Note: Is it Possible to Break the Current Deadlock in the Nuclear Agreement?

Recently, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, who attended the Sustainable Peace Conference hosted by the United Nations in New York, gave an interview to the American publication National Interest about the possibility of the U.S. withdrawing from the JCPOA and the potential reactions of the Islamic Republic. The fate of the JCPOA will be determined on Saturday, May 12, when the U.S. is set to announce whether it will remain in or withdraw from this nuclear agreement. In response to the question of what Iran's reaction would be if the U.S. withdraws, Zarif stated, "Such a move would free Iran from any commitment to remain in the JCPOA. Whether this would lead to an immediate withdrawal or Iran's continued presence in the JCPOA depends on the decision we will make, but this [withdrawal] is the most likely response we would have to President Trump." While statements from other officials of the Islamic Republic also support withdrawal from the JCPOA, there is no such consensus regarding withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In this context, Zarif told National Interest that withdrawal from the NPT is "definitely not the position of the [Hassan Rouhani] government, but we have a very active public opinion and we have always been accountable to our public opinion. For us, considering withdrawal from the JCPOA would be preferable." Separately, Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, stated that with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran has no reason to adhere to the NPT. According to the news website Tabnak, Shamkhani said in a press conference on Tuesday, April 23, that if the U.S. breaches its commitments, Iran will exit the NPT in accordance with the law, as the treaty provides for the right of all members to withdraw if their interests are threatened. Zarif continued his interview by referring to the U.S. efforts to prevent investment in Iran and the "technical violations and even more serious breaches of the JCPOA" by the Trump administration, stating that the U.S. has joined them "through negotiation and freely" and now President Trump is "creating doubt and questions" about them. In another part of the interview, Zarif emphasized that the JCPOA was achieved through one of the longest negotiations, stating that the U.S. achieved part of what it wanted and did not achieve part of its demands: "What I mean is that this is a give-and-take process. In any negotiation, both sides create a balance between what they give and what they receive. But now the U.S. says what is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable. The fact that I want to take back everything I gave you." Meanwhile, given the deadline of May 12, diplomatic activity has intensified on both sides of the Atlantic to preserve the JCPOA, and leaders from France and Germany are trying to convince Donald Trump to stay in the agreement. However, on Tuesday, April 24, President Trump, in a conversation with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron, again criticized the Iran nuclear deal, calling it a "disaster" and stating, "This terrible agreement should never have happened." According to Trump, every problem in the region, from Syria and Yemen to Iraq, is backed by Iran, and the JCPOA "did not take into account the Yemen and Syria issues, nor the ballistic missile issue." Evidence shows that Trump insists on his four conditions for adhering to the JCPOA: immediate access for international inspectors to all sites and facilities in Iran; making permanent the restrictions outlined in the JCPOA for Iran's nuclear program; guarantees against approaching nuclear weapons; and restrictions on Iran's ballistic missile program. As Zarif emphasized in his interview with National Interest, the JCPOA was formed through negotiations with the U.S. and five other countries, and the Islamic Republic does not seek "renegotiation" of this nuclear agreement. Given the contradictory positions and demands of the Islamic Republic and the U.S., the following points are noteworthy: The JCPOA only "relates to the nuclear issue of the Islamic Republic and does not cover ballistic missiles or the behavior and actions of the Islamic Republic in the Middle East or beyond. The participants in the nuclear talks, including U.S. officials from the Obama administration, acknowledge that comprehensive discussions and holistic approaches regarding the Islamic Republic could not lead to a nuclear agreement and the negotiations would have dragged on for years, bringing Iran closer to acquiring nuclear weapons. What is referred to as the "spirit of the JCPOA" is an individual and abstract interpretation of this nuclear agreement and has no legal basis. The Islamic Republic has so far adhered to the JCPOA based on inspections and verifications by the International Atomic Energy Agency and access to even military sites is possible with acceptable documents and reasons, and there are special mechanisms for this. However, the Islamic Republic opposes immediate access without prior coordination to all facilities and military bases, arms factories, and military and non-military research centers, in other words, giving a green light to inspectors to visit wherever they wish. The Islamic Republic does not consider the permanence of the restrictions outlined in the JCPOA, meaning the cancellation of the so-called sunset clauses of 10 and 15 years, acceptable. Clause 10 states that Iran can increase the number of its centrifuges after ten years (currently about 5,000 of the 9,200 operational centrifuges are in Fordow and Natanz). Clause 15 also allows Iran to increase its stock of enriched uranium. Iran does not see missile tests and satellite launch rocket launches as contrary to the JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231, and because it does not have or has not built a nuclear warhead, the allegations that these missiles can carry a nuclear warhead are considered "non-existent subject." Some American experts believe that the Islamic Republic should reduce the range of its ballistic missiles to 300 kilometers or less. This range is determined based on the "Missile Technology Control Regime" known as the MTCR, which is an informal and voluntary regime with no enforcement power and is not dependent on the United Nations. According to this regime, which was formulated 30 years ago and has 30 member countries, any missile with a range of more than 300 kilometers and an explosive weight of more than 500 kilograms is considered a weapon of mass destruction. Given the deep gap between the demands and preconditions of the U.S. and the repeated statements of Islamic Republic officials regarding refraining from discussions to change the JCPOA, the possibility of U.S. withdrawal or some form of exit from this agreement, as many American and European experts have also stated, seems inevitable, and tensions between the Islamic Republic and the U.S. will escalate further. Recent threats from Iranian officials, including Hassan Rouhani, Mohammad Javad Zarif, and Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, have also added to the reason, stating that if the U.S. withdraws from the JCPOA, the possibility of resuming nuclear activities will be one of the options. To break the current deadlock and avoid military confrontation, what can be done? The preferred option in the context of nuclear and missile issues, in my opinion, is to utilize the art of diplomacy and resort to peaceful means, especially dialogue, to reduce the gap between the demands of the Islamic Republic and the U.S., as the other countries of the 1+5 group remain committed to the continuation of the JCPOA. Mohammad Javad Zarif rejects discussions about the JCPOA but, while referring to the unilateral demands of the U.S., considers the moderation of demands and expectations and also give-and-take in political discussions as an effective process. Discussions, if realized, which will not be easy at all, could resume beyond the JCPOA, in a new framework and name, based on a win-win basis rather than a "zero-sum game." Currently, the Trump administration wants to implement its four preconditions without giving any concessions to the Islamic Republic, and this position, while drying up the motivation for dialogue among Islamic Republic officials, will prolong the existing political deadlock.