Note: The Islamic Republic's Empty Hand in the Nuclear Game with the European Union

The first round of talks by Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Islamic Republic's Foreign Minister, in Brussels aimed at obtaining "practical and definitive guarantees from the European Union" as a condition for Iran's continued participation in the July 14, 2015 nuclear agreement is unlikely to succeed due to the lack of leverage of the Tehran delegation. Hassan Rouhani on Sunday made a calculated retreat from the "few weeks" extension previously given to the EU to satisfy Iran's concerns, asking only for "guarantees from the five countries regarding Iran's interests" for Tehran to remain in the nuclear agreement without setting a deadline. The European Union, for various reasons including limited capabilities, as noted by the German Chancellor on Saturday, and the necessity for European companies and banks to adhere to the new U.S. foreign policy and follow Washington's sanctions against Iran, is unable to meet Tehran's demands; these reasons prompted the U.S. to join the nuclear negotiations with the three European powers and Iran. The Islamic Republic, if it could bear the costs of announcing its exit from the nuclear agreement, would have acted on the threats made by its officials and exited the agreement as a retaliatory measure on Tuesday, June 8, at the moment of the U.S.'s definitive withdrawal from its commitments. Rouhani's announcement of a few weeks' extension for consultations with China and Russia and discussions with European parties in the 5+1 group before making a final decision, along with Ali Khamenei's recommendation to secure definitive guarantees from Europe as a condition for remaining in the agreement, are strategies to maintain the regime's appearance and credibility rather than a genuine intention to retaliate by exiting the JCPOA. The Islamic Republic's "nuclear poker" with the U.S. began weeks before Donald Trump's final decision to exit the JCPOA, with threats of retaliatory withdrawal from the nuclear commitments; however, after the U.S. announcement, Iran's exit was postponed to a "suitable opportunity." Concurrently with the U.S. announcement of its exit from the nuclear agreement, two globally and regionally significant events occurred: one was the announcement of new U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's visit to Pyongyang, North Korea, which led to the release and return of three American prisoners in less than 48 hours, and the second was Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's participation in a military parade in Moscow, shoulder to shoulder with Russian President Vladimir Putin, at the same time Israeli fighter jets and missiles were striking military targets attributed to Iranian forces in Syria! A simple comparison of the economic importance of the U.S. and Iran shows that Europe and Asia are neither willing nor able to stand against the U.S. to defend the Islamic Republic, and particularly the European Union, in addition to the importance of maintaining a major trading partner, is not in a position to provide Tehran with "executive guarantees" to circumvent sanctions due to military and security dependencies on the U.S. In the event of a retaliatory withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, the Islamic Republic would need political and economic support from China and Russia, which it refers to as its "strategic allies," while China has supported North Korea's conciliatory policy towards the U.S. by giving it a green light, and Russia has turned a blind eye to Netanyahu's warm welcome and the Israeli missile attack on Syria, which reports claim was the largest airstrike of its kind since the start of the Syrian civil war. Both China and Russia have endorsed all punitive and reprimanding resolutions passed by the Security Council against Iran from 2006 to 2011, and if the Islamic Republic violates the provisions of Security Council Resolution 2231, which would be triggered by exiting the JCPOA, they are expected to support the reinstatement of previous sanctions. Zarif is going to meet with European countries while he is unable to offer concessions in response to the request for "guarantees to preserve the interests of the Islamic Republic," and the option of "threats" and withdrawal from the agreement will also lead to dissatisfaction from China and Russia. In implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Islamic Republic has reduced its enriched uranium reserves with a concentration of up to 3.5% to less than 300 kilograms, and if it announces its exit from the nuclear agreement to achieve the capacity for a nuclear test (nuclear breakout), it would need more than a year. Another route to achieve nuclear testing capability through the plutonium process is completely blocked by the shutdown of the Arak heavy water reactor. The cessation of oil exports and the shift to a policy of "turning off the taps," which the Islamic Republic promoted or threatened at the beginning of the 2000s, has become a spent card due to increased foreign exchange needs arising from heightened regional commitments and the intensification of the internal economic crisis, and even the market no longer takes it seriously, as it did not react to the U.S. decision to exit the JCPOA, and global oil prices even showed a declining trend afterward. The U.S. utilizes its foreign trade capacity in political arenas as a lever of power and a tool for exerting pressure, while this lever for Iran has become a "Achilles' heel" of the regime and a vulnerable part due to its depletion instead of being a tool of power. The volume of U.S. foreign trade with the European Union in 2017 was nearly $700 billion and with all European countries around $1.2 trillion, while Iran's foreign trade with the European Union (total exports and imports) in 2015 was only about $5 billion, which two years after the lifting of sanctions rose to about $24 billion. The Middle East is on the brink of experiencing a "new order," and the current Iranian government, along with its allies in southern Lebanon (Hezbollah) and the Assad government in Syria, is on the path to establishing this order. In a different atmosphere than that which made the beginning of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the global community possible in 2013, the Iranian government's arsenal for threatening or enticing Europe and the U.S. is now empty, and the outlook for the results of Zarif's negotiations in Brussels is unclear.