Note: The Island of Stability and Security Was Nothing More Than an Illusion

A note by Majid Mohammadi: The terrorist attacks on June 17, 2017, were unprecedented in their nature. For nearly three decades, such large-scale terrorist operations had not occurred in Tehran, the center of the country and the regime. Opponents and critics of the government have avoided resorting to violence over the past three decades, opting for peaceful and civil dissent, which has contributed to public security in the country, an achievement that belongs to the opposition while the government claims credit for it (during Khatami's presidency, even terrorist operations in Sistan and Baluchestan were minimized). However, opponents cannot control the country's foreign policy, its military interventions, or its terrorist actions abroad. What are the meanings and consequences of this event? Will this anticipated event serve as a lesson for the authorities? What does this attack signify? The June 17 attacks undermine three repeatedly asserted claims by the government's propaganda apparatus (and thus refute conspiracy theories attributing them to the regime itself): 1. "Presence in tense areas is aimed at strengthening national security." This operation, which bears all evidence (presented until the end of June 17) of ISIS, shows that the Islamic Republic's provocations and its presence in all tense regional arenas can pose risks to both the Iranian people and the government; the perpetrators of the operation, according to the Iranian National Security Council's deputy secretary, were inspired by ISIS, but their identities have not yet been disclosed; 2. "Security and authority come from the barrel of a gun and missile and through threats, intimidation, and the dispatch of weapons and military forces." Military and security officials, along with clerics close to the leadership, always defend hard power against soft power (diplomacy), labeling diplomacy as appeasement and attributing all of the regime's achievements to its incendiary actions. The June 17 terrorist operation demonstrated that this incendiary approach can boomerang back to the government and society; and 3. "If the Islamic Republic's record has been disastrous in various areas, it has a commendable record in security." After four decades, Islamic Republic officials have only boasted about the country's security in five areas: freedom, justice, efficiency, transparency, and security. In the other four areas, the Islamic Republic has a disastrous record, as acknowledged by former and current officials from different factions. In the area of security, people and opponents are gradually realizing that the Islamic Republic's policies are detrimental to security, and the government actually plays no role in the shaky security that exists. The only aspect of security that can be attributed to the repressive machine is the cemetery-like security. The first victims of such operations will not be the citizens or existing security measures but rather further violations of people's rights. Gatherings of professions and groups of people in front of the parliament have been among the most common and rare gatherings to assert economic demands in the country. This operation will serve as a pretext for the government to restrict such gatherings. Additionally, the leadership and security apparatus will try to further limit discussions about the Islamic Republic's military interventions in regional countries. Collective security The claim of the Islamic Republic's officials has always been that while disrupting the security of their neighbors or regional countries (under the pretext of exporting the revolution and supporting the resistance line), they can maintain a calm and tension-free country. Officials cannot speak of conquering four regional capitals (Sana'a, Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut) while expecting those harmed by these conquests to remain silent and show no reaction. The ownership of all tools of power, including terrorism, is not uncontested. This claim would eventually be violated because a country that has participated in the slaughter of about 500,000 people in Syria for five years cannot remain unaffected by its consequences. Especially at a time when ISIS is being defeated in Mosul and Raqqa, and its forces are fleeing those areas (while the Islamic Republic and its allies are fighting them in both Iraq and Syria), such incidents should be anticipated. An insignificant event? In recent years, the Islamic Republic's officials have taken such pride in the country's security that even after several terrorist operations in Europe, they claimed that European countries' security should be entrusted to them. Thus, the collective effort of political and security officials has been to downplay the significance of the June 17 event. With this approach, the director of the Ministry of Intelligence's anti-terrorism department announced, "This morning, on 17/3/96, several terrorist teams carried out terrorist attacks in Tehran, and the agents of one of them were arrested before any action could be taken." (ISNA, June 17, 2017) This claim cannot be verified by any of the realities of today's operations or reports from citizen-journalists. Previously, security