Note: Oil, Gas, and Nuclear Capacity; The Difference Between Choosing 'Force' Instead of 'Power'

The direct meaning of the threats from senior officials of the Islamic Republic to withdraw from the nuclear agreement reflects a shift towards using 'force' instead of developing the foundations of 'power' and choosing a 'confrontation' approach instead of pursuing a 'détente' policy in response to challenges threatening the existence of the government from both inside and outside. The new challenges for the Islamic Republic began when the Trump administration changed its approach to U.S. foreign policy objectives regarding the political regime in Iran, placing 'increasing pressure to contain the religious government of Tehran' on its agenda. The previous U.S. administration (Obama) expected that granting financial concessions to the Tehran government and facilitating foreign investments would lead to the development of the national economy and the strengthening of the domestic middle class, while simultaneously providing respectful receptions for political representatives of the Islamic Republic in global forums and international media to strengthen moderates and gradually weaken the regime's extremists. The approximate deadline for the transformation of the Iranian revolutionary system since the implementation of the nuclear agreement in July 2015 was considered to be about ten years, and it was expected that by the end of the period of nuclear and missile restrictions against the Islamic Republic outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Ali Khamenei would exit the political scene, the religious government would undergo a transformation, and the then-current Iranian government would voluntarily forget about achieving nuclear capacity. The weakness of this assessment stemmed from the limited understanding of the U.S. officials at the time regarding the true nature of the religious government in Iran and their placing regional security considerations on conjecture and abstract optimism. The recognized responsibility of a national government, regardless of factional or party differences, is to effectively use the levers available to the country to achieve growth and development goals, ensure welfare, and guarantee national security. At the end of the second year of the nuclear agreement's implementation, despite the release of $100 to $150 billion in blocked assets from oil exports and stabilizing annual income at around $50 billion, Iran's economic growth slowed, and the middle class became weaker than before, while Iran's regional behaviors became harsher than ever. The internal and external behaviors of the government after the implementation of the nuclear agreement showed that the religious regime in Iran continues to seek the application of 'force' in executing 'divine commands' and territorial expansion by the sword. In the political culture of the religious government in Iran, the necessity and priority of strengthening the foundations of social development and increasing 'national power' have never been addressed. The art of government in utilizing national power levers is prioritizing, as Saudi Arabia endures temporary financial losses to maintain its share of crude oil exports in global markets; Russia seeks to maintain its gas export market in Europe; China's priority is to preserve consumer goods exports to North America and Europe; Turkey aims to increase the production and export of household appliances and grow its industrial capabilities. Iran is the richest country in the world in terms of combined oil and natural gas reserves, and utilizing the production and sale capacity of oil and gas to develop economic power and increase the financial strength of the country should be a priority for the government. In 2005, with the rise of Ahmadinejad's government, the Islamic Republic's nuclear development programs, which had been designed 20 years earlier during the war to maintain the balance of power and create deterrent capacity against Iraq, were resumed without the slightest security justification or national interest. The direct result of abandoning the Saadabad agreement, which had been reached two years earlier between three European powers and Iran, was the welcoming of the referral of Iran's nuclear case to the Security Council, ignoring the imposition of sanctions, and placing plans to increase oil and gas production under the shadow of nuclear development, which could ultimately lead to the capacity to produce a nuclear bomb; reducing the power of a poverty-stricken nation, side by side with North Korea or Pakistan, but armed with a nuclear bomb and ready for territorial expansion in the region! Speaking on behalf of the people is a right belonging to the people or their elected representatives. Although exercising this right is currently impossible in Iran, it can be assumed that people in a free and rational society would not prefer the application of 'force' over the development of the foundations of 'power' and would not sacrifice their national and convertible wealth, such as oil and gas, at the altar of creating nuclear weapon capacity. There are those who continue to fight for the 'dignity of the Islamic nation' and strengthen the 'axis of resistance' while prohibiting 'inspections of military sites' or halting 'provocative missile activities.' The people, in a view contrary to the 'defenders of the shrine,' see the ropes to which the religious government of Iran has hung justifications for the use of force as frayed cords; opposition to legal inspections is equivalent to concealment, intercontinental missiles do not safeguard Iran's national security, proxy wars in the region are a factor in the country's further isolation and the intensification of infrastructure destruction and poverty development in neighboring countries; Iran's priority today is not the increased application of force, but peaceful coexistence with neighbors and the development of the foundations of national power!