Note: Why Did Mortazavi Go Into Hiding?

Saeed Mortazavi, who for years was the top figure in the judiciary in managing political cases within the framework desired by the Islamic Republic, is now serving a two-year prison sentence in Evin Prison. The handling of the charges against Saeed Mortazavi is undoubtedly one of the most unconventional and lengthy judicial cases in contemporary Iranian history, which after an eight-year tug-of-war ultimately led to his two-year prison sentence and permanent removal from judicial positions. He was accused of three charges: 'aiding in the murder in the case of the victims of Kahrizak detention center', 'continuing to preside over the Social Security Organization after the illegal ruling of this appointment by the Administrative Justice Court', and 'investigation and inquiry in the Social Security Organization'. In the first case, after the insistence of Abdolhossein Rouholamini, affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, whose son was among the victims of the Kahrizak detention center during the 2009 election protests, he was initially sentenced to five years in prison, which was reduced to two years in a retrial. He was acquitted in the case of the presidency of the Social Security Organization, and the third case, according to Mohseni Ejei, the spokesman for the judiciary, is still under investigation and has not yet resulted in a ruling. The manner of handling and the events that occurred in this lengthy case clearly demonstrate the violation of legal principles and fair trial procedures. It is not incorrect to say that Mortazavi's name is intertwined with injustice, the dependency of the judiciary on the will of the Supreme Leader's institution and its security apparatus, and the neutrality of this institution in judicial prosecutions and grievances. In fact, if one of the Kahrizak victims had not been the child of a regime-affiliated force, it is unlikely that Mortazavi would have ended up in prison. As the past behavior of the Islamic Republic shows, the actors of repression and authoritarian actions have a limited lifespan and become homebound within the regime, and in some cases, like Saeed Emami, the interests of the regime lead to a fatal outcome for them. It is sufficient to pay attention to the tumultuous trajectory of individuals such as Sadegh Khalkhali, Assadollah Lajevardi, Hassan Dehghan, known as Judge Haddad, Mohammad Reyshahri, Ali Fallahian, Hossein Ali Niri, Ali Razini, Abbasali Alizadeh, and others. Of course, there are exceptions like Ebrahim Raisi and Mohseni Ejei who have been active throughout all phases of repression. Mortazavi's prison sentence was finalized in Azar 1396 (December 2017), and while public opinion awaited the execution of the sentence, this did not happen in 1396. However, in Esfand 1396 (March 2018), whispers about the issuance of the order for the execution of his sentence were published, but he denied this news in an interview with 'Etemad Online', stating that he was resting at home and had requested a retrial. According to Mortazavi, at that time, the execution order had not been sent to him or his guarantor. In 1397 (2018), during a Q&A session with Mohseni Ejei at Ferdowsi University in Mashhad, it became clear that the prison sentence had been executed, but the judiciary agents had not been able to find him! After this point, public and media pressure to find Mortazavi and prevent his escape significantly increased until finally, on 2 Ordibehesht (April 21) after five months from the finalization of his two-year prison sentence, he was sent to Evin Prison to serve his sentence. Judicial agents found him in a house in 'Sorkhroud Mazandaran' while he was hiding. An eyewitness claims that he did not open the door of the rented house and ultimately, after being threatened by the agents, opened the door and resisted by tearing the execution order, and finally, due to the ensuing confrontation, the agents took him out of the house in handcuffs. The witness heard that Mortazavi wanted to contact someone, which the agents refused. This incident strengthens the hypothesis that Mortazavi's plan was to hide temporarily to buy time and resolve the prison issue through the Supreme Court or a pardon from the leader. Mortazavi had no opportunity to escape the country and live abroad; the environment outside Iran was unsafe and had significant risks for him. It can be speculated that he hoped to obtain the necessary agreement for the non-execution or annulment of his sentence through his connections in the power bloc. However, the question of why this did not happen is an important one that requires examining the course of Mortazavi's position in the regime. Mortazavi was at the forefront of judicial repression and the deprivation of the rights of many journalists, student activists, labor activists, human rights defenders, freedom-seeking