officials had claimed to have arrested individuals affiliated with ISIS, but no information about them has been provided to the public. The Speaker of Parliament downplays this event. (Ali Larijani, ISNA, June 17, 2017) The head of the parliamentary defense committee states, "The terrorists did not carry out any special or extraordinary tactical designs for entry, infiltration, and action today in Tehran." (Tabnak, June 17, 2017) Khamenei expressed this position differently: "These firecracker events that occurred today will have no impact on the will of the people." (June 17, 2017) In what insignificant or firecracker event do 17 people die and dozens are injured, the government suspends routine programs, and hundreds of security and military forces are dispatched to the scene? If among the dead were several officials, would this event have been treated as extraordinary? What difference does it make between the value of a guard's life and a member of parliament's? The terrorist attack on two symbols of the Islamic Republic, namely the Khomeini mausoleum and the parliament, is not insignificant or trivial. The attack was both successful and impactful (we do not discuss its value here), and its political effects will be long-lasting. Military officials initially tried to present the attack as unimportant and did not take many preventive measures (such as evacuating the parliament) against it. The government's propaganda apparatus also remained silent in the face of it. Even the state television's news network behaved as if this event were occurring in one of the capitals of South America. This event, even if it had occurred in Ankara or Dubai, would have received far more attention from the state radio and television. Political consequences Terrorism is carried out with the aim of political impact. Islamist terrorism in the past decade has played a role (even a minor one) in the rise of Trump (considering the avoidance of naming it as Islamic extremism by Democrats) or the UK's exit from the European Union (due to threats stemming from uncontrolled immigration). Shiite Islamist terrorism in Lebanon and Iraq has forced secular opponents into marginalization or emigration. The Islamic Republic's terrorism has also influenced the reactions of some opponents towards it. No one can deny the impact of intimidation and slaughter. The attacks on June 17 in Tehran will have four potential political consequences: 1. Issues related to military intervention in Syria and the war against ISIS (without ISIS having done anything in Iran for the past six years) that have always been swept under the rug will become the center of public attention in Iran. After such events, national pride and solidarity are somewhat stirred, but at the same time, questions about the causes of such events are ignited in people's minds; the government cannot keep the public in the dark about this issue and its consequences with the IRGC's secret budgets or by sending Pakistani and Afghan Shiites; 2. Rouhani's government will be criticized by the losers of the 96 elections for opening up society for a week or two and for the overall policy of de-escalation with the West. Figures like Khamenei and Zarif, who have falsely attributed the establishment of ISIS to the West, will naturally welcome increased tension in Iran's foreign relations with Western countries. However, Khamenei's first reaction indicates that he does not want relations with Arab countries to deteriorate further; and 3. The first victims of such operations will not be the citizens or existing security measures but rather further violations of people's rights. Gatherings of professions and groups of people in front of the parliament have been among the most common and rare gatherings to assert economic demands in the country. This operation will serve as a pretext for the government to restrict such gatherings. Additionally, the leadership and security apparatus will try to further limit discussions about the Islamic Republic's military interventions in regional countries. 4. The Islamic Republic has always portrayed itself as not being inclined towards negotiation and compromise, but if faced with real (and not empty or fictitious and claimed) pressure and force, it has negotiated with any government. In this matter, if political brokers (like some Qatari or Omani officials) see the situation as suitable, perhaps today's event could bring the Islamic Republic's officials, Saudi Arabia, and other powerful regional actors to the negotiating table to reduce tensions. Possibility of learning a lesson Given the experience of the past four decades, the possibility of the Islamic Republic's officials learning a lesson from this event to reconsider their domestic and regional policies seems very unlikely. Downplaying this event is merely a means to avoid policy revision. The benefit of one faction from it against another will also be another obstacle to learning from it (of course, Ahmad Tavakoli's website deleted his tweet blaming Karrubi for criticizing military intervention in Syria after a few hours). In this government policy, which accuses political and security suspects of sexual issues (accusing a woman of sexual relations with all the attackers), no change has occurred.