Note: The Aggressive Approach of the U.S. Government and Khamenei's Soft Response

Khamenei's statements during the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's death clarified some aspects of the regime's strategy in the post-JCPOA minus the U.S. He instructed the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization to prepare for the production of nuclear fuel amounting to 190,000 SWU within the framework of the JCPOA, following the president's directives. Ali Akbar Salehi's press conference the day after Khamenei's remarks and his readiness to implement recent nuclear orders indicated that the government and the institution of the Supreme Leader are coordinated in this regard. However, contrary to some reactions, Khamenei's stance is not new and does not indicate a significant change in the regime's nuclear policy. Before the final approval of the JCPOA, he issued a nine-article directive, the sixth of which stated: "According to the parliamentary resolution, the necessary plans and measures for the medium-term development of the nuclear energy industry, which includes methods of progress at various stages from now until fifteen years and culminating in 190,000 SWU, should be prepared and carefully reviewed by the Supreme National Security Council. This plan must address any concerns arising from certain matters in the annexes of the JCPOA." Given that the existing nuclear capability of the Islamic Republic is enriching uranium using IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges with production capacities of 1 and 2 SWU per year respectively, and the number of active and inactive centrifuges in storage is at most around 19,000, producing 190,000 SWU of nuclear fuel, if raw uranium resources are secured and there are no technical problems, will take several years. Therefore, Khamenei has not said anything new in practice, and his decision will not create a significant and meaningful change in the current nuclear conditions of Iran. Understanding Khamenei's cautious approach requires a review of his positions before and during the implementation of the JCPOA. From the beginning, he expressed skepticism about the U.S. government's commitment to the JCPOA and tried to create an image of himself in public opinion as someone who is not in favor of the JCPOA and accepted it due to the finality of the argument and the opinion of some forces within the regime, making it another test. However, this apparent image had a propagandistic and unrealistic aspect. He was essentially the main policymaker of the JCPOA by initiating the secret negotiations and granting permission for nuclear reconciliation, while Rouhani's government played the role of execution. However, the necessity to maintain the outwardly strong and unshakeable image of the Supreme Leader dictated that this dual game continue, and no responsibility for accepting and implementing the JCPOA should fall on the leadership. The critical state of Iran's economy and the increasing dissatisfaction with living conditions, business stagnation, and the fragile balance of power between the government and society have led Khamenei to cautiously consider a soft defensive reaction against the aggressive pace of the U.S. government. In this context, the strategy of "heroic flexibility" has been preserved, yet nuclear activities are approaching the boundary of that strategy with small steps. Emphasizing the expansion of activities within the framework of the JCPOA clearly indicates the dominant power's adherence to the red lines and sensitivities of the West and Israel. However, his repeated emphasis that the Islamic Republic will not be the initiator of leaving the JCPOA and blaming the U.S. government for not fully adhering to its commitments in the JCPOA quickly revealed the dual approach that the leadership, forced by the heavy consequences of the continuation of fragile sanctions and Iran's global isolation, does not oppose the continuation of the JCPOA for the survival of the regime. Today, after the U.S. withdrawal, another opportunity has arisen to understand the inaccuracies of Khamenei's apparent and expedient positions. After the approval of the JCPOA, he repeatedly stated that if the U.S. government withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran's response would be firm and reciprocal. He even said that if they tear up the JCPOA, we will set fire. However, none of these claims were realized after the U.S. government left the JCPOA, and instead, the government was given the opportunity to engage in serious negotiations with the European Union regarding the preservation of the half-dead JCPOA with the 4+1 group and without the U.S. It seems that the critical state of Iran's economy and the increasing dissatisfaction with living conditions, business stagnation, and the fragile balance of power between the government and society have led Khamenei to cautiously consider a soft defensive reaction against the aggressive pace of the U.S. government. In this framework, the strategy of "heroic flexibility" has been preserved, yet nuclear activities are approaching the boundary of that strategy with small steps. Emphasizing the expansion of activities within the framework of the JCPOA clearly indicates the adherence to the red lines and sensitivities of the West and Israel by the dominant power. Under these circumstances, it seems unlikely that the leadership will decide to return to nuclear adventurism and the era when sanctions resolutions were described as scraps of paper. The history of secret negotiations at a time when the leadership's attacks and aggressive stances were at their peak is another conjecture that reinforces Khamenei's cautious approach in practice. In this perspective, a defensive approach under the guise of misleading apparent propaganda is prescribed against Trump's multiple assaults. Of course, the final determining factor in this equation is the U.S. government's ability to rebuild sanctions pressure at the pre-JCPOA level and the claim of "the most severe sanctions in history." The regime, considering this issue and circumventing the unilateral U.S. sanctions, needs to cooperate with Europe and at least distance Europe from accompanying the U.S. in dismantling the JCPOA, and this issue is a significant obstacle in the path of nuclear aspirations. Khamenei's statements, given the suspicion that Western governments have towards the Islamic Republic, lead to a loss of trust and an increase in concerns and sensitivities. However, their scope is not such that it leads to a serious reaction. Khamenei has chosen a minimal approach, aware of this issue, to maintain his outward image to some extent among his supporters and claim to defend Iran's dignity and the continuation of the nuclear program while avoiding taking uncalculated and significant risks. Another goal of this approach is to open a new field in negotiations with Europe so that the discussions move beyond merely discussing the Islamic Republic's commitment to the JCPOA's provisions and Europe's efforts to meet Iran's economic expectations, and the parallel path of the potential return of Iran's nuclear activities to the pre-JCPOA rails can pressure Europe and be used as a bargaining chip. However, this approach is not the result of Khamenei's rational assessment and revision of his confrontational foreign policy but has been imposed by the country's difficult conditions and the multiple and significant challenges facing the regime in managing the country's affairs, and there is no guarantee of its sustainability. Its success in navigating the predicament also depends on the changing regional and international conditions and the balance of power that has been disrupted between the government and the nation, and may, under specific conditions due to constraints, lead to an expansion of heroic flexibility into the missile and regional domains. Although the possibility of escalating the level of conflict is not unlikely.