In the Islamic Revolution of Iran, not a single economic slogan was raised. Neither bread, nor water, nor jobs. The material and social needs of the majority of the Iranian people, especially urban dwellers, were generally met. The Iranian people had never consumed as much as they did in the last ten years of the previous regime. They had never eaten so much meat, chicken, or fish. They had never gone on so many recreational trips and shopping tours to Europe. Foreign investments had never flowed into Iran as much as they did then, and there had never been so many universities and new educational institutions built, nor so many large and small hotels and restaurants. Foreign engineers and workers were not so engaged in the country's ports and large workshops, nor were there so many Filipino maids working in the homes of the urban middle class (especially in expanded Tehran). And finally, there had never been so many wine shops, beer shops, and nightclubs opened, nor so many mosques and husseiniyahs built. So why did the revolution happen? The fact that major revolutions occur during times of relative prosperity is a normal and natural phenomenon. However, any form of relative prosperity does not necessarily lead to revolution. The determining factor is the overall conditions of the affluent society. The French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the Iranian Revolution, all considered major revolutions, occurred at times when the overall situation of these countries was better than the conditions prior to the onset of the revolutionary process. Alexis de Tocqueville, the great French thinker, demonstrated in his valuable book titled "The Old Regime" that the economic, commercial, and social conditions of France during Louis XVI were better than the overall situation before him. In Russia, the revolution occurred after the Tsarist government had undertaken extensive reforms in land, social, and political matters (including the establishment of the Duma) and was moving towards industrialization. Now, in a very general view, it can be said that revolutions in these two countries had four major factors: The first factor is the extortion of the government from the productive classes of rural and urban areas to cover the expenses of the lavish government apparatus and also to finance the king's voluntary wars. The second factor is that the social reforms carried out were not sufficiently accompanied by political reforms. This was either because the ruling political system did not want to accept the political consequences of social reforms or conceded to this from a position of weakness. The lower classes are the foot soldiers of the revolution. They pay the highest costs and reap the least benefits. Revolution requires capability, and it is the empowered that can overthrow the ruling powerful. Revolution requires money, and the lower classes lack it. Now the question is, what motivates the empowered to revolution? The third factor is the empowerment of the urban middle classes and their increased capabilities to resist the ruling apparatus alongside the growing inability of the country's infrastructure (roads, ports, and communication networks) and the inadequacy of administrative capacity (including customs and bureaucracy) to meet the new needs of these classes, needs arising from economic prosperity. The fourth factor is the spread of new ideas and the challenge to the political legitimacy of the ruling system. In France, the ideas of the Enlightenment (such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau) and in Russia, Marxism in its various theoretical manifestations. In my opinion, the last three factors have simultaneously had more impact on the occurrence of revolutions than the first factor. Because in authoritarian regimes, the first factor often exists without leading to revolution. In any case, the impact of these three factors on the Iranian revolution is very clear. Moreover, in Iran, the revolution occurred when the country was not only not engaged in war but was also the undisputed power in the region, and its influence and credibility were increasing globally. Extortion was also absent because the government’s income was more derived from oil and gas than from taxes. In other words, the people were more dependent on the government than the government was on the people. Therefore, it can be said that setting aside the characteristics of each of these societies, the effective role of urban classes is a common thread of these three revolutions. The role of the middle classes is important and effective in that these classes can bring the revolution to fruition, something that the lower classes cannot do. The lower classes are the foot soldiers of the revolution. They pay the highest costs and reap the least benefits. Revolution requires capability, and it is the empowered that can overthrow the ruling powerful. Revolution requires money, and the lower classes lack it. Organizing demonstrations, ensuring communications, conducting strikes, technical preparations, providing the minimum livelihood for the families of prisoners, and many others all require financial support. Now the question is, what motivates the empowered to revolution? Why are they willing to take risks and incur costs? The shortest answer is that when, for any reason, deep incapacities emerge in the ruling empowered, when opponents sense signs of fatigue in the system and see that the ruling power has little vitality left, that