Note: Israel's Extensive Attack in Syria and the End of an Illusion

On Wednesday, May 9, according to Israeli military officials, members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria launched 20 medium-range 'Fajr' missiles at Israeli bases in the Golan Heights. In response, Israel targeted 'all IRGC bases in Syria' with 28 F-15 and F-16 fighter jets and 10 medium-range ground-to-ground missiles. This is the third conflict between the two countries in Syria, but if the IRGC's missile attack on Israeli bases is confirmed, it would be the first of its kind and the beginning of severe future confrontations. Several elements in these new conflicts are noteworthy. First, the timing coincides with the appointment of Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State and John Bolton as President Trump's National Security Advisor, along with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. Additionally, the unprecedented arming of Saudi Arabia and the unwritten alliance of this country and its allies with Israel, Netanyahu's visit to Russia, and the establishment of friendly relations with Putin, and finally, the prominent role of Avigdor Lieberman, Israel's Defense Minister, known for his anti-Islamic Republic stance, are significant. These facts clearly mark the end of the relative understanding between the Islamic Republic and the United States, which was established during President Obama's second term and Secretary of State John Kerry's tenure with the signing of the JCPOA. Although regime change in Iran has not been officially stated in Trump's administration, it is practically back on the agenda. A long period of sanctions and economic restrictions, alongside continuous strikes against the Islamic Republic's foreign forces to exacerbate inflation and dissatisfaction and reduce the IRGC's strength, is on the way. The new military-economic situation and the direct confrontation between Israeli and Iranian military forces are the beginning of new crises that could easily engulf the entire Middle East. At the same time, these new approaches confirm the incorrectness of the Islamic Republic's expansionist policy, which is referred to as 'defensive' by Tehran. The Islamic Republic's defensive-expansionist strategy has been based on creating a corridor of impoverished Shiites from the Chinese border to the Mediterranean Sea since its establishment. This strategy began with successful intervention in Lebanon and was further facilitated by the repeated mistakes of Western governments in the Middle East, such as the overthrow of Saddam and the destruction of the Iraqi army, leading to a military-political vacuum that increasingly opened up opportunities for the Islamic Republic. President Obama's passive policy in the Middle East intensified this interventionism of the Islamic Republic. According to Islamic Republic leaders, this strategy aims to expand the defensive line against Israel and the West, which they believe is at odds with the establishment of 'true Islam' in Iran. Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are considered 'trenches' or strongholds of the Iranian government against the 'enemy's' aggression. The application of the defensive-expansionist strategy, however, has an expiration date. For example, a change in the U.S. presidency, as occurred, has unraveled many threads, or the return of local government order in the satrapies of the Islamic Republic is another factor that weakens Iran's role, as is currently happening in Iraq. The popularity of Muqtada al-Sadr, an Iraqi Shiite cleric who has based his recent electoral campaign on rejecting and opposing Iranian policies, is an example of this. The reopening of the Saudi embassy in Iraq and promises of economic aid ensure the entry of a rival to the Islamic Republic into the scene. Israel's military attack on the IRGC bases in Israel showcased another aspect of the Islamic Republic's expansionist policy's constraints in the region: none of the allies defended the IRGC bases, and no retaliatory offensive action was taken against Israeli forces by allied forces such as Hezbollah, the Islamic Jihad Movement, the Al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza, or even the Syrian army. The Russian government, which was previously informed of this attack, did not intervene at all. This lack of defense for the Islamic Republic's military bases should be very alarming: the Islamic Republic cannot rely on any of its regional allies in a broad confrontation with Israel. The Shiite-centered strategy of the Islamic Republic has failed its first serious test in the region. It seems that this country, which expanded its forces in the vacuum after the Iraq war and the chaos in Syria, Gaza, Yemen, and sometimes Lebanon in coordination with local Shiite forces, is now facing a widespread backlash. The re-imposition of sanctions, which will take shape at the end of the calendar year, will further erode the Islamic Republic's financial base and will hinder its ability to maintain and sustain paramilitary and military forces in the region. Although the Islamic Republic can sustain its influence to some extent by aligning with dissatisfied and radical groups for years, the continuous strikes from Israel today and the Arab countries tomorrow, along with the attraction or neutralization of Iraq and even Syria, will weaken their relations with the Islamic Republic and make the government's work even more difficult. The Islamic Republic must inevitably accept the reality of the changing regional landscape and accurately assess its power limitations. It is clear that the Israeli government does not accept the extensive presence of Iranian-aligned Shiite forces, whether hired or volunteer, and the IRGC bases in the Golan Heights, and will do everything in its power to prevent the establishment of another Hezbollah, this time in Syria. The country is not alone in this matter: Russia and even the Assad government do not accept such a formation. These two countries do not tolerate the current presence of Iranian forces around Damascus and demand their practical exile to the eastern deserts of Syria bordering Iraq. Moreover, the Sunni majority in the Middle East has a negative view of the Islamic Republic and its forces, seeing them as occupiers, and may even consider their Shiite compatriots as traitors. This perception fuels Sunni-Shiite animosity and, in the long run, is detrimental to the Shiite minority in the region. Several points about the near future: With the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and other events analyzed, it seems that the Islamic Republic does not have many options. However, it can be imagined that the Islamic Republic, in the current situation—namely, the military pushback against its forces and allies by Arabs, Israel, and the U.S., followed by severe sanctions—could continue its half-life. The stimulation of nationalism and sometimes religious sentiment among the people has worked well throughout the life of the Islamic Republic. But in the current difficult economic and security conditions, this equates to a more profound disorder and poverty that could at least lead to further protests similar to the recent winter protests in Iran. The Islamic Republic could accept President Trump's proposal and enter into lengthy negotiations with the U.S., waiting for Trump's presidency to end, but even assuming Trump is a one-term president, the presidential election is more than two and a half years away, and it is unlikely that Trump will have the patience for such negotiations. Currently, it seems unlikely that the Islamic Republic will agree to a fundamental change in its internal and external affairs, as the U.S. desires, especially since it considers such a move synonymous with regime collapse. It can be imagined that some of Trump's four demands may be implicitly accepted by the Islamic Republic, but given the regime change inclination in the Trump administration, even such a compromise may not be agreed upon. Furthermore, the hardliners of the Islamic Republic, led by Ayatollah Khamenei, believe that the more concessions are made to the U.S., the more it will demand, as its goal is regime change and the suppression of 'true Islam.' At the same time, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly proven that it has squandered the best opportunities for negotiation and deal-making, ultimately negotiating under the worst conditions and accepting the worst contracts. There is no reason to believe that the Islamic Republic's behavior will be different this time.