Note: IRGC Commanders and the Illusion of Military Power

Hosseini Salami, the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated on Saturday, February 3, during the television program "Tonight's Headlines" on the news network that we have the capability to confront our greatest enemy, the United States, and in war, we realized we have no committed allies and no support beyond the internal capacities of our nation. His statements in this television program were based on four main pillars: the advancements, capacities, and military capabilities of the IRGC; the IRGC's complete awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. military in the region; a "variety of defensive power packages" from the IRGC to strike effectively against the U.S. at any time and place; and the extensive strategic security field of Iran, considering the Syrian and Iraqi armies as the strategic depth of defense for the Islamic Republic. These claims, made on the occasion of the Fajr decade, are also related to the shift in the Trump administration's military strategy in the Middle East, which has caused concern for the Islamic Republic. Based on this new strategy, the U.S. will strengthen its military presence in Syrian Kurdistan and prioritize confronting "immediate threats from Iran to the stability of the Middle East" over what Rex Tillerson called a "flawed nuclear deal." Salami's claims have a long history; in May 2015, he warned the U.S. that the Islamic Republic had prepared itself "for extensive and prolonged wars on a real scale and with the result of victory and overcoming them [the Americans]." Comparing and juxtaposing Salami's recent and previous claims shows that, like many IRGC commanders, he lacks the necessary military knowledge, processes information incorrectly, or, for political reasons, exaggerates the IRGC's capabilities, leading to a naive and incorrect understanding of military technologies and capabilities of the U.S. that could result in misdirection of commanders and units under his command and instill false confidence that could lead to disaster. The exaggeration of achievements and belittling of the "enemy" relates to his "variety of defensive power packages" against the U.S., which he outlined in an interview with the news network in November 2014, focusing on air and naval domains, especially in the Persian Gulf, primarily relying on the use of cruise and ballistic missiles, deploying drones equipped with "smart and precise missiles," mining, and utilizing missile-launching fast boats and patrol boats. In the television program "Tonight's Headlines," Salami mentioned reverse engineering and optimizing the American "RQ-170" drone and indigenous radar-evading drones with long ranges and high ceilings as part of the IRGC's capabilities. While the Islamic Republic has produced drones like the "Shahed 129," which likely has a narrow radar cross-section, the achievements in radar evasion in the Islamic Republic are questionable. Similarly, the claim that the Iranian "RQ-170" drone is even better than its American counterpart borders on exaggeration, as one of its features, like its American model, should be radar evasion and stealth. The reality is that, contrary to Salami's claims, the Islamic Republic has yet to demonstrate any skill that would confirm its acquisition of stealth or radar-evading technology. Currently, only three countries, the U.S., Russia, and China, which have the highest military budgets in the world, possess this technology. In the same television program, while explaining the "fear and dread" of the U.S. regarding the IRGC's capabilities, Salami stated that the enemy has not yet resorted to military options against the Islamic Republic because it knows that with the first bullet fired or the first missile launched, it would face an "endless war." He further added, "We can place all enemy bases in the region under heavy and continuous strikes and confront the enemy at sea and at any level." Previously, in July 2012, Salami likened American aircraft carriers to "scrap metal," claiming that due to their massive size, they could be ideal targets for the Islamic Republic's "unique ballistic and precision missiles." The reality is that, contrary to Salami's claims, the Islamic Republic has yet to demonstrate any skill that would confirm its acquisition of stealth or radar-evading technology. The commander of the IRGC Navy, Ali Fadavi, also shares a similar perception of U.S. capabilities in the region. In September 2012, at a gathering of Basij professors in Mashhad, he claimed that no one in the IRGC believes that the power and capability of the U.S. Navy is greater than Iran's. He explained this disbelief by stating that IRGC members observe this issue every day. He even made repeated promises to destroy the U.S. Navy if confronted by the IRGC, claiming the ability to sink American ships within 50 seconds, believing that U.S. aircraft carriers are like ammunition depots and can be destroyed by a single missile. This naive perception of U.S. capabilities is expressed while the U.S. has a significant and powerful presence in the countries south of the Persian Gulf. The number of American military personnel in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries exceeds 35,000, and the U.S. military has seven bases in the Persian Gulf: the Fifth Fleet base (the naval branch of CENTCOM) in Bahrain; Al Udeid Air Base (one of the most important operational centers of the U.S. military) in Qatar; the Thumrait base in Oman; Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain; Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait; Ahmad Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait; and Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. Various aircraft at Al Dhafra Air Base, depending on their different missions in refueling, intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, command and control, ground attacks, and air support, are of special importance for the success of CENTCOM missions. The Bagram base in Afghanistan and the Lemonnier base in Djibouti are also considered major U.S. bases not far from the Persian Gulf region. In addition to the aforementioned bases, the U.S. Navy generally has an aircraft carrier, which is a mobile airbase in the region, protected by various ships against potential surface, subsurface, and missile threats. Despite this, Salami recently stated at a coordination meeting for the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution on February 5, with confidence, "If the enemy enters into a military war with us, it will definitely be defeated... The Islamic Republic will not have a military war, and all military options of the enemy against the Islamic system are blocked." In the same meeting, he referred to a type of ballistic missile from the Islamic Republic that can "hit moving vessels with 100% accuracy," asserting, "I can confidently say this technology exists neither in the U.S. nor in Russia, only in Iran." This missile he referred to, which the commander of the IRGC Navy, Ali Fadavi, has also repeatedly mentioned for destroying American aircraft carriers, is likely the Persian Gulf ballistic missile, which was modeled after the Fateh-110 missile and reportedly went into mass production seven years ago, according to Mohammad Ali Jafari, the IRGC commander. This single-stage missile with solid fuel reportedly has a range of 300 kilometers and was unveiled nearly six years ago, with its accuracy reported to be less than ten meters. Some experts have expressed doubts about this ballistic missile's ability to hit moving vessels. It is worth noting that following the terrorist attacks on June 17 against the Iranian Parliament and the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini, the IRGC launched six ballistic missiles from two western provinces targeting ISIS positions in the Deir ez-Zor region (650 kilometers away), with Western experts, including Israelis, estimating that two missiles landed in Iraqi territory and the others did not hit their intended targets. Despite the ongoing uncertainty regarding the accuracy and effectiveness of the Persian Gulf missile against moving vessels, given the current level of technology in Iran and the three tests conducted, it seems that IRGC commanders, especially Ali Fadavi, consider U.S. aircraft carriers as simple and defenseless targets for their missile attacks. One of the components of Salami's "defensive power packages" against the U.S. and other enemies is mining in the waters of the Persian Gulf and its surrounding waters. Mines are a very strong deterrent in naval warfare, and the number of mines from the IRGC and the army, including advanced Chinese "EM 52" mines, is estimated to be around two thousand, which is considered a relatively acceptable capability. However, one of Iran's major weaknesses is the lack of mine-clearing capability. This means that if mines are laid and the strategic ports and islands of Iran are blockaded by the U.S., the Islamic Republic of Iran will be unable to clear or neutralize the mines. Nevertheless, some IRGC commanders, including Mahmoud Fahimi, the deputy operations commander of the IRGC Navy in 2012, have spoken of their dominance in mining and mine-clearing operations and the inability of the U.S. to counter this tactic, while the capabilities of the IRGC and even the Navy are very limited in mine-clearing, restricted to two or three American "RH-53" helicopters from the Shah's era with mine-clearing capabilities, which are over forty years old. Strategic depth According to Salami, the Syrian and Iraqi armies are the strategic defensive depth of the Islamic Republic, and that "the best strategy for engaging the enemy is at a distance." This is while the Syrian army has been completely worn out due to the seven-year civil war, leaving only a shell of it remaining. The Islamic Republic, with its extensive and costly human and non-human support to the Syrian regime, aims to maintain Assad while pursuing its anti-Israeli policies with Hezbollah and Hamas, which is not in line with Iran's national interests. Regarding Iraq, despite the role of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the fight against ISIS, the Iraqi army is not considered a strategic depth of the Islamic Republic. The U.S. has nearly 9,000 military personnel in Iraq, although their numbers are expected to decrease after the victory over ISIS, but it is anticipated that half of these soldiers will remain in Iraq. Most of the weapons and equipment of the Iraqi army are American, and according to Haider al-Abadi, this army needs American training assistance for years to come. Iraq's intelligence, security, and military cooperation with the U.S. is at a high level. Furthermore, Haider al-Abadi aims to balance Iraq's relations with the U.S., Iran, and even Saudi Arabia, reducing Iran's influence in Iraq. The illusion of power, impossible victory Salami, Fadavi, and many senior IRGC commanders consider the experiences gained during the Iran-Iraq War as one of their advantages and often highlight these experiences in their statements, attempting to extend them to the present situation in Iran and regional events and developments. In other words, they are living in the past. While these experiences have faded over time. Most of the IRGC members present at the fronts have retired, and the majority of the country's population, which is under 25 years old, has no direct knowledge of the revolution and the war, and their demands are different. Additionally, the regional conditions have changed, and with the entry of new actors into the region, different alignments have formed. Despite this, some IRGC commanders continue to beat the same drum, including Mohsen Rezaei, the former commander of the IRGC, who stated in an interview in October 2016, "With the experience of war, we can manage the next 200 years. The war taught us so many lessons and experiences that we have the equivalent of 200 years of experience." Contrary to Salami's claims, who repeatedly challenges the U.S. and considers its military power insignificant and has even expressed readiness to "bring realities to light on the battlefield" against Americans, a military victory for the IRGC and the armed forces of Iran over the Gulf Cooperation Council countries is impossible, let alone against the U.S. Despite having missile capabilities and relative superiority at sea compared to Saudi Arabia, Iran has glaring weaknesses in the air domain, as most of its fighter jets and bombers are outdated and have long surpassed their legal lifespan. This force poses more of a threat to itself than to others, and in recent years, many of its aircraft have crashed due to technical defects and obsolescence. The number of fighter jets, bombers, and transport and attack helicopters in Iran is mostly less than that of Saudi Arabia. This is while the Iranian Air Force was stronger than the combined air forces of the Gulf countries in 1971. While the Gulf countries benefit from alliances, support, and backing from the U.S., the Islamic Republic, as Salami himself has stated, has no "committed ally" in the region and is alone. Any conflict with the U.S. will bring the Arab Gulf countries and Israel into the battlefield to varying degrees, and vice versa. In other words, in the event of a war, the Islamic Republic will face a range of countries it considers enemies, and no advanced military knowledge or understanding beyond conventional wisdom is needed to know what the outcome of such a war will be. The illusion of power and the blunders of Salami, Fadavi, and many current and former IRGC commanders, which largely stem from their incorrect assessments, naivety, and false confidence, could lead to disaster for Iran and the Iranian people.