Note: Seven Stages of Fundamentalism in Iranian Kurdistan

One: When political prisoners in Kurdistan were released in the final months of the Pahlavi regime, there was likely not a single religious person or believer in political Islam among them. Unlike the rest of Iran, where Islamists constituted part of the political prisoners (mainly supporters of Khomeini and Ali Shariati), all political prisoners in Kurdistan belonged to leftist, nationalist, and democratic groups. During Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule, no Islamic movement emerged in Kurdistan even for a single day. The people of Kurdistan did not witness any gatherings, protests, or attacks on taverns or cinemas in their spontaneous and social movements, while hundreds of leftist and democratic political activists were imprisoned or in exile. The first armed movement against the Shah, prior to the Siyahkal movement, was formed in Kurdistan by the Revolutionary Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Political Islam was completely absent in Kurdistan. The leadership and organization of the gatherings and demonstrations leading to the revolution were also shaped by these leftist and democratic forces. Two: After the victory of the revolution and its inclination towards Islamization, the first tension began in March 1979 in Sanandaj. Influenced by the revolutionary atmosphere in central Iran, some in this city, led by Ahmad Moftizadeh, developed Islamic tendencies and stood alongside government forces during the bloody Nowruz events in Sanandaj. With the mediation of Mr. Taleghani and the dismissal of General Gharani, who had unilaterally ordered the attack, the atmosphere in Sanandaj calmed down, and with the agreement of all groups, the first elections in Kurdistan—and the first elections in Iran after the revolution—were held in Sanandaj, forming a council composed of leftists, independents, and these Islamists. However, according to documents from Taleghani's biography, before the delegation sent to Tehran returned, incited by Banisadr and Rafsanjani, the related group announced that they did not accept the council and only accepted the Islamic council! The term Islamic council was first used at that time. Even months later, when the parliamentary elections were held, it was still not called the 'Islamic Council.' The provocations of this group, as supporters of the central government, peaked in the summer of that year, and with Khomeini's order to attack Kurdistan and the dispatch of Khalkhali, the role of this group in identifying and executing political activists became more pronounced. In the years leading up to the revolution, thousands of Kurdish political activists were active in Kurdistan and outside it, but not a single one of them believed in political Islam. Even Moftizadeh, who spent 1964 in prison, was arrested for his nationalist thoughts and attempts to form a party more radical than the Kurdistan Democratic Party (by Mr. Salah Mohtadi, Moftizadeh's brother-in-law). Three: After the suppression of Kurdistan, the Islamic Republic could not tolerate even this group loyal to itself. Its high-ranking leaders, such as Moftizadeh, were imprisoned from 1982, and that part of the body that had become infamous among the people and was recognized as the perpetrators of the murder and execution of their fellow young citizens was organized by Boroujerdi in the form of Muslim Peshmerga in the Revolutionary Guard. In fact, from the early 1980s, the Islamic Republic began suppressing Sunnis whom it had politicized, Sunnis who had no history of being political. Four: The Kurdish movement in Iraq was somewhat different. There, the main fighting force was also the nationalist and Marxist parties, but a few individuals influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood of Iraq had developed Islamic tendencies. The Islamic Republic began to strengthen and organize these individuals from the 1980s, coinciding with the Iran-Iraq War. The representative office and base of two Islamic parties in Iraqi Kurdistan were established by Iranian officials in Tehran and several cities in Iranian Kurdistan. Although these movements did not yield much profit for Iran and are now mostly inclined towards Turkey's Justice and Development Party, they imposed significant costs on Iranian Kurds and, alongside some remnants of Moftizadeh's group, promoted fundamentalism. Five: In the 1990s, with the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the suppression and humiliation of Sunnis intensified under the Ministry of Intelligence and Saeed Imamis, and several instances of chain murders before and after Khordad 2 (June 1997) further wounded the religious sentiments of Sunni Kurds. Efforts to change the demographic makeup of the region, assigning important responsibilities to non-locals or Shiite locals, coincided with attempts to completely weaken leftist and nationalist movements during those years. At the same time, the intensification of religious provocations in Iraqi Kurdistan against the two secular ruling parties that came to power after the first American invasion of Iraq constituted the main policy of the Islamic Republic in the region. Dozens of assassinations of members of the Democratic Party and Komala in the depths of Iraqi Kurdistan were mostly carried out by these groups. In one case, seven members of the Democratic Party were captured by one of these Islamic parties (Bzotenewe) and handed over to Iranian authorities, six of whom were executed. In fact, the policy of suppressing Sunnis in Iranian Kurdistan and strengthening Sunni Islamic parties in Iraqi Kurdistan played a significant role in promoting Sunni Islamism through both negative and positive means. Six: In the 2000s, with the American occupation of Iraq, the policy of strengthening fundamentalist Sunnis by the Islamic Republic gained more dimensions. Firstly, a group of these Sunni parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, which were attacked by a joint