is when the attack begins. Suddenly, everyone becomes revolutionary. What seems "sudden" at a moment in time is actually a gradual "sudden". This is what is called the "revolutionary process". The coalition of the market and the clergy. In my past ancillary research on revolutions, especially the revolution in Iran, I have concluded that in the victory of the revolution, the market (commercial bourgeoisie) played the most significant and effective role. To the extent that it can be said that without the effective participation of the market in the revolution, the revolution could not have succeeded. Here, the market is meant in its general sense. That is, a cohesive social stratum; more cohesive than all other strata with extensive nationwide communication networks. With its own specific culture (values, customs, type of language use and word choice, clothing, food, socializing, recreation, and leisure) with an awareness of its own interests and also with a cunning shrewdness in daily work and life. The market is composed of various layers, in an unwritten hierarchical form. Major merchants at the top and shopkeepers, money changers, brokers, vendors, craftsmen, street vendors, and other professions in subsequent ranks. The market is essentially a non-productive stratum whose income is derived from trade and buying and selling. The market, like similar strata everywhere, is inherently conservative. It is dependent on and defends traditional values. In the economic sphere, the market supports the policy of closed doors out of fear of competition with foreign merchants, unless the control of exports and imports is in the hands of its own representatives. If the market feels threatened, it may resort to the extremism of "poujadism" to pressure the levers of power and change the unfavorable situation. In Iran, the clergy is the closest relative of the market. Before the revolution, these two were interdependent. The revolution was essentially the result of this interdependence between merchants and clerics. The market provided the material foundation, and the clergy provided two other important things: the creation of the discourse of revolution and mobilizing the foot soldiers. When Khomeini, upon his arrival at Mehrabad Airport, promised free water and electricity at the Behesht Zahra cemetery, his audience was not the affluent urban classes. He needed martyrs and victims, and with these promises, which soon turned into promises of paradise and houris, he sought to mobilize the impoverished masses, which he did. Merchants and clerics are intertwined with multiple threads (financial, value-based, familial, and historical connections). This intertwining began at least from the mid-19th century when the market emerged as a dynamic stratum and continued thereafter. Together, they achieved significant victories in the "Tobacco Movement", the "Sugar Affair", the "Constitutional Movement", and briefly during the "Nationalization of the Oil Industry". In Iran, the clergy is the closest relative of the market. Before the revolution, these two were interdependent. The revolution was essentially the result of this interdependence between merchants and clerics. The market provided the material foundation, and the clergy provided two other important things: the creation of the discourse of revolution and mobilizing the foot soldiers. In the oil issue, the support of the market-cleric coalition for Mossadegh's government continued as long as Abolqasem Kashani, the "religious leader", was aligned with Mossadegh, and the government, under the pressure of economic blockade, supported domestic products. After the separation of these two, a large part of the market distanced itself from the National Movement, while a small part remained loyal to the National Movement alongside several religious leaders (Seyyed Reza Zanjani, Seyyed Mahmoud Taleghani, Hajj Seyyed Javadi, and a few others). This group also joined the large market-cleric coalition led by Ruhollah Khomeini during the "15 Khordad Uprising" alongside Mehdi Bazargan (son of Hajj Abbasgholi Tabrizi, a famous merchant) and his companions. With the end of the "15 Khordad Uprising" and the Shah's hand being freed to continue reforms, in a climate of repression and political suffocation, the price of oil also increased unprecedentedly due to the initiative and insight of the Shah and Jamshid Amouzgar. Oil revenues revitalized the newly sprouted productive and industrial sectors. Concurrently, the market also flourished. In the major cities of the country, some affluent merchants moved to affluent neighborhoods and their newly built homes. The most popular style of house at that time was the "White House" style! The flourishing of urban classes (other than salaried workers) especially merchants, enabled them to cover the increasing costs of the revolutionary process. During the time Khomeini was in the suburbs of Paris, the national airline and Air France arranged several daily flights between Tehran and Paris. Most of the passengers on these flights were merchants and clerics. No one heard or saw that the industrialists and producers of the country (such as Khosroshahi, Khiyami, Lajevardi, Arjomand, and Rezaei) had given any money to the revolutionaries, let alone having a meeting with Khomeini. This does not mean that factory owners and producers and the service sector were satisfied with the overall situation of the country. Their dissatisfaction was similar to that of French producers