Note: Is the JCPOA Tied to Structural Changes in the Iranian Government?

Intensive negotiations have taken place between the United States and three countries, France, Britain, and Germany, regarding the preconditions set by Donald Trump's administration for remaining in the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, which will continue at least until French President Emmanuel Macron's visit to Washington on April 24. The question now is whether these discussions could lead to changes in the political mechanisms governing Iran and structural transformations in the geopolitical landscape of the region? Trump announced in January that if the U.S. preconditions are not met, it will not remain in the nuclear agreement. The direct result of the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement is the cessation of the lifting of sanctions against Iran; a significant and impactful development that major European financial and commercial institutions, even despite the dissatisfaction of their respective governments, will inevitably follow. According to the White House daily bulletin dated February 23, the U.S. President, in his latest remarks regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at the 'Conservative Political Action Conference' in Washington, noted: 'After refusing to certify Iran's compliance with the JCPOA, interesting developments have occurred.' This statement from the U.S. President indicates progress in the direction of adopting a common policy between Washington and European countries regarding the future of the nuclear agreement and how to deal with it. Concurrently with Trump's remarks, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also confirmed that 'we are discussing with our European allies concerning shared concerns related to the nuclear agreement and also the hostile and destructive behaviors of the Islamic Republic in the region.' New discussions across the Atlantic last week saw Brian Hook, head of the U.S. State Department's policy planning, lead a joint working group meeting of Europe and the U.S. in Paris. The purpose of the Paris discussions, which included experts from the three major European countries, U.S. State Department political design experts, Andrew Peek, the Director General for Iran and Iraq at the State Department, Chris Ford, responsible for global security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and Julie Rebor, Senior Director of the National Security Council and responsible for Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, was to examine the considerations raised by Trump regarding Iran and to reach a common policy in this regard. These negotiations are set to continue next week in Rome and will persist until the official visit of Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, to the U.S. It is expected that before May 12, which is the expiration date for the seasonal lifting of U.S. nuclear sanctions against Iran, the three major European countries and the United States will reach a framework for a joint agreement regarding Iran. One can estimate that the nuclear agreement of July 2015 with Iran was based on the possibility that strengthening pragmatists within the Islamic Republic's governance (Hassan Rouhani's government) would weaken conservatives and moderate foreign and domestic behaviors, leading to a 'gradual change in the nature of Iran's revolutionary government.' The experience of the year following the implementation of the nuclear agreement and the release of billions of dollars of Iran's blocked assets showed that not only did the strengthening of pragmatists and moderation of government behavior not occur, but the Islamic Republic increased its military presence in the region by equipping tens of thousands of militants and expanding proxy wars. With the change of the U.S. presidency, the way the United States deals with the Islamic Republic changed. Donald Trump on February 23 in Washington described the nuclear agreement as 'horrible' and 'one-sided,' reiterating his opposition to it, stating: 'When we signed the agreement with them (the Islamic Republic), they were chanting death to America... why did we even compromise with them?' During the same session, Trump added regarding the Islamic Republic: 'Those who befriend us see our friendship, and those who misbehave with us will see our behavior towards them will be much worse.' The four announced preconditions by the U.S. for maintaining the nuclear agreement include: 1- Lifting the time limitations and not allowing the Islamic Republic to increase its uranium enrichment capacity at the end of the JCPOA expiration (sunset), 2- Limiting ballistic missile capacity, 3- Strict implementation of the Additional Protocol (inspections by inspectors from the Agency at suspicious sites), and 4- Preventing Iran from approaching the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. A major concern of Washington, which is not included in the four stated conditions, is the cessation of the Islamic Republic's military presence in the region, which has been declared a shared concern by European countries, in addition to Saudi Arabia and Israel. This week's visit by Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, to London, coinciding with the start of the next round of U.S.-European expert negotiations in Rome, as well as his official visit to the U.S. before the French President's negotiations in Washington, is part of a plan to exert pressure from regional powers on European governments to align them with U.S. policies regarding the Islamic Republic. Considering the importance and extent of trade, political, and security relations across the Atlantic, predicting a convergence between the U.S. and Western Europe regarding the Islamic Republic, despite the verbal support of European countries for maintaining the JCPOA, is not difficult. The potential reaction of the Islamic Republic to the stated demands, especially in the current internal crisis situation in Iran, makes pre-assessment somewhat challenging. On one hand, the return of sanctions in a situation where the country has not yet overcome the recent waves of protests could lead to increased internal dissatisfaction, and on the other hand, accepting U.S. preconditions, even if moderated through European mediation, will be perceived as a sign of weakness of the government and submission to defeat. The fate of authoritarian governments is often on the line when they lose foreign support while internal dissatisfaction rises, and the deepening rift between power holders and claimants of governance places them in a crisis situation; a scenario that seems to be facing the Islamic Republic after the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement.