Note: Two Consequences of the 'Terrorist' Attacks in Tehran

A note by Morteza Kazemian -- The terrorist attacks last Wednesday in Tehran represent the first serious shock to Iran since the rise of ISIS in the region. These attacks have called into question the government's illusion and claim of security based on military-security presence in Syria. This significant event was not entirely unexpected. In a region where insecurity has reached a strange depth and violence and terror are increasingly being reproduced, the continuation of security within Iran seemed inconsistent with regional conditions; especially since the Islamic Republic has become a party to the prolonged crisis and conflict in Syria and is engaged in an indirect conflict with Saudi Arabia. The terrorist operations in Tehran can be evaluated from various angles; below are two possible consequences of the recent event. 1. The risk of escalating insecurity and instability in the region In a region where the competition and conflict of visible and hidden actors and regional powers have intensified, the occurrence of terrorist operations in Iran is no longer an event limited to the borders of one country. In the context of recent events, it is unlikely that anyone in the Islamic Republic would not place Riyadh among the primary suspects. Just a few days ago, the leader of the Islamic Republic explicitly described the rulers of Saudi Arabia as 'worthless', 'incompetent', 'lowly', 'foolish', and like a 'milking cow'; sharp criticisms that were a reaction to the meeting between Trump and King Salman, and the signing of a heavy arms deal between the US and Saudi Arabia. On another level, last May, the Saudi Minister of Defense stated that Riyadh would not wait for the war to reach inside Saudi Arabia and would seek to bring the battle to Iran. This statement was met with a strong reaction from the Islamic Republic, including the Iranian Minister of Defense emphasizing that if Riyadh pursues such behavior, the Islamic Republic would 'leave no place safe except Mecca and Medina.' In this context, and as the rift and animosity between Saudi Arabia and Qatar have intensified, with Iran appearing as a potential means to alleviate pressures on Qatar, the terrorist attacks in Tehran have occurred. These attacks notably took place on the same day that the Saudi Foreign Minister tweeted: 'Iran must be punished for its interference and support for terrorism in the region.' It is not far-fetched to suggest that the security officials in the IRGC and hardliners in intelligence and judicial institutions may use recent events as a new pretext for tightening measures against civil activists, political actors, and media. After Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain, which are the main arenas of indirect and hidden conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it now seems that the trend of security developments in the region -- and specifically the conflict between Tehran and Riyadh -- has taken a more dangerous direction. The IRGC's statement regarding the terrorist attacks adds to concerns about escalating crises in the region. The statement noted that the 'terrorist act occurred one week after a joint meeting between the US President and the leaders of one of the reactionary states in the region that has continuously supported Takfiri terrorists,' calling it 'very meaningful' and adding that: 'the responsibility taken by ISIS indicates their involvement in this heinous act.' It remains to be seen how much the pragmatic and interaction-seeking approaches of Rouhani in international relations can control the adventurous and dialogue-averse methods of the security officials in the IRGC at the core of power in the Islamic Republic, where the major policies of the system are designed and finalized. On a level distinct from Tehran-Riyadh relations, Rouhani's victory in the recent elections and the continuation of his government for another four years had created hope for a gradual change in the quality of Iran's presence in Syria. However, the recent terrorist attacks have also nullified this faint possibility and dim hope for the time being. Justifications for Iran's military-security presence in Syria will increasingly be emphasized, especially since the leader of the Islamic Republic reiterated this point in his first response. 2. A pretext for restricting and threatening civil society The recent terrorist attacks in Tehran can also be problematic in another area: the increase in political closure and the imposition of restrictions against the pillars of civil society in Iran. It is highly likely that the possibility of holding protest gatherings and demand-oriented rallies in the short-term -- and perhaps medium-term -- will diminish and become more restricted under the pretext of specific security conditions. As a witness to the new situation, the issue of 'women's presence in sports stadiums,' which had been raised in the context of the new round of the World Volleyball League in Iran, has effectively been sidelined. On another level, the possibility of critiquing the consequences of Iran's military-security intervention in Syria will become increasingly difficult. This will primarily affect the media and will force journalists into more stringent self-censorship in this area. In other words, based on the political-security record of the far-right, it can be inferred that the totalitarian faction will not hesitate to take advantage of the recent terrorist events within the country. Authoritarian figures entrenched in security, judicial, and military institutions, who experienced a bitter defeat after Rouhani's victory in the recent elections, now have a suitable pretext to maneuver in society and push back Rouhani's slogans -- particularly in the areas of political and cultural development. The strengthening and intensification of the military-security atmosphere within the country, coinciding with the beating of the drums of conflict and hostility outside of Iran, will mean more restrictions against civil society. The question of how much the moderate government can contain the authoritarian figures in such a context is important. In his campaign speeches during the last elections, Rouhani emphasized the deepening of relations between the nation and the government and increasing social participation, stating the importance of these issues for national security. Will Rouhani resist the military-security demands of the Islamic Republic for increased spending in the militaristic domain and the expansion of militaristic approaches in the new conditions? In other words, will he be able to safeguard the requirements for human and sustainable development against the militarism desired by the far-right? It seems that to the extent that Rouhani's government can maintain a larger active supportive social force alongside itself, and bring more moderate, realistic, and pragmatic conservatives with it, the greater the possibility for pursuing its programs both inside and outside Iran. These considerations are independent of Rouhani's necessity to continue dialogue and deepen interaction with the supreme leader -- to reduce his obstacles.