American and regional government, were stationed deep inside Iran. Secondly, the possibility of jihadists from Pakistan and Afghanistan passing into Iraqi Kurdistan and freely moving in Iranian Kurdistan was facilitated. In fact, the first conspiracy of the Islamic Republic against the democratic national movement of Kurdistan began the day after the revolution with efforts to create parallel and infiltrative movements against the Kurds. Interestingly, in a report prepared two years ago by several experts from the Ministry of Interior regarding how to deal with Salafists, one of the suggestions was to form parallel movements and attempt to create a rift among them! It remains to be seen what kind of outcome the Islamic Republic will achieve with these efforts and what fate it will write for itself. Thirdly, some Kurds from Iran who were attracted to these groups traveled freely to Pakistan and Afghanistan to participate in political and military courses. In fact, this time the dual policy of the Islamic Republic among Iranian and Iraqi Kurds had also become dual within Iran itself: a general policy; the continued insult and humiliation of Sunnis, and a specific policy; the facilitation of attracting some of them to jihadist groups. While even non-political religious individuals in Kurdistan did not have security, some others saw the opportunity to equip forces and carry out operations in Iraq against Americans. Personally, I know one of these individuals who, despite being arrested with a suicide vest in Baghdad and handed over to Iranian authorities through the mediation of a Shiite Iraqi official—with the claim that he would serve the rest of his sentence in his country's prisons—was immediately released upon his return to Iran and now owns a mobile phone shop in the city of Javanrud, with several family members and relatives killed in Iraq. Thus, in the 2010s, especially after the emergence of ISIS, while tens of thousands of Peshmerga and Kurdish fighters in Iraq and Syria were fighting against ISIS, some members of the same groups in Iran and Iraq joined ISIS. Those who carried out the terrorist operations in Tehran had been known to Iranian authorities for years. Seven or zero: (This section was intentionally placed at the end of this writing instead of the beginning) Tourists and Orientalists who traveled to Iran and Kurdistan in the 19th century expressed their surprise at the distinctiveness of Kurdish society in several notes. For instance, they noted that unlike other regions of Iran where women fled or covered themselves upon seeing strangers, Kurdish women, firstly, did not wear hijab, secondly, were not afraid of strangers, and thirdly, helped strangers when asked for directions to find roads and caravanserais. In general, the chador was never part of the clothing of women in any Kurdish region. Also, from these notes, it is evident that the mixed dancing of Kurds at their weddings attracted the attention of those tourists. There is not enough time here to examine all the reasons for the different perspectives of Kurds on religion, the status of women, and political-social relations; it is only noted that even the clergy and religious scholars in Kurdistan have been facilitators and moderate. Many daughters of those religious leaders did not wear hijab and were mostly educated. Those religious leaders did not only not prohibit mixed dancing and unveiled women at the weddings and celebrations of family members but also danced hand in hand with other women and men. Most religious figures in Kurdistan, from Qazi Muhammad and Molla Avareh to Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini and Mamosta Abdollah Hassan Zadeh, were leaders of national and leftist movements in Kurdistan. In the years leading up to the revolution, thousands of Kurdish political activists were active in Kurdistan and outside it, but probably not a single one of them believed in political Islam. Even Moftizadeh, who spent 1964 in prison, was arrested for his nationalist thoughts and attempts to form a party more radical than the Kurdistan Democratic Party (by Mr. Salah Mohtadi, Moftizadeh's brother-in-law). In the summer and autumn of 1979, when Kurdistan witnessed the release of political prisoners, those who were released were either the core members of Komala who had been imprisoned since 1975 with Foad Mostafa Soltani or figures like Tayfor Batayi who had been arrested alongside Khosrow Golserkhi and Karamat Daneshian, or seasoned prisoners like Ghani Bolurian who had spent 25 years of his life in the Shah's prisons. Before their release, the last detainees in Kurdistan were also those arrested in June 1979 during the funeral of the late Aziz Yousofi. Aziz Yousofi, who passed away just three months after his release, had also spent 25 years in prison like Ghani Bolurian. Among those detained during that event, there was not a single Islamic individual. Alongside dozens of young leftists and democrats, two prominent figures among the activists and speakers at the June 1979 event were Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini, the Imam of Mahabad, and Professor Jalil Gadani, who had spent 25 years prior, five years in hiding, ten years in prison, and ten years in exile from Kurdistan. Months before the talk of Khomeini's return, Dr. Qasemlu, Hosseinzadeh, Dehqan, and others had returned from Iraq to Kurdistan and organized the revolution in Kurdistan. In fact, the first conspiracy of the Islamic Republic against the democratic national movement of Kurdistan began the day after the revolution with efforts to create parallel and infiltrative movements against the Kurds. Interestingly, in a report prepared two years ago by several experts from the Ministry of Interior regarding how to deal with Salafists, one of the suggestions was to form parallel movements and attempt to create a rift among them! It remains to be seen what kind of outcome the Islamic Republic will achieve with these efforts and what fate it will write for itself.