lawyers, intellectuals, writers, university professors, and critical political activists and opposition figures in the 1990s and 2000s. During this period, which coincided with the presidencies of Sheikh Mohammad Yazdi and Seyyed Mahmoud Shahroudi in the judiciary, he had a powerful position, supported by the leadership's office, to threaten and exert pressure on independent and critical political and civil forces and was a key player in managing the political space and public sphere. However, in the late 2000s, the tide turned. Initially, some hardline conservatives close to the Revolutionary Guards, such as Alireza Zakani, Farhad Tajari, and Elias Naderan, clashed with him. The investigative committee of the seventh parliament in 1387 (2008) accused Mortazavi of selling exam questions and called for action against him. 208 representatives of the seventh parliament also wrote a letter to Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the head of the judiciary, demanding the formation of a competent, impartial, and public court to address the charges against Saeed Mortazavi, the Tehran prosecutor. Prior to that, there was already sensitivity among some regime-affiliated forces in the judiciary regarding his rise to high positions in the regime. The Kahrizak tragedy marked the decline of Mortazavi. The high costs of the crime led Ayatollah Khamenei to condemn it and call for action against the offenders. With the arrival of Sadegh Larijani as head of the judiciary, Mortazavi was dismissed from the Tehran prosecutor's office and was demoted to the deputy prosecutor general (Mohseni Ejei). However, in the winter of 1388 (2009), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appointed him as the head of the Central Headquarters for Combating Smuggling of Goods and Currency. This appointment faced widespread protests from the representatives of the eighth parliament. From this point on, Mortazavi joined Ahmadinejad's faction. Ali Akbar Heydari Far, the prosecutor accused of issuing orders for political detainees to Kahrizak detention center, claims that Ahmadinejad intended to select Mortazavi as Minister of Justice in the tenth government, but was dissuaded due to the opposition of Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. However, with the formation of the Kahrizak detention center trial, Mortazavi's judicial immunity was lifted in 1389 (2010), and in 1393 (2014) he was permanently banned from judicial positions and for five years from public service by court ruling. Mortazavi's selection for the presidency of the Social Security Organization and his claims regarding the bribery proposal from Fazel Larijani created another scandal and increased tensions within the power bloc. This incident also made the judiciary more serious in punishing and penalizing him. However, his influence and possibly the concern of exposing unspeakable secrets led to him ultimately receiving a light sentence. However, his refusal to resign despite the promise he made to Gholamali Haddad Adel, considering his closeness to the leader and being part of Ahmadinejad's faction against the parliament and the judiciary, led to forces in the dominant power sector finding a serious will to confront and eliminate him. The confrontation between the Revolutionary Guards and Mortazavi escalated to the point where the newspaper Javan, the organ of this institution, mentioned Mortazavi's widespread violations of citizens' rights! While Mortazavi provided the judicial cover and framework to facilitate illegal and inhumane actions by security forces, including the Revolutionary Guards, against political and ideological detainees. Overall, as the past behavior of the Islamic Republic shows, the actors of repression and authoritarian actions have a limited lifespan and become homebound within the regime, and in some cases, like Saeed Emami, the interests of the regime lead to a fatal outcome for them. It is sufficient to pay attention to the tumultuous trajectory of individuals such as Sadegh Khalkhali, Assadollah Lajevardi, Hassan Dehghan, known as Judge Haddad, Mohammad Reyshahri, Ali Fallahian, Hossein Ali Niri, Ali Razini, Abbasali Alizadeh, and others. Of course, there are exceptions like Ebrahim Raisi and Mohseni Ejei who have been active throughout all phases of repression. Now it seems that Mortazavi has also reached the end of the line, but he has received the privilege of serving a light punishment and not paying a heavy price. His two-year imprisonment may also be reduced to less than a year with parole and possibly a pardon. Thus, the disproportion between the outcome of his eight-year judicial case and the serious charges and this individual's role in the violation of the rights of countless individuals in society becomes more prominent, and the institutional and chronic injustice of the judiciary of the Islamic Republic becomes clearer to public opinion.