossad, assured his colleagues with 'one hundred percent' certainty that Iran is still pursuing. The significant difference between Iran's current situation and the pre-2015 nuclear agreement conditions is the abandonment of capacities and capabilities that the Islamic Republic had acquired through two decades of extraordinary and costly preparations and actions. Before the official implementation of the nuclear agreement (January 16, 2016), 98 percent of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile with a concentration of 3.5 percent and 20 percent was removed from the country, nearly 18,000 active or soon-to-be-installed centrifuges were deployed, and the number of active units was reduced to just over 4,000. The heavy water reactor core in Arak was removed from its location and its cavity was covered with reinforced concrete, and the heavy water produced in Arak was also sent abroad. According to the assessment of the previous US administration, as a result of the implementation of the nuclear agreement, the distance between Iran and the capacity to conduct a nuclear test (nuclear breakout) was increased by at least one year. In the event of Iran announcing its exit from the nuclear agreement in retaliation for the US exit and resuming any actions contrary to UN Security Council Resolution 2231, not only will the set of lifted UN sanctions be automatically reimposed against Iran, but the threat of foreign military attacks aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons will also loom over the country. Resuming uranium enrichment above 3.5 percent, refraining from sending enriched uranium above the permitted 300 kilograms abroad, installing new centrifuges, refusing to implement the 'Additional Protocol,' reducing cooperation with the Agency, and even refraining from extending visas for Agency inspectors are among the actions that the Islamic Republic may undertake after announcing its exit from the nuclear agreement. In the very complex 159-page nuclear agreement (JCPOA), which was drafted based on the global community's lack of trust in Iran's behavior, the upper hand has been given to Western countries, and in Security Council Resolution 2231, despite the conditional lifting of previous punitive resolutions, the imbalance resulting from uncertainty has been repeated against the Islamic Republic. In the event of a unilateral US exit from the JCPOA, the United States would not commit any specific legal violation, while announcing Iran's exit from the nuclear agreement would not only lead to the reinstatement of the previous set of UN Security Council sanctions but would also trigger the reimposition of sanctions that the US and Europe had enforced against Iran since 2012; sanctions that, while gradually halting crude oil exports, have plunged the country's foreign trade into a major crisis.