and merchants around the time of the French Revolution. They were dissatisfied with the lack of necessary structural infrastructure and the inadequacy and favoritism and sluggishness of administrative apparatuses and the influence and interference of parts of the royal family. However, despite these dissatisfactions, they did not support the revolutionary process. As mentioned, the costs of organizing demonstrations, quickly and widely recording and duplicating Khomeini's tapes and leaflets for thousands of demonstrators, transportation for religious delegations from mosques to demonstrations, and distributing bananas and sandwiches were mainly covered by merchants and groups affiliated with them. In this context, I present another witness. For a university research on the role of the market, I interviewed Mr. Abolhassan Banisadr at his home in the suburbs of Versailles on June 16, 1988, and asked him about the amount of cash Khomeini had during his stay in Paris. He said: "He came with several tens of thousands of French francs and left with several million." Based on the considerations mentioned above, it can be said that the flourishing of merchants on the one hand and the emergence of signs of fatigue in the regime and the mistakes of the Shah on the other hand laid the groundwork for the revolutionary process. In this process, the role of the market was not only effective but decisive. Decisive, in the sense that without the will of the market and without the financial capabilities and communication networks it had, and naturally without its historical intertwining with the clergy, the occurrence of such a revolution seems highly unlikely. A year and a half before the revolution, an article of mine was published in the French magazine "Foreign Policy" that pointed to this very point, titled "If the Market Goes, Everything Goes". In my opinion, the reasons for such an assessment were evident in the evaluation of the position of the forces at that time. Neither the Tudeh Party, nor the People's Mojahedin, nor the Fedai groups, nor other groups, neither alone nor even collectively (unlikely) possessed the characteristics of the market. They neither had that awareness and class cohesion, nor represented a specific class or stratum, nor had roots deep in society, nor had the extensive traditional communication networks and sufficient financial resources. Therefore, it can be said that the most important factor was indeed the intertwining of merchants and clerics with each other. Furthermore, as much as the coalition of the market and the clergy was an inherent and natural coalition, the efforts of other forces to get closer to the clerics appeared artificial and false and, naturally, very fragile. To the extent that the more these groups tried to cling to the so-called "bourgeoisie/market" and "reaction/clergy", the more they tightened the noose around their own necks. The rise and fall of the market in the Islamic Republic. In this writing, there is no opportunity to examine the fourth factor in relation to the theoretical aspects of the revolution in Iran. I have discussed this issue in my recent book titled "Islamism: The New Totalitarianism". Alongside the decline of the market's influence and greatly due to the "blessing" of war, the replacement force of the market gradually emerged: the "Revolutionary Guards". The emergence of this new armed force freed the regime from reliance on the market and formed a new coalition: the coalition of the clergy and the guards! In writing this article, my intention was to briefly analyze only a part of the structural aspects of the factors that gave rise to the revolution and to avoid political issues and the role of individuals, which are very important in their own right. This approach to issues may help better understand the objective conditions of Iranian society at present and its future. Now, I summarize some of the results obtained below: One - The revolution occurred under conditions of relative prosperity. Poverty was not the main cause of the revolution. Everyone knows that the revolution followed the Shah's extensive social reforms. Political reforms were declared from a position of weakness and did not come to fruition. Two - At that time, the merchants and the clergy...
Note: The Role of the Market in the Islamic Revolution of Iran
The article discusses the role of the market and the clergy in the Iranian Revolution, emphasizing that the revolution occurred during a time of relative prosperity rather than poverty. It argues that the intertwined interests of the market and the clergy were crucial for the revolution's success.
👥 Key Players
📰 What Happened
The article analyzes the Iranian Revolution, highlighting that it occurred during a time of relative prosperity, driven by the collaboration between the market and the clergy. It argues that the revolution was not solely a response to economic hardship but rather a complex interplay of social and political factors.
- The revolution took place when Iran was experiencing significant economic growth and foreign investment.
- The market and clergy formed a crucial alliance that facilitated the revolution's success.
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a pivotal moment in history, leading to the establishment of an Islamic Republic. It was characterized by the collaboration of various social classes, particularly the clergy and the commercial bourgeoisie.
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